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The selection of papers from the 6th Annual International Conference on Pragmatics and Language Learning (Urbana, Illinois, April 1992) include: "Discourse Markers Across Language" (Bruce Fraser); "Conjunction and Causality: Pragmatics and the Lexicon" (Yael Ziv); "Situated Discourse: The Sociocultural Context of Conversation in a Second Language" (David P. Shea); "Transferability of L1 Indirect Strategies to L2 Contexts" (Satomi Takahashi); "A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Requestive Speech Act Realization Patterns in Persian and American English" (Zohreh Eslamirasekh); "Closing Kiswahili Conversations: The Performance of Native and Non-Native Speakers" (Alwiya S. Omar); "The Use of Lexical Certainty Modifiers by Non-Native (Finnish) and Native Speakers of English" (Tarja Nikula); "Refining the DCT: Comparing Open Questionnaires and Dialogue Completion Tasks" (Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig, Beverly S. Hartford); "Assessing L2 Sociolinguistic Competence: In Search of Support from Pragmatic Theories" (Robin D. Zuskin); "Exchange Structure in the ESL Classroom: Q-A-C- and Q-CQ-A-C Sequences in Small Group Interaction" (Jane Nicholls); "Discourse Organization and Power: Towards a Pragmatics of Sales Negotiations" (Mirjaliisa Lampi); and "What Do You Include in a Narrative? A Comparison of the Written Narratives of Mexican and American Fourth and Ninth Graders" (Erica McClure, Montserrat Mir, Teresa Cadierno). (MSE)

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Monograph Series

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Pragmatics and Language Learning consists of papers selected each year from those presented at the annual conference sponsored by the Division of English as an International Language and the Intensive English Institute at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The general theme of this conference each year is on the interaction of pragmatics (including discourse analysis and conversation analysis) with the teaching and/or learning of a second or foreign language (especially English) in either formal or informal surroundings. Individual papers may be focused on any of the following or related topics.

1. the contribution of pragmatics to our understanding of what we mean by communicative competence
2. research into specific facets of English discourse
3. contrastive pragmatics
4. analysis of the discourse patterns found in the language classroom

The purpose of both the conference and this monograph series is to serve as a forum for research into the pragmatics of the language learning process and to encourage the interaction of scholars involved in pragmatics and in language pedagogy in a common effort to increase the level of communicative competence achieved in the language classroom.

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Editors
Lawrence F. Bouton and Yamuna Kachru



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PREFACE

The papers in this volume are selected from among those presented at the 6th Annual International Conference on Pragmatics and Language Learning sponsored by the Division of English as an International Language of the University of Illinois (Urbana Campus) in April, 1992.

As with all volumes of this sort, it could not have been published without the help of innumerable people, and we would like to take this opportunity to thank them. First, our gratitude goes out to all of those who graciously acted as referees and aided in the difficult process of selecting the papers to be included in this volume from among the many submitted: John Algeo, Lyle Bachman, Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig, T. K. Bhatia, J R. Cowan, Fred Davidson, Bruce Fraser, Georgia Green, Laura Hahn, Beverly Hartford, Mei-chen Huang, Donna Johnson, Braj B. Kachru, James Lee, Numa Markee, Erica McClure, Montserrat Mir, Cecil Nelson, Mina Sridhar, Margaret Steffensen, James Yoon. The assistance that these scholars provided through their knowledgeable evaluation of the papers they read and their constructive comments have contributed significantly to the quality of this volume.

We also owe a great deal to the staff of the Division of English as an International Language, especially to Cindy Meyer Giertz for the creative and efficient management of the inner workings of the Conference itself and to Barbara Buckley, on whose shoulders fell much of the work involved in preparing the manuscripts for publication. Without these two individuals, neither the conference nor this volume would have become a reality.

Finally, we would like to thank the conference committee of the Division - Eyamba Bokamba, Tom Gould, Braj Kachru, and Cindy Meyer-Giertz - for their sound advice and moral support when it was needed; to the Division faculty for their interest in the and active support of the conference each year; College of Liberal Arts and Sciences for their continued willingness to assist with the funding of the conference even in these stringent times. It is the support of these people and of the participants who come to share their ideas concerning pragmatics and its interaction with different facets of language learning that has made the conference what it has become over the past six years.

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

CONTENTS

i *Introduction*

1 Discourse Markers Across Language, *Bruce Fraser*

17 Conjunction and Causality: Pragmatics and the Lexicon, *Yael Ziv*

28 Situated Discourse: The Sociocultural Context of Conversation in a Second Language, *David P. Shea*

50 Transferability of L1 Indirect Strategies to L2 Contexts, *Satomi Takahashi*

85 A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Requestive Speech Act Realization Patterns in Persian and American English, *Zohreh Eslamirasekh*

104 Closing Kiswahili Conversations: The Performance of Native and Non-native Speakers, *Alwiya S. Omar*

126 The Use of Lexical Certainty Modifiers By Non-Native (Finish) and Native Speakers of English, *Tarja Nikula*

143 Refining The DCT: Comparing Open Questionnaires and Dialogue Completion Tasks, *Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig and Beverly S. Hartford*

166 Assessing L2 Sociolinguistic Competence: In Search of Support from Pragmatic Theories, *Robin D. Zuskin*

183 Exchange Structure in the ESL Classroom: Q-A-C and Q-CQ-A-C Sequences in Small Group Interaction, *Jane Nicholls*

195 Discourse Organization and Power: Towards a Pragmatics of Sales Negotiations, *Mirjaliisa Lampi*

209 What Do You Include In A Narrative? A Comparison Of The Written Narratives Of Mexican And American Fourth And Ninth Graders, *Erica McClure, Montserrat Mir and Teresa Cadierno*

INTRODUCTION

The papers in this volume have been selected from among those presented at the 6th Annual International Conference on Pragmatics and Language Learning held at University of Illinois.

The first paper, **"Discourse Markers" by Bruce Fraser** has a two-fold purpose: "to present an overview of discourse markers to show both what they are and what they are not...and to explore the challenge of how we might go about examining the extent to which they function similarly across languages." Discourse markers are what Fraser calls *commentary markers*: "each signals an entire message - both force and content - which is separate from the basic message and which provides a comment on the basic message." Fraser begins by illustrating what he means by *discourse marker* and by providing us with four definitive characteristics: 1) like all commentary markers, he says, they are detachable, though their loss removes "a powerful clue about what commitment the speaker makes regarding the relationship between the basic message...and the prior discourse"; 2) discourse markers cannot be conceived of simply as "their correlative lexical counterparts being used pragmatically (whatever that might mean"; 3) because "a discourse marker not only signals a commentary message but, at the same time, signals the scope of this message," they can sometimes occur at various points in the sentence structure; and 4) each discourse marker has a core meaning, part of which is to indicate the sequential relationship between the current basic message and its prior context and part is to mark the point at which the scope of the commentary message begins. Having set out for us what discourse markers are, Fraser then argues against including such elements as interjections, vocatives, pause markers, or other specific items as *because* or *y'know* when used in sentences like *John must be at home, because his car is there* or *y'know, I really like eating raw pickles*.

Having clarified what he means by *discourse marker*, Fraser notes and illustrates that there are three types, each of which can be identified in terms of its function: discourse topic markers, discourse activity markers, and message relationship markers. Finally, Fraser suggests that from language to language, discourse markers "may be as ubiquitous as nouns and verbs"; if this were not true, he argues, what would provide the "discourse glue" in those language from which they are missing. And he ends with a challenge to linguists from different language backgrounds to determine whether these markers exist within their own specific language and, if so, what they are and how they function. Such work, he says, is

necessary "if we are to make progress in understanding how languages compare in pragmatic areas and, more practically, if we are to inform language teaching materials with accurate information about the use of discourse markers in the new language.

Ziv's "Conjunction and Causality: Pragmatics and the Lexicon" complements Fraser's in a sense. It focuses on the process by which inferences indicated by Gricean maxims are drawn, especially the inference that one element is the cause of or temporally related to another. It is necessary, she argues, to hypothesize some basic reasoning primitives, among which might be *causality* and *temporality*. The interaction between such reasoning primitives and Gricean-like maxims, she says, would permit us "to account in a non-ad-hoc way for a variety of instances involving implicit causal relations across languages." It would provide a basis for explaining how we draw inferences of causality from texts in which there are few if any clues, explicit or implicit, suggesting such inferences. And, she suggests, it would have the added benefit of linking a participants perception of causality in language based interactions with comparable perceptions in contexts in which language plays no role. What's more, she says, if we recognize causality and similar relationships on the basis of cognitive primitives, then the ability to draw inferences concerning those relationships should be something that second language pedagogy need not concern itself with to any significant extent.

With his **"Situated Discourse: The Sociocultural Context of Conversation in a Second Language," Shea** considers another piece of puzzle of human interaction. His data is drawn from the transcribed record of a dinner involving two American's and two Japanese and his interest is focused on the interplay between the cultural background of each of the participants and their perceptions of the immediate context, including the interpersonal relationships existing between specific participants and the culture within which the dinner is being held. Furthermore, Shea argues, the factors controlling an interaction are not status, growing out of "a cultural model...or intuitive conversational style," but rather from a dynamic "pragmatic frame of reference which is made salient by motivated actors in a local context of interaction." The primary concern of those interested in cross-cultural interaction, he goes on, should not be a description of how various participants behave when

interacting in their native cultural settings with participants from that culture, "but rather what happens when individual speakers from different cultural backgrounds interact and negotiate a shared intersubjectivity."

Takahashi's "Transferability of L1 Indirect Request Strategies to L2 Contexts" is a continuation of her ongoing study of indirect requests in Japan and America. This time, as her title indicates, she has turned her attention to the question of whether specific indirect strategies by which Japanese can make requests are transferable and transferred to comparable situations in an English speaking environment. She first provides us with a thorough concise discussion of studies in this area of interest done so far; she then describes her present project. Her subjects are 37 female Japanese English language learners who were divided into high and low proficiency groups. These subjects were asked to evaluate the appropriateness of certain indirect request strategies to four different situations - first in Japanese, then in English. Her findings indicate that different types of strategies that are transferable and transferred in one context may not be in another. Further, she says, since such factors as gender, status, and familiarity were controlled, it is difficult to determine which of the other myriad factors in the various situations made a strategy transferable in one context but not in another. At least one strong candidate that, she notes, was not brought into focus in this study is the degree of imposition associated with a particular request. But, one things that Takahashi establishes beyond question is the fact that transferability of L1 behavior is, as is so true with other aspects of linguistic behavior, situation specific.

Eslamirasekh's "A Cross-cultural Comparison of the Requestive Speech Act Realization Patterns in Persian and American English" investigates the relative directness of Persians and Americans as they make requests in their own languages. She found that Persian speakers overwhelmingly and consistently use imperative forms, while Americans tend not to. However, this structural directness is offset, to at least some extent, by the equal tendency of the Persians to use many more alerters, supportive moves, and internal modifiers. Perhaps, she says, this is a way for them to compensate for the structural directness inherent in the imperative. Because of this difference in the way the two groups express and soften their requests under normal circumstances, it is important, says

Eslamirasekh, for those learning either language to learn to interpret the social (interactional) implications of the various modes of expression as well as their lit eral meanings.

Omar's interest in her **"Closing the Conversation in Kiswahili: The Performance of Native and Non-native Speakers,"** is in comparing conversation closings in Kiswahili and American English and in studying the skill with which American nonnative speakers of Kiswahili perform closings. She found that the fact that conversation closings are morelike those of English than are conversation openings seems to make them easier for Americans. As one might expect, she also found that the relative proficiency of the various nonnative speakers in Kiswahili had an effect on their ability to use appropriate structures in closing a conversation, but she also found that having interacted with others outside the classroom in a Kiswahili speaking environment did not. And finally, Omar notes and discusses the fact that mistakes made by the nonnative speakers in performing greetings in Kiswahili are often perceived as rude by native speakers, while those made in closing conversations do not seem to be.

The last paper that concerns itself with a comparison of pragmatic factors across cultures is **Nikula's** study of **"The Use of Lexical Certainty Modifiers by Non-native (Finnish) and Native Speakers of English."** By *lexical certainty modifiers*, Nikula is referring to "expressions with either a mitigating or an emphasizing function, for example *I suppose, sort of, obviously*, and *very*." She notes that these modifiers can be important interpersonally and that the failure to use them correctly can lead native speakers to perceive the violator as rude. Yet, she says, "even fluent foreign language speakers may fail to use modifiers where it would be appropriate."

Nikula's data came from the transcriptions of informal conversations between acquaintances, both Finnish and British, with the Finns being highly proficient in terms of the structure and vocabulary of English. The conclusion: the Finns were largely unaware of the importance of certainty modifiers to the phatic impact of their conversation and were unable to use them effectively. Overall, they seemed cold and distant, more matter of fact and less involved with the topic or with their interlocutors. And Nikula then closes her paper with some pedagogical implications of her findings.

With **Bardovi-Harlig** and **Hartford's "Refining the DCT: Comparing Open Questionnaires and Dialogue Completion Tasks,"** we turn from the study of pragmatic facets of specific cultures to a controlled comparison of two versions of the DCT - a device widely used for the elicitation of data in such studies. Both versions of the DCT begin with the description of a situation to which the subject is to react. What distinguishes these two versions is the presence in one of an utterance to which the subject is to respond. This utterance immediately follows the situation. What the researchers were interested in was 1) whether the hypothetical utterances affected the responses of the subjects when compared with their responses to the questionnaire containing only the situations themselves; 2) whether the differences themselves between the responses of the NS and NNS subjects would be affected by the differences in the elicitation devices. Having introduced us to their project in this way, the authors present us with a thorough, highly detailed analysis of the results they obtained. Their conclusions: 1) the format of the device affected the NNS more than it did the NS, with the performance of the former approximating that of the latter more closely when the utterance followed the description of the situation; 2) the impact of the utterance in question is apparently of more value when the speech act being investigated is one involving a response to someone else.

Zuskin, "Assessing L2 Sociolinguistic Competence: In Search of Support from Pragmatic Theories," provides us with a more global approach to the problem of assessing a language learner's communicative competence. She starts with the basic theories that underlie both pedagogical development and testing of that competence, and suggests that even though those theories may be of value to language teaching, they are not an appropriate base from which to set up assessment procedures. What needs to be done, she argues is to define what we are trying to teach and test more precisely and from a more appropriate theoretical base.

Of particular interest to reader's of this volume is Zuskin's treatment of the DCT, in which she touches on things dealt with more lightly both by Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford and by Takahashi. Of relevance to the former, Zuskin suggests that the formulation of a genuinely appropriate comment in response to a situation , as is required by the DCT, would require a much more informative and more carefully worked out description of that situation. "The latest studies on roleplay effectiveness as an evaluation too indicate that communicative performance is highly

situation specific, so that the context of each scenario can actually affect examinees' speech act strategies (Cohen & Olshtain)" - a finding echoed by Takahashi in her discussion of her study of requests by Japanese English language learners.

In the final analysis, Zuskin offers a twofold rationale for revising the theoretical model underlying communicative testing: "first, we absolutely need to establish construct validity to justify psycholinguistic measurement instruments; second, we need to collectively work toward understanding human communication so that refinement of linguistic theories can follow. In so doing," she goes on, "we need to recycle some good ideas, throw out those lacking support and reorganize for effectiveness of explanation."

The next paper in this volume, **Nicholls' "Exchange Structure in the EIL Classroom: Q-A-C and Q-CQ-A-C Sequences in Small Group Interaction,"** provides us with transcribed data from ESL classes that illustrates both the standard classroom pattern Q-A-C mentioned by McHoul and a deviation from it that Nicholls call a Q-CQ-A-C (Question/ Counter-Question/Answer/Comment). This latter sequence, she notes, results when a student's question threatens the more traditional Q-A-C sequence, in which the teacher is the sole arbiter of who talks in the classroom, when, and about what. From her data, Nicholls is able to show that the function of the Q-CQ-A-C sequence is to provide the teacher with an opportunity to regain control of the classroom interaction. Of course, she says, teachers do not always respond to student questions in this way. To illustrate this she also provides us with a rather untraditional, free wheeling classroom discussion in which the speaker selection rules at work seem to be much like that of normal conversation and suggests that interactions such as that are what teachers using the Q-CQ-A-C may be trying to avoid. As Nicholls' says, in classroom interaction patterns such as this last one, "the issue of power and status is far more subtle, particularly in so far as the student is able to control topic, traditionally the sole domain of the teacher." And as different styles of classroom interaction evolve, more studies like this one will be necessary to describe the modified rules by which the new classroom game is played.

Lampi also deals with institutional discourse in her **"Discourse organization and Power:** Towards a Pragmatics of Sales Negotiations." Using samples of authentic discourse, she focuses on the power differential inherent in the business negotiating because of the roles and purposes of the participants - and on the conversational strategies each uses to control the topics taken up and discarded. Given the buyer's ability to accept or reject what the seller offers, he or she has the greater power and can make the seller talk or not talk and about whatever topic he or she chooses at any given moment. The seller's power, on the other hand, lies in the ability to exercise great care in the strategies used and the actual words used. Though the buyer can be fairly direct in attempting to open or close topics, the seller must be indirect. And ultimately, Lampi demonstrates, the success of either party in the particular interaction - and in their ongoing business relationship - depends on the skill with which each exercises the power and the strategies available to them.

But, says Lampi, the nature of the specific pragmatics of these interactions is elusive for participants involved in cross-cultural negotiations of this sort. Finns with whom she has talked who have taken part in business negotiations with native English speakers feel that "their own pragmatic intentions may not be fully appreciate, that their carefully planned negotiation strategy falls flat in its actual implementation." Basically, she argues, the problem is a linguistic one. Business executives perceive their relative power accurately, but they do not know how to enhance that power through tactics appropriate to the situation in English. But this problem can be remedied, she argues and she goes on to suggest how she believes this can be done.

Finally, we come to **"What Do You Include in a Narrative? A Comparison of the Written Narratives of Mexican and American Fourth and Ninth Graders"** by **McClure, Mir** and **Cadierno**. This is a study of the types of information included in the English narratives written by monolingual American and monolingual and bilingual Mexican school children. The narratives on which this study is based were elicited with a short silent film telling a fable involving a naughty owlet and the troubles he got himself into. Subjects were from the 4th and the 9th grade levels and all came from excellent, well equipped schools. Three questions provided the focus for this particular study. 1) Do Mexican and American monolingual students include different information in their narratives? 2) Does grade (and age) influence the types of information

students include? And 3) Does a student's bilingualism affect this choice and, if so, does that effect take the form of transfer from one language to the other? - of a developmental lag?

The answers to these question grow out of a subtle and detailed analysis of a myriad facets of the data. For instance, with regard to the story structure, the two groups of monolingual children differed very little, but the amount of detail and the variety of the vocabulary used to present those details was much greater in the writing of the monolingual Spanish speaking children. Bilinguals, on the other hand, included fewer setting and action details than did either monolingual group? These and other results, together with an analysis of their possible causes and their implications, make this paper an interesting way to end this volume.

Pragmatics and Language Learning
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Discourse Markers Across Language

Bruce Fraser
Boston University

Introduction

When I talk about discourse markers I am referring to objects such as the underlined lexical items in the following examples:

(1) a) A: I like him. B: So, you think you'll ask him out then.
b) John can't go. And Mary can't go either.
c) A: Did you like it? B: Well, not really.
d) But when do you think he will really get here?
e) I think it will fly. Anyway, let's give it a chance.
f) Now, where were we?

Mentioned by Levinson (1983) only briefly, the first serious examination of this area of linguistics was carried out by Schiffrin (1987). Based upon her analysis of *and, because, but, I mean, now, oh, or, so, then, well,* and *y'know* as they occurred in unstructured interview conversations, she proposed that these markers typically serve three functions: i) they work as contextual coordinates for utterances by locating them on one or more planes of discourse; ii) they index adjacent utterances to the speaker, the hearer, or both; iii) they index the utterance to prior and/or subsequent discourse. She sees discourse markers as serving an integrative function in discourse, contributing to discourse coherence: they serve as a kind of *discourse glue.*

At about the same time, and apparently unaware of Schiffrin, Blakemore (1987) discussed the discourse markers *and, after all, you see, but, moreover, furthermore* and *so* under the label of "discourse connectives." Working from within the relevance framework proposed by Sperber & Wilson (1986), she proposed that these expressions are used to indicate how the relevance of one discourse segment is dependent on another: they are expressions which "impose constraints on relevance in virtue of the inferential connections they express." (141).

In Fraser (1990) I proposed an analysis of discourse markers as part of a grammar of the language, albeit as members of a pragmatic, not a syntactic, category. In my analysis, which drew on Schiffrin's work as well as analysis of other discourse, discourse markers are more narrowly defined than by Schiffrin.

Each marker has certain privileges of occurrence, and each has a core meaning signaling how the speaker intends the role of the utterance of which it is a part to relate to the prior discourse. Relationships signalled by discourse markers include a speaker intent to change the topic (e.g., *parenthetically, incidently*), to show a parallelism between the present message and part of the foregoing discourse (e.g., *and, similarly*), to reorient the hearer away from the present focus (e.g., *y'see, anyway*), to foretell a dissonance between the present message and some information in the foregoing discourse (e.g., *it could be, but, well*), and to claim a consequential relationship between the present message and the prior context (e.g., *thus, so*).

My purpose in the present paper is twofold. Primarily, I want to present an overview of discourse markers to show both what they are and what they are not. In addition, I want to explore the challenge of how we might go about examining the extent to which they function similarly across languages. I will use English as a basis for my discussion, both because I am familiar with it and because I have carried out research on English discourse markers. However, I have no reason to believe that English is either representative of the range of discourse markers in other languages or that it offers the researcher any special insight into this aspect of language.

Characterizing Discourse Markers

Following Fraser (1987, 1990, 1991a) I assume that sentence meaning is analyzable into two distinct types of encoded information: content meaning, and pragmatic meaning. Content meaning, sometimes referred to as the "propositional content" of the sentence, captures the state of affairs about which the speaker is talking. It is what the sentence is about. Pragmatic meaning, in contrast, provides signals of what different messages the speaker intends to convey through the direct, literal communication. It is signaled by both structural and lexical expressions. For each sentence, there are potentially three types of messages.

First, there is the basic message, always present, which is the message conveyed when the sentence is used in direct, literal communication.[1] For the basic message, the propositional content of the sentence serves as the message content, and the message type is signaled by basic pragmatic markers which may be syntactic structures or lexical expressions. The declarative structure, for example, is a basic pragmatic marker and signals that the speaker intends to convey his/her belief in the propositional content of the sentence. In contrast, the imperative structure, another basic pragmatic marker, signals the speaker

desires that the hearer bring about the state of the world referenced in the sentence content meaning. The lexical basic pragmatic marker *please* in imperative-initial position, as in "Please sit down," signals a request, while a performative expression such as *I promise* in "I promise to be there on time" signals the speaker's intent to convey a promise.

Second, there are commentary messages, signaled by commentary markers. These markers need not be present, but when they are, each signals an entire message--both force and content--which is separate from the basic message and which provides a comment on the basic message. In a sentence such as "Frankly, you are mistaken" the *frankly* functions as a commentary marker, and signals that the speaker recognizes that the message content following will be viewed unfavorably by the addressee. Similarly, in "Foolishly, John didn't check his e-mail" the *foolishly* signals the speaker's evaluation of the activity referenced in the basic message content.

And third, there are parallel messages. Here, also, these markers need not be present. When they are, each signals a message which is parallel to, but not a part of, the basic or any commentary message. In a sentence such as "He put his damned shoes on the table," the parallel marker *damned* signals that the speaker is angry, while in "Mom, where are my running shoes?" the *mom* signals that the speaker is addressing his mother.

The relationship between these aspects of sentence meaning is shown in the following figure:

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

Within this framework, discourse markers are one type of commentary pragmatic marker.

Consider the following interchange:

(3) **Attorney**: What happened then?
Witness: Alright, we got into an argument, I sort of lost my cool, and called him a jerk. You know how sometimes you just can't keep your temper...haven't you had that happen to you? I'm sorry about that, but it just happened.

Attorney: Anyway, so you called him a jerk. And then what did you do?

There are four discourse markers (underlined) in the above interchange, each of which signals a speaker comment on the current utterance, the utterance of which it is a part.[2]

The first marker, *alright*, signals that the utterance following is focusing on the topic at hand (here, the request for an account of what had occurred.[3] The second, *anyway*, signals a reorientation of the discourse focus (here, back to the witness' story), while the *so* signals that the following assertion is grounded on the foregoing (indeed, the witness asserted it). The initial *and* of the final utterance signals that what follows is to be heard as parallel to some part of the foregoing discourse (here, the initial question.)[4]

Within this general framework, I now want to look more closely at discourse markers. First, like all commentary markers, a discourse marker does not participate as a part of the propositional content of the sentence. It is detachable and may be deleted without changing the content meaning or the grammaticality of the sentence. This can be seen by removing the discourse markers from the examples in (1) and (3) and noticing that the content meaning is not altered. Note that this detachability is not permitted in the second sentence in the pair of the examples in (4), in which the underlined form is not a discourse marker:[5]

(4) a) $\underline{\text{Now}}_{\text{DM}}$, where are we? / [looking at map] $\underline{\text{Now}}_{\text{ADV}}$ where are we?
b) $\underline{\text{However}}_{\text{DM}}$, you can do it / [answer] $\underline{\text{However}}_{\text{ADV}}$ you can do it
c) $\underline{\text{Well}}_{\text{DM}}$, is how I feel important? / $\underline{\text{Well}}_{\text{ADV}}$ is how I feel

While, the absence of the discourse marker does not affect the grammaticality of a sentence, it does remove a powerful clue about what commitment the speaker makes regarding the relationship between the basic message conveyed by the present utterance and the prior discourse. For example, the presence of *alright* in (3), signals that the witness' intention is to focus on the request to recount the event, information that might be less readily recognized were the discourse marker absent.[6]

Second, discourse markers are not simply schizophrenic adverbs, sometimes functioning as an adverbs, other times as a discourse marker. One argument

against this analysis rests with the fact that discourse markers are drawn from areas of the traditional grammatical inventory other than adverbs, and include a few which seem unique:

(5) a) Verbs (*look, listen, say*)
b) Adverbs (*anyway, now, then*)
c) Literal phrases (*to repeat, as a result*)
d) Idioms (*by and large, still and all*)
e) Interjections (*well*)
f) Coordinate conjunctions (*and, but, or*)
g) Subordinate conjunctions (*however, so*)
h) Other (*ok*)

Moreover, even if one were to argue that discourse markers are simply their correlative lexical counterparts being used pragmatically (whatever that might mean), this proves untenable. The meaning of a marker is often significantly different from the meaning of the expression when used as an adverb or verb, not to mention the use as idioms. For example, the temporal meaning of *now* is only suggested in the interpretation of this form as a discourse marker in "Now, where should we go from here?" And, the verbal meaning of *look* is only remotely related to the interpretation of this form in "Look, I don't like what is going on here." Rather than attempt to account for the meaning of discourse markers as a function of the meaning of their corresponding traditional form, they must be treated as belonging to the pragmatic category of discourse markers.

A third aspect of discourse markers involves their privileges of occurrence. Like other commentary markers, each discourse marker may occur in sentence initial position, but some may also occur in sentence-medial position, and a few may occur in sentence final position. This pattern of distribution follows from the fact that a discourse marker not only signals a commentary message but, at the same time, signals the scope of this message.[7] The scope of the commentary message is usually the basic message conveyed by the sentence of which the discourse marker is a part. Thus, just as forms such as *even* and *only* are usually placed immediately prior to the material within their scope, so a discourse marker is generally placed prior to the material in its domain.

In those cases where the discourse marker is other than in the sentence-initial position, we find a change in marker scope. Consider the following examples:

(6) I'm willing to ask the Dean to do it.

i) However, you know he won't agree.
ii) You, however, know that he won't agree.
iii) You know, however, that he won't agree.
iv) You know that he won't agree, however.

Although the *however* is functioning as a contrastive discourse marker in each example, its position determines the scope of the commentary message. In (6i) the speaker signals that there is something problematic about the message that follows in relation to the foregoing message. In (6ii), however, the speaker is taking only the addressee to be within the scope of the comment, while in (6iii), it is the speaker's knowing, and in (6iv) it is the failure to agree that is being contrasted.[8]

Finally, each discourse marker has a "core" meaning associated with it. There are two points here. First, part of the core meaning is to signal type of sequential relationship (change of topic, parallelism, consequence, contrast) between the current basic message and the prior context. This is quite different from providing a description of how two propositions are related. For example, in a sentence such as (7a), where the *so* functions

(7) a) John was sick. So_{DM}, don't expect him
b) John was sick, so_{SCJ} he went to bed

as a discourse marker, it signals a consequent relationship, namely, that the subsequent advice not to expect John is grounded on the earlier claim that John was sick. In contrast, in (7b), where *so* functions as a subordinate conjunction, there is a single message with a compound propositional content: a claim that John was sick and because of this he went to bed. It is not that the meaning of *so* is radically different in the two cases; it is not. Rather, in the discourse marker case, the *so* is relating two separate messages, while in the subordinate conjunction case, it is relating two propositions within the same message. This is the quintessential nature of discourse markers.

Second, the core meaning only provides the starting point for the interpretation of the commentary message in a given case. Consider the following examples.

(8) a) Susan is married. So, she is no longer single.
b) John was tired. So he left early.
c) Attorney: And how long were you part of the crew?

Witness: Five years.
Atty: So you were employed by G for roughly 5 years?

d) Son: My clothes are still wet.
Mother: So put the drier on for 30 minutes more.

e) Teenage son: The Celtics have an important game today.
Disinterested parent: So?

f) [Grandmother to granddaughter] So tell me about this wonderful young man you're seeing.

While the core meaning of *so* remains the same in each example--that the basic message bears a consequential relationship to the foregoing--these examples reveal that *so* as a discourse marker permits a wide range of interpretations. It is the task of the hearer to enrich this core meaning in light of the details of the particular discourse context.[9]

I now wish to turn to what discourse markers are not. First, in spite of their independence from the sentence proper, discourse markers are not single word sentences, even though some can be found standing alone as a complete utterance. Two examples will illustrate:

(9) a) **Mother**: There is no way you're going to watch TV.
Child: But...
Mother: Sorry, but that's the way it is.

b) **Faculty Member 1**: I heard there isn't going to be a salary increase next year.
Faculty Member 2: So?

In (9a), a non-falling intonation on the Child's utterance makes it clear that she was not finished.[10] In (9b) a question intonation has the effect of imposing an interrogative gloss on the core meaning of "What follows is...", thereby creating the interpretation "What follows?"

In contrast, (10) contains interjections: lexical formatives which stand alone and represent an entire message, usually reflecting the speaker's emotional state.

(10) a) **Father**: The Celtics lost tonight.
Son: Oh! Wow!

b) Ouch!

c) **Teenager 1**: I just talked to Madonna.
Teenager 2: Far out!

In (10a) there are two interjections. The first, *oh*, has the basic interpretation of "What I understand you to be saying is new information to me." Of course this interjection, like others, has imposed upon it a marked intonation which, in itself, provides an additional parallel message. In this instance, it was a utterance-final rising intonation which signals surprise. "Wow!" also stands for an entire message, roughly "I am pleased at this information," while "Ouch!" conveys "That hurts," and "Far out!" conveys "I'm pleased." Interjections differ significantly from discourse markers and do not signal a comment on the current utterance. Indeed, they are not even pragmatic markers but are pragmatic idioms and may always stand alone.

Vocatives, nominals used to refer to the addressee (e.g.., *Colonel, Waiter, Doctor, Everyone, Ahem, Sweetie*), must also be distinguished from discourse markers. Like interjections, they encode an entire message, to the effect: "I am addressing my remarks to _____." They seldom stand alone but are associated with an utterance and, as such, are one type of parallel pragmatic marker.

There are other candidate discourse markers. I only mention a few here. *Because* is one. Consider the examples in (11).

(11) a) **Wife**: Why do you want to go there?
Husband: Because I like the ice cream.
b) John must be at home, because his car is there.

In (11a), *because* is functioning as a subordinate conjunction, albeit in an utterance in which the main clause of the sentence has been elided *(I want to go because I like the ice cream)*. In (11b), *because* is functioning as a commentary pragmatic marker, but not as a discourse marker--it does not relate two messages, the one in the current utterance to some prior part of the discourse. Rather, like *inasmuch as, in view of the fact that, since, according to what I hear*, and *based on my observations that*, it signals the basis for which the speaker is expressing belief in the basic sentence proposition. It is a member of a different type of commentary markers.[11]

Excluded also from discourse markers is *Y'know*, a type of parallel marker. Consider (7):

(12) a) Y'know, I really like eating raw pickles.
b) John is, y'know, more of a friend than a lover.

In (12a), *Y'know*--not to be confused with the literal *you know*--does not signal a comment on how the current utterance is related to the foregoing. Rather, it signals a message requesting that the hearer appreciate and/or be in sympathy

with the speaker's point of view. In this role, it is a parallel marker like *come on* and not a discourse marker.

Finally, excluded are pause markers, illustrated in (13).[12]

(13) a) Coach: How many can you take in your car?
Parent: Well...at least 6 if they squeeze.
b) There were..oh...maybe half a dozen left when I arrived.
c) Ah...John...uh...could you come over here for a moment?

While in some cases these pause markers are homophonous with discourse markers or other pragmatic markers, their interpretation in (13) makes it clear that they are not signalling a sequential discourse relationship. Rather, they signal a message that the speaker wishes to keep the "conversational floor," perhaps because of the need to think before answering. Pause markers are members of a type of parallel pragmatic markers.

To summarize, discourse markers are lexical expressions. Each marker has a core meaning, and through that core meaning, it is independent of the basic sentence structure. It signals a sequential relationship of a specific sort between the basic message conveyed by the utterance of which it is a part and some earlier message. I now wish to examine the distinctions within this category.

Types of Discourse Markers

At the most general level, a discourse marker signals one of three types of comments: either that the current basic message to which the comment applies involves the discourse topic in some way; or that the comment involves the type of discourse activity currently underway (e.g., explaining or clarifying); or that it involves some specific relationship to the foregoing discourse (e.g., that it is parallel to, or contrasts with). I will briefly examine each of these three types in turn.

Type 1: Discourse Topic Markers

The notion of "topic" is, at best, problematic. Some researchers write of sentence topic, others of utterance topic, while still others explore the notion of discourse topic. Some researchers wisely avoid the topic altogether. I will consider only discourse topic: what the discourse participants are "talking about" at any given time, including various subtopics as they arise.[13]

Some topic markers signal a different discourse topic (an initial topic, a previous topic) while others signal the reemphasis on the current topic. Included in this first group are the markers listed in (14):[14]

(14) *à propos X, back to my original point, before I forget, by the way, continuing, in any case, in case you don't recall, incidentally, just to update you, listen, moving right along, on a different note, parenthetically, say, speaking of, that reminds me, to continue, to return to my original point, turning now to, while I think of it, while I have you, with regards to*

Obviously, there are other means to introduce a discourse topic, such as an indirect suggestion, "How do you think you have been performing, Jack," or by announcing "I would like to talk to you today about your recent performance, Jack," or "Let's begin with a discussion about your recent performance."

The second group of topic markers signals a refocusing on or the emphasis on part of the topic at hand. These are listed in (15):

(15) *again, alright, but, here, indeed, in fact, listen, look (here), now, OK, say, see, well, y'see*

We find these in examples such as the following:

(16) a) Alright, let's get this thing organized.
b) Indeed, he is a good-looking guy.
c) Y'see, we really don't have enough money at this time.

Although most of these markers seem to belong in either one group or another, some markers, such as *listen*, and *say*, serve both the introducing and refocusing function.

Type 2: Discourse Activity Markers

The second class consists of discourse markers which signal the current discourse activity relative to some part of the foregoing discourse. These activities refer to types of discourse work such as explaining or summarizing, and not to the type of message (e.g., a claim or a promise) the speaker conveys through the utterance. I have identified 7 such activity types--surely not a complete list--and presented some representative examples in (17), with each type labeled by a term suggesting the discourse work being done.

(17) a) **Clarifying**: *by way of clarification, to clarify*
b) **Conceding**: *admittedly, after all, all in all, all the same, anyhow, anyway, at any rate, besides, for all that, in any case/event, of course, still and all*
c) **Explaining**: *by way of explanation, if I may explain, to explain*
d) **Interrupting**: *if I may interrupt, to interrupt, not to interrupt*
e) **Repeating**: *at the risk of repeating myself, once again, to repeat*
f) **Sequencing**: *finally, first, in the first place, lastly, next, on the one/other hand, second, to begin, to conclude, to continue, to start with*
g) **Summarizing**: *in general, in summary, overall, so far, summarizing, summing up, thus far, to sum up, at this point*

The ways in which these markers are used is self-evident, and I therefore omit sentence examples.

Type 3: Message Relationship Markers

The third class of discourse markers are those which signal the relationship of the basic message being conveyed by the current utterance to some prior message. There are four groups: Parallel; Contrasting; Elaborative; and Inferential.

Parallel markers are the most general of these and signal that the current basic message is, in some way, parallel to some aspect of the prior discourse. I have listed examples in (18):

(18) **Parallel Discourse Markers**: *also, alternatively, analogously, and, by the same token, correspondingly, equally, likewise, or, otherwise, similarly, too*

To see how these function, consider the examples in (14):

(19) a) **Student 1**: How was the party?
Student 2: Fantastic. Harold came. And who do you think he brought?
b) **A**: John is sleeping in the den and I'm in the kitchen
B: And where am I sleeping?

In (19a), *and* functions as a discourse marker, signaling that the second message is parallel to but separate from the first. The speaker has signalled that she is conveying two messages: the first, a claim that Harold came; and the second, a (rhetorical) question involving Harold's companion. Similarly, in (19b), the discourse marker *and*, uttered by the second speaker, signals a message parallel to the first two, in the sense here that this latter bit of information is needed. This use of *and* as a discourse marker is separate and distinct from its use as a coordinate conjunction, within the sentence propositional syntax, in cases such as "Oil and water don't mix" or "Reagan was asleep and no one would wake him."

Each of the other parallel discourse markers signals some qualification on the nature of the parallel relationship. I can tentatively identify two subgroups. The first contains *alternatively, or* and *otherwise*, which signal an alternate to an earlier message. The second subgroup contains *also, analogously, by the same token, correspondingly, equally, likewise, similarly,* and *too*, which signal a message similar along some unspecified dimension, with *also* and *too* signaling an identity of a part of the current message to one preceding.

Contrastive markers, listed in (20), populate the second group.[15]

(20) **Contrastive Discourse Markers**: *all the same, but, contrariwise, conversely, despite, however, I may be wrong but, in spite of, in comparison, in contrast, instead, never/nonetheless, notwithstanding, on the one/other hand, on the contrary, otherwise, rather, regardless, still, that said, though, well, yet*)

Here, similar to the parallel markers, there seems to be a single, more basic contrastive marker: *but*. Just as *and* signals that there is some sort of parallelism at hand, *but* signals a sense of "dissonance." The examples in (16) reflect some of the contexts in which the discourse marker *but* is found.[16]

(21) a) **Son** (whining): I can't do it.
Father: But I know that you CAN do it.
b) **Job Interviewer**: The position has been filled. But do come in anyway and talk for a minute.
c) **Witness**: I didn't think I should talk about it.
Attorney: But what did you actually say?

There are several subgroups which specify a more detailed sense of contrast. Markers such as *contrariwise, conversely, in comparison, in contrast, on the contrary* and *on the one/other hand* signal explicitly that, from the speaker's

viewpoint, the content of the two messages is in sharp contrast. Another subgroup, containing the markers *all the same, despite, however, in spite of, instead, irrespective, nevertheless, nonetheless, notwithstanding, rather, regardless, still, though,* and *yet,* signals a sharp but unexpected contrast. A third subgroup of contrastive markers contains *I may be wrong but* and *that said,* which signal a contrast between a previous claim or like message (by either the speaker or another discourse participant) and the claim in the current message. Finally, *well* appears to be the sole member of a fourth subgroup, signalling that the current message is contrary to that which the hearer is presumed to expect.

Elaborative markers populate the third group. These markers signal that the current utterance constitutes an elaboration of an earlier one. Included in this group are the following:

(22) **Elaborative Discourse Markers**: *above all, also, besides, better, for example, for instance, further(more), in addition, in fact, in other words, in particular, indeed, more accurately, more importantly, more precisely, more specifically, more to the point, moreover, namely, on top of it all, that is, to cap it all off, what is more*

Of these, the markers *above all, indeed, in fact, on top of it all,* and *to top it all off* signal a more general sense of elaboration, (e.g., "He was fairly scared. Indeed, he was scared silly"), while a second subgroup containing *better, in particular, more accurately, more importantly, more precisely, more specifically, more to the point* has just the opposite effect, namely, to signal a more refined characterization of the sense of the foregoing. A third subgroup containing *also, besides, further(more), in addition, moreover, what is more* signals one additional aspect to the current topic (e.g., I don't think we should go due to the danger. Besides, I don't want to go.") A final subgroup signals the speaker's intention to have the current message signal an illustration of an earlier point. Such markers include *for example, for instance, in other words, namely.*

The fourth and final group is **Inferential Markers**, which signal that the current utterance conveys a message which is, in some sense, consequential to some aspect of the foregoing. Examples are presented in (22):

(22) **Inferential Discourse Markers**: *accordingly, as a consequence, as a result, consequently, hence, in this/that case, of course, so, then, therefore, thus*

Contrary to the other three groups, there is no obvious subgrouping, although there are subtle differences. For example:

(23) a) John is remaining. So (?in that case) I am leaving.
b) I don't want to talk with you. But I will. Therefore (?as a result) sit down

The Challenge

In the foregoing I have laid out a framework of sentence meaning within which I have identified discourse markers as a type of commentary pragmatic marker. While there is no a priori reason to assume that discourse markers can be found in every language (although one wonders what would serve as "discourse glue" in their stead), I feel confident in asserting that these are as ubiquitous as nouns and verbs. I base this not on any universalist intuitions I might have, but on the research of two groups of graduate students during the past few years in examining discourse markers in their own languages. These included Arabic, Bulgarian, French, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, and Spanish. Moreover, their research confirmed my hope that each of these languages has discourse markers which are separate from the propositional content of the sentence, are detachable, and have a core meaning. It also confirmed my suspicions that one cannot expect to do research in this area to any degree of subtlety unless the researcher is a native speaker of the language being examined and the data is naturally occurring discourse.

But this is just the starting point. A more detailed comparison requires that the "other" language--I'll call it L--be analyzed in at least as much detail as we now have for English. This means a native speaker of the language must develop an emic analysis based on naturally occurring discourse in terms meaningful to native speakers of the language.

Let us assume that we have such an emic analysis of L along the lines of the English analysis that now exists, and that we do not contest the quality of the analysis. We still cannot consider a comparison, since the terms of analysis in each case--English and L--are language-specific. For example, in English there is a set of contrastive discourse markers (e.g. *but, conversely, however, in contrast, rather, still, yet*). But there is no a priori reason to assume that L will have a similar set of markers, all of which signal the same sort of contrastiveness that we find in English. What needs to be done (as is the case for all comparative work) is to develop an etic framework within which the concepts for all languages can be accounted for, much as has been done in

contemporary phonology. Only then will it be possible to make a meaningful comparison of English and L in the area of discourse markers.

Developing this etic framework in a pragmatic area is no mean feat as anyone who has attempted it will attest. It is, however, necessary if we are to make progress in understanding how languages compare in pragmatic areas and, more practically, if we are to inform language teaching materials with accurate information about the use of discourse markers in the new language.

NOTES

[1] More accurately, associated with every sentence is the potential for it being used to convey a basic message, based on the propositional content of the sentence and certain pragmatic markers. Whether the speaker is successful depends on whether the hearer recognizes the intended message.

[2] As far as I can tell, a commentary marker signals a message relevant to only the basic message, never to an indirect message.

[3] For the sake of exposition, I am assigning an interpretation to the discourse markers here and below. The points to be made should survive whether or not readers have slightly different glosses.

[4] In some cases, the discourse to which the marker signals a relationship may be in the distant past. For example, a student initiated a conversation with me not long ago with "*So*, when are you going to Italy?" The *so* in her utterance referenced our conversation of some two weeks earlier. For a detailed examination of *so*. see Fraser 1991b.

[5] In most but not all cases, the discourse marker is set off phonologically by a brief pause (an orthographic comma). This, as well as the intonation on the reminder of the sentence, usually serves to distinguish which role forms such as *now*, *however*, and *well* play in a given sentence.

[6] Commentary markers, other than discourse markers, cannot be absent from the sentence without a loss of meaning. For example, the presence of *frankly* in "*Frankly*, you didn't do very well in the exam" signals a speaker comment, which cannot be inferred when *frankly* is not present.

[7] I am using scope here in the same sense in which a quantifier is said to have a scope.

[8] This is similar to how the scope of *even* changes as a function of its location.

[9] This process is analogous to what occurs when one interprets *good* in "a good meal" versus "a good movie" versus "a good boy," or when one interprets *just* in "just now" versus "just behind the barn" versus "just right."

[10] The reader is referred to (Barton, 1990) on the issue of elliptical sentences.

[11] There is also the utterance "Because!" in response to "Why aren't you cleaning up your room?" which appears to have become a fixed form, perhaps shortened from "because I don't want to." In any event, it is not a discourse marker.

[12] Some of these pause markers appear to function as a kind of "start-up" form, signalling that the speaker is taking time to think about the answer or at least not responding too quickly, perhaps out of deference to the hearer.

[13] English focus markers (e.g., emphatic stress, a WH word, the lexical material in the scope of *even*), which signal the part of the utterance the speaker wishes to make most salient to the hearer, are different from topic markers and are a type of parallel pragmatic marker in this framework.

[14] The lists of discourse markers in the following discussion are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. In some cases, a marker belongs in more than one group but has not been included for clarity of exposition.

[15] The expression *on the one hand* is the one exception I have found of a discourse marker which signals that the current message is related not to a prior one but one forthcoming.

[16] For a detailed examination of *but*, see Bell, 1991.

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CONJUNCTION AND CAUSALITY: PRAGMATICS AND THE LEXICON

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ABSTRACT

The Gricean maxims or their proper alternates are claimed to constitute necessary but not sufficient properties of an overall theory of interpretation. To make the correct predictions, the theory seems to require reference not just to the Gricean-like inference maxims but also to some basic reasoning primitives not derivable from any variant of the Cooperative Principle. Causality is argued to constitute such a cognitive primitive. The interaction between this reasoning principle and the Gricean inferencing maxims is shown to account in a non-ad-hoc fashion for instances of implicit causality as well as cases where conjunctions like *if, and, so* involve causal interpretations. The lexical specifications of such conjunctions are, consequently, considerably simplified. The adoption of this hypothesis provides a non-arbitrary account for the systematic convergence across languages of readings involving causality with those associated with addition, conditionality, and temporality and the claim is made with respect to second language instruction that the existence of such interpretation heuristics significantly facilitates the learning process of certain lexical items.

INTRODUCTION

Conjunctions like *and, if, so* have been known to appear in a variety of contexts and to be associated with a wide range of interpretations. Thus, *and*, for example, has been observed to occur in instances like the following where temporality, circumstantiality, causality and the like are involved:

(1) I went to the store and bought some whisky.
(2) He died and they buried him.
(3) Mary went to the concert and Bill stayed at home.

(4) There was a fire and I called the fire department.
(5) They failed the exam and did not get accepted to school.

The theoretical options available concerning the lexical specifications of these items are (a)multiplicity of senses and (b) restricted senses augmented by conversational implicatures. Arguments have been adduced for both these positions, the latter option gaining more ground with our growing understanding of the Gricean implicatures.[1] In this paper I will side with the minimalists and provide additional arguments for the fewer senses position alongside the machinery for adopting it. I will restrict my attention to one possible interpretation with which such conjunctions may be associated, i.e., causality. It will be argued that causality. It will be argued that causality is a major reasoning principle which interacts with some version of the Gricean inferencing maxims to yield the desired interpretation. The account proposed will also provide an explanation for a range of additional instances where implicit causal relations hold and will shed light on the convergence in a variety of languages of readings involving causality with those associated with addition, conditionality and temporality, among others. It will be claimed in this context with respect to the proposed interpretation heuristics will considerably facilitate the learning process of the relevant "meanings" of the lexical items in question.

BACKGROUND

Following Grice's (1975) theory of implicature, it is now widely believed that comprehension involves not only the recovery of the propositional content of a given utterance and its intended implications in the context in which it was uttered, but also the presumption that the speaker has tried to conform to some general standards of verbal communication. The standards proposed by Grice involve his Cooperative Principle (CP) and the maxims of conversation, including Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner, all of which are used as a guide to the intended interpretation. Since the CP and the various maxims were formulated rather loosely, attempts were made at their reformulation or modification, In this context, we can regard the neo-Gricean approaches evident in Dascal's (1977), Horn's (1984), Leech's (1983) and Levinson's (1987) contributions, inter alia, which specify a variety of alternative principles. Alongside the different modifications, there are at least two major attempts at reducing the number and variety of principles and subsuming them under a single, general

principle from which the others follow. Under this category we will find Sperber and Wilson's (1986) cognitively oriented Relevance theory and Kasher's (1976, 1982, 1987) socially oriented Rationality principle.[2] In this paper I will assume that some variant of the CP, be it of the neo-Gricean or of the reductionist type, constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient property of an overall theory of interpretation. For such a theory to make the correct predictions, I would claim, it would need to refer not just to the Gricean-like reference principles, such as causality and temporality, which are not derivable from any variant of the CP. As I intimated above, in the present context, I will concentrate on causality. The interaction between the reasoning principles and the Gricean-like inferencing maxims (in whatever guise) will be shown to account in a non-ad-hoc fashion for a variety of instances involving implicit causal relations across languages.

IMPLICIT CAUSALITY

The following sequences display implicit causal relations between their various sub-components:

(6) A: Are you coming to my party?
B: No. I have an exam tomorrow.
(7) She's not at home. I can't see her car.
(8) There was a fire (./and) I called the fire department.
(9) The road was icy and she slipped.
(10) (10)Persuaded by our opotimism, he gladly contributed time and money to the scheme. (From Quirk et al. 1985:1121)
(11) John, knowing that his wife was expecting, started to take a course on baby care. (Quirk *et al.*, 1985: 1123)
(12) People who eat too much get sick.
(13) If you don't get enough exerecise, you get sick.

An account of the causal interpretation evident in such cases has traditionally involved a Gricean treatment. Hence, it was conceived of as an implicature. This is naturally the case in instances where there is no lexical connective between the two segments in question. A similar account was considered for instances involving conjunctions such as *and*. The alternative account attributing multiplicity of senses to such lexical connectives has also been entertained. These accounts consider 'and then and 'and as a result of' as additional senses of *and* alongside its 'plus' sense.[3]

The various accounts differ in what they consider criterial for proper inclusion within the semantics of the lexical items at hand. The view

that attributes conversational implicature status to such so-called "causal suggestions" accords prime importance to their cancellability. Following Grice (1975) and Karttunen and Peters (1979) cancellability of a given sense serves as an indicator that the sense in question is only implicated and does not constitute part of the (truth conditional) semantic content of the item under investigation.[4] Thus the lack of contradiction in the following sequence where the potential causal connection in (c) is explicitly denied (in (d)) is used to argue that causality is not an inherent part of the meaning (of(c)) but rather conversationally implicated in the appropriate context, e.g., (15):

(14) (a) Last night when we went to the party, it was pretty cold. (b) We put on our warmest coats and started on foot. (c) The road was icy and Susan slipped. (d) But she did not slip because of the ice on the road; she was wearing these high heeled boots and she couldn't maintain her balance very well.

(15) (a) Last night when we went to the party, it was raining heavily. (b) The road was very icy and Susan slipped. (c) She can't maintain her balance on icy roads.

However, the view that considers the connectives at hand (possibly multiply) ambiguous regards the inclusion of causality within the scope of logical operators (as in (16) (following)) as criterial, making 'causality' a distinct sense of this lexical item. Consider:

(16) If the old king had died of a heart attack and a republic was declared, then Sam will be happy; but if a republic was declared and the king died of a heart attack, then Sam will be unhappy. (Adapted from Cohen, 1971)

The causal interpretation is clearly in the domain of the conditional and hence, according to this approach, it constitutes an additional meaning of the coordinating conjunction *and*. This, however, is not the only theoretical alternative, in the existing state-of-affairs. Under the assumption that there ware pragmatically determined aspects of propositional content (advanced by Wilson and Sperber (1981) and developed by Carston (1984) and Blakemore (1987)[5] these causal suggestions need not be considered part of the semantics of the lexical items in question, even if they are affected by logical operators. Rather, they could be conceived of as pragmatically determined aspects of propostional content. Accordingly, considerations of cancellability seem to outweigh those of the scope of logical operators, and we can still maintain the thesis concerning the implicature nature of the causal reading of the coordinating conjunction on the one hand and its effect on truth conditionality, on the other. A unitary account

of the semantics of the connective at hand is thus available: *and* mean '+', 'addition.'

The question of the causal interpretation requires illucidation at this point. It appears to be the case that irrespective of the treatment, whether causality is properly conceived of as part of the semantics of *and* or only as implicated in the appropriate context, no account can *predict* the causal interpretation; it does not follow from anything. It is simply a fact that it is an available reading. Within the Gricean maxims treatment, Causality would probably end up being an instance of the maxim of Relation, establishing the required relatedness between the propositions in question. Still, it is not clear exactly how the addressee would come up with this particular instantiation of Relevance rather than any other one. Sperber and Wilson's Relevance theory could accommodate such causal interpretations effectively, only if an appeal were made to scripts, frames or scenarios (Minsky, 1977, and Schank and Abelson, 1977) and stored encyclopaedic Knowledge, where similar interchanges have been recorded. The question would then be how speakers are supposed to pull out the relevant script involving causality in the case at hand without going over an abundance of non-fitting scripts, where going through a considerable amount of material involves more processing and hence, by Sperber and Wilson's criterion, reduces relevance. Accordingly, the theory of Relevance would make the wrong predications attributing a low value in terms of degree of relevance to an intuitively highly relevant relation.

In view of these difficulties, I would like to advance the following proposal: it seems to be a fact of human reasoning that we may perceive and relate states of affairs causally.[6] I would thus like toconjecture that Causality constitutes a basic reasoning principle against which we check and appeal to which is made in attempts to establish relatedness between propositions. The following factors lend credence to the hypothesis concerning the centrality of causality in the context at hand: (a) causal interpretations are available in a variety of distinct constructions where no lexical clues are evident (cf. 6-13 above); (b) there are different instantiations of implicit causality across languages; (c) causality has been claimed to fulfil a critical function in the development of human reasoning in general (cf. Piaget, 1930) and it is therefore reasonable to assume that it is functional in the current context as well and (d) Philosophers have attempted to derive causality from more basic principles and have encountered what are currently regarded as considerable difficulties (cf. fn. 6). Causality may thus best be analyzed for the present purposes as a primitive or basic building block in the human cognitive capacity.[7]

Naturally, the number of such basic reasoning principles to which an appeal will be made in the process of interpretation would be minimal. Causality and perhaps also Temporality would be likely candidates. The adoption of this treatment will account automatically for the option of a causal interpretation in

instances where the nature of the relationship between the propositions under investigation is semantically underspecified. I will now consider the status of such basic reasoning mechanisms in our overall theory of interpretation.

CAUSALITY AND CONTEXT SELECTION

Search Heuristics

Accounts of interpretation make crucial reference to stored knowledge, as one variety of information that has to be accessible for full comprehension. Models of Knowledge representation abound.[8] Irrespective of the particular model espoused, however, we can reasonably assume that all of them would have to make use of search heuristics, factors affecting the retrieval and activation of the variousentities in store. Without such search mechanisms the processing of information would be most inefficient. In fact, it seems that noGricean account, of whatever variety, could handle such interpretations without an efficient context selection mechanism. In particular, theories of Relevance of the Sperber and Wilson type, where the presumption of Relevance guides efficient context selection, would be inconceivable or non-consequential. I would thus propose that such basic reasoning principles as establishing causal relations constitute part of the retrieval mechanisms in the search process for the appropriate entities within our Knowledge base. As such, it could function also in explicating the type of text coherence that would maximize relevance. Granting such prominence to Causality as a reasoning principle and hence as an inferencing device seems to account in a natural way for the near automatic inference of causality in a variety of instances where no explicit lexical marker of causality occurs. Processing would be considerably more effective, once causality is explicitly mentioned as part of the search mechanism or as an instance of coherence. Consequently, sets of intuitively highly relevant described states-of-affairs exhibiting causal relations will count as relevant also in the Sperber and Wilson sense, since processing effort would be reduced significantly. There will be no need to scan a variety of non-fitting scripts, or to assign a distinct type of coherence until we come across the causal interpretation. Note that no extra machinery is required if this heuristics is adopted. It is a well-known fact about human reasoning that it utilizes causality as a basic tool. The current proposal thus amounts to making a more extensive use of Causality. Incidentally, an alternative conception of Relevance, e.g., Dascal (1977) and Kasher (1976, 1982, 1987), where it is made up of minor principles, would regard causality as one such subpart, i.e., one instantiation of Relevance.

Speculations.

I would like to entertain two speculations concerning the type of theory of interpretation proposed here and our overall model of linguistic competence. Under the assumption that we can distinguish linguistic from nonlinguistic pragmatic factors (cf. for example, Ariel (1990)) I would like to propose the adoption within linguistics pragmatics of a Sperber and Wilson type Relevance theory, and to argue that the socially oriented Rationality-like principles (a' a1 Kasher) constitute part of the extra-linguistic pragmatic component. (The prediction would then be that it would be applicable elsewhere in human interaction, as indeed it is.) The reasoning principles such as Causality, or Temporality would clearly be part of our general cognitive capacities (located in the central system). Interpretation would thus involve both linguistic as well as nonlinguistic pragmatic factors and relevance theory of the type advanced by Sperber and Wilson could be argued to be located within the strictly linguistically oriented pragmatic factors. The interaction between the central system and the particularly linguistic component that seems to be essential for interpretation would thus appear to challenge the concept of a module as informationally encapsulated (cf. Fodor, 1983).

The second comment concerns the option of distinguishing between formal and substantive inferencing principles. The Gricean like maxims in some version of the Sperber and Wilson type Relevance and the Kasher type Rationality would constitute formal inferencing maxims while the specific reasoning principles (e.g., Causality, Temporality) would constitute substantive cognitive principles. The interaction of the formal principles of inference with the specific substantive maxims would yield the desired interpretation.

CONJUNCTION: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The suggestion concerning the centrality of causality as a reasoning principle which is functional in interpretation is corroborated by the variety of languages which turn out to display the same range of conjunctions of the addition, condition or temporality type where causality is implicated, and at the same time this proposal makes it possible to predict that this range would be characteristic of the next language we come across, all other things being equal.[9] Thus, I would conjecture that an addition conjunction used as a cohesive device in a given language would be exceptional to be restricted such that the propositions that it would coordinate could never, in principle, be related causally.[10] The unmarked case would then be for those coordinating conjunctions that are not particularly restricted to possess the potential to relate causally related propositions. This state of affairs bears some obvious practical implications for

second language instruction. The relevant cases would involve instances in a variety of languages where causality is not explicitly stated lexically but is, rather, "implicated" using conjunctions of the addition, condition or temporal variety. The claim would be that the same mechanism would be functional in all these instances and the prediction would be that the conjunctions need not be specified for a variety of senses, rather a unique addition, condition or the relevant type of temporality would be explicitly stated for the language learner. The inferential step concerning causality will be automatically followed, and need not be specified. Hence, French, *et*, German *und*, Polish */i/* and Hebrew */ve/*, for example, will predictably display properties akin to the English *and*.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the adoption of the proposed conception of interpretation as involving the interaction between some version of the Gricean implicatures with general reasoning principles of which causality is one, allows us to make certain theoretical predictions with respect to lexical specifications in a variety of languages, as well as to be functional in accounts of second language instruction.

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NOTES

[1] See Posner (1980) for a discussion of these positions.

[2] Cf. Ziv (1988) for a discussion of these reductionist approaches and the claim that neither is sufficient as it is. Incidentally, Green (1990) independently attributes the Gricean maxims to a rationality principle, as well. However, Rationality is defined in somewhat different terms Kasher and by Green.

[3] Dictionaries vary as to the number of senses they attribute to such lexical items as and. Not surprisingly, the same variety of senses appears in

characterizations of French *et*, German *und*, Polish [i], and Hebrew [ve], inter alia. Thus we find 'addition,' 'contrast,' temporality, conditionality, and causality in the specifications of the possible senses of these lexical items.

[4] In fact, non-detachability and variability are mentioned as additional tests in this context. However, these two are considerably harder to apply than the cancellability test. I will, therefore, restrict my tests to cancellability.

[5] Posner's (1980) solution may be interpreted along similar lines.

[6] According this prominence to causality as a basic reasoning principle, I do not wish to imply that causality is well defined. In fact, despite its centrality in human thought, attempts at characterizing causality are fraught with problems (cf. Anderson and Belnap (1975)).

[7] Note that it is immaterial in the present context whether Hume's position concerning the 'constant conjunction' nature of causality is correct. Whether Causality occurs in the real world or whether it is merely the imposition of the human intellect upon constant conjunction of events in the world, it is clearly a fact about human cognition that causality is a major reasoning principle.

[8] Cf. Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977), Posner (1989) and Lycan (1990) and references therein for some characterizations of certain relevant factors.

[9] The high incidence across languages of co-occurences of temporal and causal connectives as in English *since*, German *wenn*, French *quand*, and Hebrew [az] constitutes further corroboration. In this context we may also count the historical link between current causal conjunctions and their temporal ancestors, as in the case of German *weil*, which ceased to function temporally and *wahrend* replaced it.

[10] For a discussion of explicit and implicit cohesive devices see Halliday and Hasan (1976).

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Situated Discourse: The Sociocultural Context of Conversation in a Second Language

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This paper presents an analysis of sociocultural aspects of a dinner conversation, drawn from a larger dissertation study designed to generate a grounded theoretical understanding of the interactional pragmatics of second language discourse. Building on recent interpretations of indexicality, I present an analysis of a conversation between an advanced Japanese NNS of English and two of her American colleagues that considers sociopragmatic features of discourse and how they influence the construction of a conversational participant structure, understood primarily in terms of negotiated solidarity. While the data suggest that differences in discourse strategies between the American and Japanese participants exist, a heteroglossic rather than consensual understanding of the sociocultural context of cross cultural communication is suggested.

The pragmatic negotiation of meaning

Recent theories of language use suggest that discourse is generated and interpreted because it is situated in an interactive, emergent orientation to a shared sociocultural context of norms, values and expectations. Sajavaara (1987) argues against an autonomous linguistics which restricts meaning to word recognition, pointing out that discourse is a holistic process of negotiation, the purpose of which is not always to transmit messages but also to establish social contact. Echoing Reddy's (1979) criticism of conduit metaphors in language, Linell (1988) argues that any interpretation of discourse necessarily goes beyond surface linguistic meaning and is guided by underlying frames of expectation. Green (1983, 1989) notes that "words don't mean" but instead are used as indices which are used by people, constrained by conventional practice, who do. Meaning is neither literal nor autonomous but is produced within an "intersubjectivity" (Rommetveit, 1974, 1987) that is jointly negotiated and constructed in local contexts by social actors.

Ultimately, it is the underlying sociocultural matrix which allows the negotiation and construction of meaning in spoken interaction. Meaning is interactive

which guide appropriate communicative behavior, has significant implications for understanding the interactional dynamics of second language discourse.

In spite of the tendency to describe American culture (particularly in contrast with Japanese culture) as goal-centered and individualistic, the negotiation of meaning in English discourse is restricted neither to disconnected, autonomous individuals nor to a linear intentionality of interlocutors. As members of an interpretive community (Fish, 1981), constrained by the behavior and expectations of others with whom texts are negotiated and constructed, speakers intuitively follow the parameters of possible and acceptable interpretations, not in the form of rules but in terms of sociocultural practices and conventions.

Pragmatic notions of linguistic indexicality can be integrated with more social approaches to discourse, such as those used in the ethnography of communication (see Briggs, 1988). Language is an index of the social order and the relations which articulate the status and social distance established among interlocutors. The structure, coherence, and meaning of discourse can be seen as an integral function of the social identity of the interactants involved. Talk as an index reflects social organization; as practice, it produces the social order (Gal, 1989). An emergent, interactional understanding of discourse sees the negotiation of the social position interactants take vis à vis each other as critical in creating the shared intersubjectivity necessary for the mutual interpretation of linguistic forms.[1]

As an emergent and negotiated process, discourse simultaneously implicates both referential as well as social meaning (Olson, 1980).[2] On the one hand, discourse conventions index pragmalinguistic notions such as topicality, reason, and coherence. On the other hand, sociopragmatic patterns implicitly locate speakers within socially constructed participant structures (Erickson, 1989; Philips, 1972). Any utterance will then carry both linguistic and social reference. Thomas' (1983) distinction between pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic is a useful heuristic to account for the pragmatic gaffes of NNS, but her admittedly fuzzy binary division between the two categories does not fully capture the sociocultural context which underlies the pragmatic negotiation of meaning in discourse. I would suggest that, particularly for the advanced learner, the more subtle dimension of constructing appropriate social distance and status (as defined and negotiated in local contexts) may pose as great a pragmatic hurdle for the second language learner as the more explicit aspects of interactional pragmatics and defined speech acts.

Erickson's (1989) analysis of a traditional Italian-American family's dinner conversation demonstrates the importance of the structure of participation in shaping discourse. Erickson shows how the coherence of narrative is accomplished in part because of the family members' shared reference to their social

roles and status. Erickson builds upon (while slightly restricting) Philips' (1972) original notion of participant structure in order to capture the authority of speakership in conversation, reflected in who has narrative access (both quantitative and qualitative) to the floor.

The concept of participation structure, however, can be expanded to incorporate a broader notion of the sociocultural context and patterns of interaction. The structure of participation encompasses the negotiation of a locally instantiated speech community which indexes not only status, primary in Erickson's discussion, but also shared perspective and solidarity. This socially situated process is especially evident in cross cultural discourse, since interlocutors jointly construct an intersubjectivity that calls upon culturally generated assumptions to mediate discourse.

Data

In this paper, I analyze a dinner conversation involving a Japanese NNS and two American NS colleagues. The conversation is part of a larger body of qualitative data, collected in an ongoing dissertation study investigating the pragmatics of cross cultural conversation between Japanese NNS and American interlocutors in a university setting. I look at salient features of the discourse in terms of implicit frames of reference about social membership which are brought into play in interaction. Primary data consist of the conversation,[3] while secondary data include open-ended ethnographic interviews with the Japanese NNS interlocutor.

The nonnative speaker is Kazuko,[4] a core informant in the larger study, who is an advanced speaker of English (defined loosely as "proficient" enough in English to be accepted into a U.S. university and to successfully pass academic classes). Kazuko is a post-doctoral researcher in chemistry (about 35 to 40 years old) who has been in the U.S. approximately six months at the time of the conversation. The dinner takes place at Kazuko's apartment. In addition to Kazuko and her mother (with whom she lives), there are two other participants: Sandy (S) and Valerie (V), both professional colleagues of Kazuko.

Kazuko met Sandy more than a year and a half ago when Sandy worked at Kazuko's university research lab in Japan on a six month fellowship. Sandy speaks only a few words of Japanese, while Kazuko's mother speaks only elementary English. Although Sandy and Valerie are close friends who were in graduate school together, it is the first time for Valerie to meet Kazuko. The three women all have PhD's in the same field, and thus the status among them, according to

macro sociological indices, is roughly equal. Sandy and Valerie are in town for a professional conference and are spending the night at Kazuko's apartment. The conversation was recorded by Kazuko's mother, at my request.

Analysis

The conversation, both to my ears and to Kazuko's recollection, evidences a rather successful interaction. The pace is lively, with a good deal of laughter and joint involvement in various topics throughout the conversation. An interesting example of the positive intersubjectivity established among the three major participants is the exchange which takes place while they are talking about Kazuko's mother, who has just recovered from a bad case of the measles, for the
second time. (Her mother is 65 years old.)

V I thought that if you, I didn't realize you got them again. I didn't realize that was, huh!
S You're doctor said /
K Unhun
S Huh!

The positive, shared understanding illustrated in this exchange (which also nicely demonstrates how interpretation is based not on mechanistic notions of linguistic accuracy but on joint, emergent interpretation) does not necessarily equate, however, with a similar view of membership and social distance.

Instant intimacy

Throughout the conversation, both Sandy and Valerie employ discourse patterns which serve to develop a high solidarity, what Scollon and Scollon (1981) call the instant intimacy of positive politeness, emphasizing solidarity and commonality. Sandy and Valerie accomplish this using three pragmatic patterns of discourse:

(1) solicitation of information,
(2) reference to shared experience, and
(3) good-natured teasing.

Throughout the conversation, Sandy and Valerie solicit information from Kazuko, seen in the sustained questioning about her experiences, her ideas, her opinions, etc.

V And so you've been here in town six months?
K Yeah, almost, yes
V Do you feel accustomed to it yet?
K Yeah, , after, we, you know we spent uh three or four nights away on a trip, we feel this our home hhh {hhh}
S Oh so it's good to go away
K {Yeah, wh--
S {so you can do that
V And this is your first time to be, in the United States,
{or have been, or not for you
K {For her, but not for me
V Where were you before?
K In the North {University of--
V {And were you working there?
K Yeah with Dr. Mary Brown
V Was that the same woman you're working with {here?
K {Yeah

By soliciting information, Sandy and Valerie are expressing interest in Kazuko's situation, which in turn tends to create a closer proximity and the basis for a better understanding.

Sandy and Valerie also explicitly reference shared experience with Kazuko. Sandy talks often about her experience in Japan, what she and Kazuko did together while she was there, and her continuing interest in Japanese culture. She also talks about her efforts to find a good doctor in terms of an experience that is "the same" as Kazuko's:

S I have a choice so, I should find a good doctor, but it's hard-, I mean it's the same with you,

Further, Sandy occasionally demonstrates a noticeable tendency toward "foreigner talk," using simplified, non-grammatical sentence structure and easily understood non-linguistic information: "If she sings, we shh." Although FT modifications are unnecessary in light of Kazuko's advanced linguistic ability,[5] Sandy's use of FT nevertheless reflects an accommodative convergence and

identification with Kazuko, one which emphasizes a shared perspective and orientation toward Kazuko's point of view.

Valerie, who is meeting Kazuko for the first time, also explicitly attempts to indicate commonality. Speaking about the songs Kazuko's mother sang to her when she was a child, Valerie tells Kazuko, "You say that you thought all of the kids should have known the lullabies? I know that I've had that reaction too." In a different context later in the conversation, Valerie again explicitly references a shared experience with Kazuko. She says, "I'm gonna have something of a similar experience of being somewhere that I don't speak the language because I'm going to Spain next year." Both Sandy and Valerie are negotiating to create a common bond with Kazuko, essentially saying, "I know how you feel. I feel the same way. I have the same experience," thus constructing a sense of belonging to the same
group, being in the same boat with similar view of the waves of life.

The good-natured teasing, which occurs occasionally throughout the dinner, serves to reinforce this sense of solidarity. Sandy, for example, kids Kazuko's mother for being "a crazy skier" and, in the following exchange, of not being the kind of person who could possibly be shy:

K She is embarrassed
S N::o! you!? hhh {All hhh} Not-, it's not possible
All hhh
K She is a shy, shy woman
S But she is also a performer
K Right
Mo Shy woman, I am shy woman
All hhh

Teasing in good jest is a positive bonding strategy reserved for members of the same group, as can be seen in the teasing which occurs between the two native speakers when Valerie, who is from Virginia, kids Sandy about not understanding the South:

V She's never been to the South at all, the South, the part of the country, I mean the Southeast that is, so, , {She's just ignorant,
S {I'm not a Northerner,
I'm ignorant, hhh

Greater distance

Kazuko, however, does not demonstrate as strong a concern for constructing intimacy as her native speaker interlocutors. While she is friendly and responsive, she is also more reserved and appears to maintain greater social distance and evidence a corresponding lack of reciprocity to the enthusiastic solicitation of her colleagues. First, Kazuko is less solicitous of Sandy or Valerie's experiences than they are of hers. Second, she tends to hedge when asked to give her opinion. She requests clarification, for example, when Valerie asks about her impressions of America:

K This particular, , town you mean?
V Just, well
K Or America?
V This place yes, well, I guess this place because you're here. I mean did you have strong um, feelings and impressions and reactions to coming here?
K Um, , I don't know if I, understand your question correctly but uh , , ,

Kazuko's reticence may stem in part from a sense of deference or self-deprecation. She seems to be more comfortable talking about her mother than herself, and when Valerie's question about America is later pursued by Sandy, Kazuko again shifts the focus away from her own experience, directing it to her mother's. "She" refers to Kazuko's mother:

S And I was just curious if, what you thought about that
K Uh huh, yeah. Cause, I'm, I've been in America before so I'm not good person. Yeah, she's, she's I think got sort of shocked here

Often social distance is correlated in a linear fashion with indirectness. In the Brown and Levinson (1978) model, for example, greater distance engenders more indirect, "off record" behavior. Certain features of Kazuko's discourse in fact reflect a tentative indirectness. She expresses hesitant doubt rather than an assertive negation of Lucy's mistaken assumption that *Sweet and Low*, the song which Kazuko's mother sang to her as a child, is the "Southern" *Swing Low, Sweet Chariot*, with "Really? I didn't know that."

K Yeah, my favorite was {Sweet and Low
S {In English? And you sang to her in English a long time ago?
K Right {hhh}

S And it's a Southern song too isn't it?
K Really? I didn't know that
S I somehow think of it as, , ,
K So, but it's England

In the middle of the conversation when the tape is being turned over, Kazuko also makes an indirect reference to not feeling well, hinting that the time has been dragging. She simply notes that the forty-five minutes (of side A of the tape) seemed more like ninety:

K Already? I said {only
S {hhh Doesn't seem so long. It seems too long for you?
K Well, , I thought 90 minutes {hhh
S {already gone hhh , , ,

Direct and indirect features

Certain features of Kazuko's discourse, however, can not be characterized as indirect. What stands out in Kazuko's discourse is the blend of both indirectness and directness. She demonstrates an explicitness which is clearly evident in two ways: first, she pointedly and somewhat emotionally criticizes Americans for producing poor quality consumer goods, and second she explicitly negates some of Sandy's well-intentioned but erroneous guesses about what she is saying.

Sandy, who knows a little (but not a lot) about Japan, often explains to Valerie about Japanese customs. At one point, Sandy is helpfully interpreting for Kazuko, only to be upstaged by Kazuko's rather explicit contradiction of her assumption:

S It's Japanese custom, to have rice for breakfast, {but - - -
K {oh not, you know
S - - - Kazuko-san and her mother don't ever have, sometimes have rice for breakfast
V What do you have for breakfast? ,
K Well, usually we have rice , ,
S Hm' !

The above exchange demonstrates the problems that can arise in making assumptions about what one's interlocutor thinks, something which Sandy does a number of times during the conversation:

S So, what do you miss most about Japan, besides our boss?
K Un hhh, The toilet hhh {I told you
S {hhh oh that's right I forgot, , What about your bathtub? I was telling Valerie, it's too bad we're not visiting you in Japan {K: ah} because you have such a lovely bathtub where you can be in water all the way up to here. Do you miss that?
K No {hhh

The emotional peak of the conversation is reached midway through the meal when Sandy, returning to Valerie's earlier question, asks Kazuko about her impressions of America. Sandy has noticed the gap between images of Japan prevalent in the U.S. and the "reality" of Japanese daily life, and she asks if Kazuko has noticed any similar discrepancies in Japanese perceptions of America. Kazuko's response touches on the lack of products made in America:

K Unhun, but everything is made in **Taiwan** or Thailand hhh this is - - -
S {Made in Japan
K - - - Japanese, and we don't want to send , , <...>
It's just that we don't know the place to, to look for, but still in Japan you-, you-, it's hard to find a products not made in Japan in Japan hhh, you know, You have to {look for
S {That's because Japan is so
protectionist about their trade hhh
K So, maybe that's true but uh, , I wondered, if **you** don't, if **you** don't make **things** , , ,

In her answer, Kazuko's voice is strained and high pitched, indexing not only the importance of the topic, but also the tension of the exchange, which is soon resolved by Sandy's offer of repair (i.e., she takes out gifts she has brought for Kazuko).

The exchange between Kazuko and Sandy invokes different social identifications which are brought to the surface. In effect, different group memberships are indexed and made salient via their talk. While Sandy uses the third person to refer to Japan ("their trade") and thus locates the problem outside the locus of the current group (i.e., the participant structure in which she is framing the conversation), Kazuko uses the second person ("you") to reference Sandy (and Valerie) as members of a different group (i.e., Americans). Sandy, in spite of her criticism of the Japanese government's (supposed) protectionist trade policies, is claiming Kazuko as member of her in-group. Kazuko, however, declares

a different allegiance within a different participant structure, one that casts Sandy and Valerie as an out-group in relation to herself as a Japanese.

Kazuko's statement carries an explicitness that is reinforced by its strong emotional tone. Sandy is somewhat surprised, which precipitates her rather quick repair:

S Here, I brought you things made in the U.S.
K Okay hhh
S Actually, it's all food hhh {hhh}

At this, the conversation gets back on track and proceeds relatively smoothly in much the same manner as it did during the first half, although political issues are not brought up again.

Culturally located frames of reference

In interviews conducted with Kazuko, group membership emerges as one of the central categories of her worldview. This categorization can be delineated according to two dimensions: cultural identity and work-affiliated association. Significantly, the sense of group membership seems to constitute one of the frames of reference that Kazuko uses when negotiating the participant structure in which she stands vis à vis Sandy and Valerie in the conversation.

For instance, in regard to her cultural identity, Kazuko characteristically (but not exclusively) refers to Japanese as "we" and Sandy and Valerie as "you," locating herself within a different group membership. At one point in the conversation, Kazuko contradicts Lucy's assertion that the conference hotel where everyone stayed was expensive, stating that, "Our Japanese standard, it's not expensive at all." Kazuko's rationale for the trade friction is that "you don't make things" and "your product's not very high quality." While Japanese-ness is not a completely positive category (in that Kazuko is critical of some aspects of Japanese society, especially the position of women), it is salient at certain points in the conversation, serving as a frame of reference that mediates the social distance constructed in the discourse.

A second dimension of group membership is reflected in Kazuko's references to an established circle of associates and colleagues related to her position in the research lab at the university. Aside from her mother, Kazuko interacts most regularly with Lilly, the American technician in Kazuko's lab, who shares not only various research duties but also mutual interests, one of which is working under their sometimes irascible department chair. When speaking with Lily,

Kazuko's discourse reflects a high degree of shared perspective and social membership.

One characteristic of the frame of group membership for Kazuko appears to be its non-negotiable quality. More precisely, shared membership entails relatively less negotiation about group borders, as relationships with associates are categorized in terms of socially defined categories such as post doctoral research assistant or Japanese nationality. In contrast, Sandy and Valerie appear to be less dependent on membership as a category which shapes negotiation and more sensitive to the negotiation which shapes membership. In other words, Valerie and Sandy are negotiating membership in their discourse as individuals who are constructing a shared solidarity. Kazuko, in turn, appears to be employing a frame of reference which mediates the negotiation of a joint participant structure differently than her colleagues. Further, this difference seems to be related to social distance and an established group orientation. Importantly, this characterization of different frames of reference toward conversation is consistent with typical descriptions of Japanese interactional style as reserved and group-oriented.

As a frame of reference, however, group membership for Kazuko seems to have a dynamic character, one that is made relevant in negotiation with her conversation partners. The boundaries of the group frame may be relatively less permeable for Kazuko than they are for Sandy and Valerie, but the frame itself appears to shift according to the exigencies of the conversation. Kazuko's national identity as a Japanese, for example, is not evident throughout the conversation. In many contexts, it appears to have little or no bearing upon the conversation.

I would suggest that Kazuko's discourse reflects not fixed categories of culture or personality, such as deference or indirectness, that are laid upon social interaction as interpretive constructs. Rather, sociopragmatic patterns of negotiation about social distance and solidarity, at least partly based on culturally specific frames of reference, are made salient in local contexts according to the dynamics of the interaction.

On one hand, cultural assumptions and frames of expectation certainly mediate the negotiation in discourse, especially when the cultures differ as much as they do in the case of Japan and America. Kazuko, who has the opportunity to talk in the conversation but does not take it as might be expected of a NS, appears to be relying on a culturally specific frame of reference that mediates the construction of a participant structure reflecting more distance and less dynamic negotiability than the participant structure her American interlocutors are constructing. On the other hand, the discourse also reflects a mutual and jointly constructed intersubjectivity, which is the locally instantiated sociocult-

ural context. Social actors are capable of adapting to circumstances, including strikingly different cultural patterns of interaction. As McDermott and Tylbor (1986) point out, communicative breakdown tends to occur not primarily because culturally specific interactional codes are different, but rather because of the micropolitical dynamics of the interactional context, which are inherent in any communication, not just in the cross cultural variety.

While it seems fairly clear that Kazuko is employing a culturally specific frame of reference in this conversation, one which mediates her participation in the discourse and inhibits a quick negotiation of shared social solidarity, it also seems clear that this frame of reference is not static. Even though there is relatively less flexibility in Kazuko's notion of group membership that frames the construction of an implicit participant structure, the frame can change both over time and in the course of the conversation because it is negotiated in the local context according to the motivations of the participants. In this regard, there is another dimension of the conversation which needs to be pointed out, one that is related to the unconscious adoption of a native speaker standard in order to judge the success of cross cultural interaction.

The high solidarity strategies of solicitation and assistance provided by Sandy and Valerie to demonstrate their understanding of what Kazuko is trying to say, may contain implicit problems for the advanced NNS. In Sandy and Valerie's solicitation of Kazuko's experience in the U.S., for example, their repeated questioning indicates an interest in Kazuko and indexes a shared solidarity. At the same time, however, it also blocks Kazuko's ability to offer a full, extended answer. In much the same way, Sandy's tendency to fill in words and phrases for Kazuko that complete her thoughts, reflected in the exchange about protectionism, also serves to limit Kazuko's response:

K Unhun, but everything is made in Taiwan or Thailand hhh this is - - -
S {Made in Japan
K - - - Japanese, and we don't want to send, ,

While Sandy demonstrates that she understands Kazuko's point and her discourse perspective, she nevertheless also serves to undermine Kazuko's authority to make the point in the first place. This impression is reinforced when, in the same exchange, Sandy interrupts Kazuko's response (which she in fact solicited) to assert her own position:

K <...> it's hard to find a products not made in Japan in Japan hhh, you know, You have to {look for
S {That's because Japan is so protectionist about their trade hhh

Thus, the nominally collaborative pattern of the native speaker's concern to negotiate a shared perspective and sense of solidarity may also contain an implicit message which says, "Yes, we accept you and you are a part of our group, but you are a junior partner."

From this perspective, then, the negotiation of a structure of participation is not solely a question of different culturally contexted frames of reference and whether they are congruent or mismatched. It is also critical to consider whether the local sociocultural context instantiated by the speakers serves to facilitate or impede full and equal participation in discourse. Cultural understandings, like any cultural text, are used by individual, motivated actors to generate meanings in an emergent and interactive process of negotiation.

Limitations

The present analysis is certainly subject to a number of limitations which, while not restricted to qualitative approaches to discourse, should perhaps be noted. Other conversations, either of Kazuko or of the other three core participants in the study, have not yet been analyzed with the same lens utilized in this analysis. Further, I have not analyzed any discrepant cases (Erickson, 1986) that might challenge the interpretive categories generated thus far. But the principle idea which informs grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987) is that any theoretical understanding generated in one analysis needs to be "tested" against subsequent data. In this respect, the interpretation presented in this paper serves as a working hypothesis, valuable as a heuristic construct which can be used in further data collection and analysis in order to produce a more firmly grounded and more tightly integrated theoretical understanding.

Consensual and heteroglossic notions of culture

One generalization which may be supported by the data at hand, however, concerns the situated character of cross cultural interaction. The conversation provides evidence that directness is a critical element of Kazuko's discourse. It suggests that Kazuko's indirectness, both pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic, may be related to her tacit cultural assumptions regarding group membership, but that this understanding is not a static cultural model of indirectness or conversational style, but a pragmatic frame of reference which is made salient by a motivated actor in the local context of interaction.

In other words, the data suggest that claims often made about Japanese communicative behavior may slight the diversity of cultural style. It is often argued that the Japanese are, among other things, selfless and evasive (Barnlund, 1975), reciprocally egalitarian (Yamada, 1990), mutually cooperative (Hayashi, 1988), intuitive (Clancy, 1990), deferential (Matsumoto, 1988), and harmonious (Condon, 1984). Even granting that these descriptions are true for all Japanese across all contexts (a highly questionable assumption in itself), it does not follow either (1) that a Japanese NNS of English will automatically employ first language communicative patterns in interaction in English, or (2) that broad, macro-level cultural attributes such as indirectness do indeed characterize micro-level interaction.

One must be careful, as Verschueren (1985) cautions, of "overgeneralizing the polarity between two cultures." The outlines of culture, even Japanese culture, are not as static and homogeneous as they often are made out to be. Befu (1981), for example, has pointed out the limitations of the group model of Japanese society. Other critical sociological and anthropological studies (see McCormick & Sugimoto, 1986; Moeran, 1988; Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986) have illustrated the ideological roots of consensus models of culture, whether Japanese or American, which serve to downplay social conflict and struggle, particularly in relation to issues of ethnicity, class, and gender.

The primary question of cross cultural pragmatic behavior seems to be not whether typical Japanese and typical Americans (whomever they may be and, importantly, whomever they may exclude) interact differently in their own culture, but rather what happens in local, situated contexts when individual speakers from different cultures interact and negotiate a shared intersubjectivity that draws upon but also modifies cultural conventions and understandings. In effect, in cross cultural encounters, participants make adaptations to communicative style according to both their experience and motivation.

It is only in context that we can speak of directness and indirectness of discourse style. To characterize a culture as direct or indirect misses the fundamentally dynamic and heteroglossic nature of culturally situated discourse. An understanding of intercultural communication which relies on the cultural mismatch hypothesis, the assumption that discrepant communicative styles invariably cause "miscommunication," fails to recognize the fuzzy borders of culture where advanced speakers of a second language live their lives. To depict culture as homogeneous and ahistorical, a "consensual system of abstractions located in the cultural actor's mind" (Quantz & O'Connor, 1988) is to deny the diverse and contending voices of any cultural text.

An understanding of the Bakhtinian notion of multivoicedness leads us to see culturally situated discourse as generated in response, and in turn serving as a

stimulus, to other voices. Cultural models and norms of appropriateness are not static structures, but dynamic frames of reference used by social actors and inevitably shaped in their use, particularly their use in cross cultural encounters.

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NOTES

[1] This does not mean, of course, that in order to be understood, social actors must negotiate a shared membership. To the contrary, people can easily index an antagonistic, out-group relationship and understand each other perfectly well.

[2] A parallel distinctions is made between transactional and interactional utterances, where the former transmit information, and the latter establish social relationships (Brown & Yule, 1983; Kaspar, 1990). These categories distinguish different kinds of utterances, but I would argue, following Olson, that utterances index both dimensions simultaneously.

[3] In this paper, I draw from different exchanges located in different sections of the conversation, which totals ninety minutes in length. The appendix provides a longer fragment of the transcripted conversation which, while not containing all the elements or excerpts discussed in the paper, might allow a better a sense of the tone and character of the discourse.

[4] All names in the study are pseudonyms and bear no relation to the real names of informants.

[5] As Beebe (1988) and others have pointed out, accommodative convergence may also reflect stereotypes about speakers which are not connected with actual patterns of language use. Although some NNS may resent FT as condescending

or inappropriate, Kazuko expressed no general aversion to accommodative adjustments made by American native speakers for her benefit.

Transcript conventions

hhh	laughter
JJJ	Japanese
, ,	pause of about one-half second per comma
{ }	overlapping speech inserted as BC backchannels
{	overlapping, joint maintenance of the floor
???	words not understood
[ ]	analyst's explanation or description
<...>	conversation omitted
/	rising intonation
?	rising intonation at a question
-	speech that is clipped short
--	speech that is clipped short at an interruption
::	elongation of a sound
- - -	bridge: continuing speech that is overlapped

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APPENDIX

S Turkey cooking? that sounds strange!
K Its got the, top prize for, - - -
V {Dessert
K - - - dessert section
S And did you make something?
K No'
S No, just, just your wife, your husband, your husband hhh
V That sounds like a good idea, a departmental cookoff {hhh - - -
K {Unhun yeah
V - - - a good excuse to, , eat
K Yeah, and many people came from many countries so, and you can

taste different kind of dishes, its very interesting <...>
V And so you've been here six months? {Is that right?
K {Yeah, almost yes
V Do you feel accustomed to it yet?
K Yeah, , after, we-, you know we spent a three nights, four nights at the conference, we feel this our home hhh {hhh}
S Oh so its good to go away
K {Yeah, right
S {So you can do that
V And this is your first time to be, in the United States?
{or have been--
K {For her but, - - -
V {not for you
K - - - not for me, yeah
V Where were you before?
K In the North/ {University of---
V {And were you working there?
K Yeah with Dr Mary Brown/ um,
V Was that the same woman you're working with here?
K Yeah
S Valerie asked, how did you get this post doc, I couldn't remember, Now, {M: oh} did she write you?
K Yeah, when, she decided to come here, from the North to here, she-, I think she sent letters to many people to annous [announce] about it and then, she's looking fo:r some people, to work with, um like technicians, and post docs and graduate students/ and so forth, so I was, I was unhappy with my possin [position] hhh, I was, sort of looking for, {S: unhun} looking for a chance to--
S {Which boss was this?
{hhh
K {Well, well hhh {S: hhh} You know that hhh, so I wonder, if I could be uh, her post doc then, ,
S This is delicious. Prize winning food
K Okay hhh yeah
V And this is a, a one year/ or a two year post doc?
K Uh, Mary says two years, and,
S Kikuchi san/ Japan said one year {hhh
K {Yeah
S So who knows,

K But I have to write, present uh, document for extension/ for another one year, {S: unhun} and, maybe in, , before, the end of February, and to do, that, I have to report, how much progress I got during, and I got one year would be so fruitful for me and fruitful for Japanese government hhh or something like that {S: unhun unhun}, but actually I haven't, got anything yet, {you know {so I'm so,

V {hhh {But do you, but you hope to stay both years'

K Right, unhun, maybe, uh, yeah, I think so hhh [4 sec pause]

S The progress in molecular biology, is like, uh nothing nothing nothing nothing nothing,{unhun/} a lot

K Oh really!?

S Unhun <...> [end of side A]

K Already? I said only? hhh

S Doesn't seem so long,

K Really,

S It seems too long for you?

K Well, , , I thought 90 minutes {hhh

S {Is already gone there hhh , , ,

V It's funny though you say that, you thought all of the kids should have known the lullabies/ {unhun} I know that I've had that reaction too, my-, not about music, but my parents read stories to me {unhun/} that, that, they read to me a lot when I was very young and then I thought, everyone knew these stories because they seemed, they were sort of children's classics {unhun} and things like that, and then I talked to people and they never even heard of them you know? {right unhun} hhh it's :so funny, {yeah, unhun} it just seems like, I think-, {unhun} they have a defect you know hhh - - -

K {unhun yeah I thought--

V - - - they don't have an aura or {something like that

K {Right unhun yeah, , [JJJ with Mother]

S But back to Valerie's other question about America, {unhun/} cause when I went to Japan, I had this idea that Japan um-, everyone is so successful in Japan, they are making so much money and, they are working very very hard {unhun} and everyone has the highest technology everywhere, and, you know in America, you learn about-, I mean the image of Japan, {unhun} is this society that is so successful and everybody works so hard, {unhun} and they're out-competing America and they're dangerous to use because they're so good {hhh} at business you know? {unhun} But then I go there, and the day to day Japanese life is not like that at all

K No,

S But, there must be the same sort of misconception {unhun} about America to Japanese people, and, I was just curious, if-, what you thought about that

K Unhun yeah, cause I'm-, I've been in America before, so I'm not {good person, yeah, - - -

S {But she's ???

K - - - she's, she's I think got sort of shocked, here to find uh, uh, actually your product's not very high quality, {S: unhun} a:nd you said, that you-, that when you came back America and send us a letter saying you've struck, to find out, uh, prices, lower than Japan but the quality is lower too, {S: unhun unhun} and she uh, couldn't believe it, was "we:ll, the Americans quality is lower than Japanese!" {S: unhun} It's so strange to her, but now she understands hhh a little bit and, even to find American product is very hard, here, it's very, , strange, you know-, we are trying to find some presents to send our friends in Japan/ {S: unhun} and we wanted to send something American, {S: unhun} American product, but it's so hard to find, nice, American hhh thing, well it's orange or, , potatoes {S: right} hhh it's really cheap and good, and you know, but but you cannot send them, we want to send something like a sweater or {uh hhh

S {Right made in America?

K Unhun, but everything is made in Taiwan or Thailand hhh this is- - -

S {Made in Japan

K - - - Japanese, and we don't want to send, ,

S Although like in Minnesota you can find hand-made things so, you know hand-made pottery {right} or hand-made embroidery or knitting and crocheting, or quilts/ {unhun} and that sort of thing is very popular, but, maybe it's not as popular in this state, cause it's so cold in Minnesota everyone stays home in the winter {hhh} and makes crafts hhh

V I don't think that would be, an uh, an accurate generalization {S: huh} cause I think in the South, that there is a, a tradition of crafts too yeah, it's just different kinds of crafts,

K It's just that we don't know the place to, to look for, but still in Japan you-, you-, it's hard to find a, , products not made in Japan in Japan hhh, you know, you have to {look for

S {That's because Japan is so protectionist about their trade {hhh

K {Well maybe, that's true but uh, , well I, I wondered if you don't, if you don't make things , ,

S Then, , yeah, I think it's just a matter of what's, you know, what's the least expensive is often the most available, {unhun} But not always

V Well it's, I think it's a matter of diversity thought, right? I mean, companies can have things, there are-, there can be factories here, there c a n b e factories other places, {unhun} so things can be made in various-, I mean it's just, a lot of diversity of products {unhun} s:o, I don't-, I'm not sure that I would sa::y, you know that you can't find American things cause you can certainly find American made products, <...> so, I think it's more-, I think-, there is just diversity,

S Here I brought you things made in Minnesota {hhh

K {okay hhh

S Actually it's all food hhh

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Transferability of L1 Indirect Request Strategies to L2 Contexts

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This study is intended to examine the transferability of five indirectness strategies realized by the conventions of usage of Japanese indirect requests when Japanese learners of English realize English indirect requests in four situations. Subjects representing two proficiency groups were asked to undertake the acceptability judgment task for five indirect request expressions in Japanese and English, respectively, for each situation. The transferability rate was computed for each indirectness strategy for each situation by subtracting the acceptability rate of the English indirect request from the acceptability rate of the corresponding Japanese indirect request. The results clearly indicated that contextual factors played a major role in determining transferabilities at the pragmatic level. Furthermore, some proficiency effects on the transferabilities of those indirect request strategies were identified.

INTRODUCTION

A central concern of transferability studies has been to determine how, why, and when L1 features can be transferred to an L2 (see Andersen, 1983; Eckman, 1977; Gass, 1979; Jordens, 1977; Kellerman, 1977, 1978, 1979a; Zobl, 1980; and others). Much of the research on transferability, however, has revolved around the investigation of syntactic, lexical, and semantic features. Little attention has been paid to transferability as it relates to pragmatics. Rather, what has interested interlanguages (IL) pragmatics researchers is detecting the fact of pragmatic transfer as a possible source of miscommunication, without seriously examining

the conditions or process of pragmatic transfer (see Beebe et al., 1990; Olshtain, 1983; Wolfson, 1989, Ch. 7; and others).

The current study is intended to examine transferability at the pragmatic level. Specifically, an effort is invested here in clarifying the nature of transferability observed in L2 production requiring pragmatic competence. First, however, it is necessary to review how SLA researchers have been dealing with the notion of transferability. Subsequently, another attempt will be made to examine to what extent the notion of transferability has been explored in the area of IL pragmatics.

On the Notion of Transferability

In order to define 'transferability,' a number of criteria have been suggested. Based on the Markedness Differential Hypothesis (MDH), Eckman (1977) proposed **typological markedness** as a transferability criterion. According to Eckman, the more typical and unmarked the structures are, the more likely they will be transferred, thereby connecting transfer with universality.

Universality was also suggested as a transferability criterion by Gass (1979). She argued that "the likelihood of the transferability of linguistic phenomena must take into account **both** target language facts and rules of universal grammar" (p. 343). Specifically, Gass suggested for the area of syntax that transferability is mainly determined by the following three conditions, which interact with language universals: (1) surface structures in L1 correspond to those in L2; (2) the TL and the transferred patterns manifest a high degree of perceptual salience; and (3) the transferred pattern has a less elliptical structure than the corresponding TL pattern.

By placing more emphasis on L2 structural properties than L1, Zobl (1980) argued for **selectivity of transfer**, proposing various formal and developmental criteria for the selective nature of L1 influence. According to Zobl, L2 learners must attain a certain level of development in L2 structures before transfer is activated. Furthermore, transfer is selective on the formal axis which is "defined in terms of systems and structures of the L2 that differ along such dimensions as stability (verb types), consistency (word order), and innovativeness (question types) in that L2's learner-language" (Zobl, 1980, p. 54). Andersen (1983) reformulated Zobl's claim, proposing the **transfer to somewhere principle**. According to this principle, consistent transfer takes place "**if and only if** there already exists within the L2 input the potential for (mis-)generalization from the input to produce the same form or structure" (p. 178) (though one could argue that ***existence in the L2*** input may not necessarily be an essential condition).

The above transferability criteria were formulated on the basis of linguistically established concepts. Hence, as Faerch and Kasper (1987) pointed out, a problem inherent in the above criteria is that they may not be ***psychologically real*** for L2 learners in their process of transfer. In order to solve this problem, some SLA researchers have made attempts to establish ***psycholinguistic*** criteria for transferability. Among them are Kellerman and Jordens.

Kellerman (1977, 1978/87, 1979a, 1986) conducted a series of experiments by focusing primarily on the transferability of lexis. Kellerman defined the transferability of a structure as "the probability with which it will be transferred to an L2 compared to some other structure or structures" (1986, p. 36). Unlike Zobl (1980) and Andersen (1983), he claimed that transferability can be established solely based upon L1-specific features independent of the L2. Three criteria of transferability were proposed by Kellerman: (1) psycholinguistic markedness, (2) the reasonable entity principle (REP); and (3) psychotypology (Kellerman, 1983).

Psycholinguistic markedness refers to the perception of a feature described as "infrequent, irregular, semantically or structurally opaque, or in any other way exceptional" (Kellerman, 1983, p. 117) and transferability of the feature is defined as inversely proportional to its degree of markedness. Psycholinguistic markedness is a crucial factor in determining whether an L1 feature is perceived as language-specific (and thus non-transferable) or language-neutral (and thus transferable). In his 1977 study, Kellerman set up an experiment to examine how Dutch learners of English at three different proficiency levels would treat Dutch idiomatic expressions translated into English. The learners were asked to judge if the translated English expressions were acceptable in English or not. The results showed that the lowest proficiency group tended to reject Dutch-like idioms (due to their 'language-specific' judgment on Dutch idioms as a result of the perceived greater psycholinguistic markedness of those lexical items). In contrast, the highest proficiency group was more successful at distinguishing correct English idioms similar to Dutch ones from Dutch-based erroneous idioms.

Jordens (1977) and Kellerman (1977) further indicated that *non-transparent* idioms were more often rejected (whether correctly or not) and thus non-transferable than *transparent* ones. Furthermore, Kellerman (1978/87) examined the various senses of a polysemous Dutch word *breken* (to break) in English or ***(zer)brechen*** in German for those senses. He concluded that expressions which contained words manifesting a greater core (unmarked) meaning identified along a putative coreness/markedness dimension of a two-dimensional semantic space were more often accepted as translatable expressions. Those expressions were therefore predicted to be transferable (see Kellerman, 1986). (For more on the 'markedness' claim, see Kellerman, 1979a.)

With the **reasonable entity principle** (REP) as another criterion of transferability, Kellerman (1983) claimed that "in the absence of specific knowledge about the L2, learners will strive to maximalize the systematic, the explicit, and the "logical" in their IL" (p. 122). In other words, L2 learners tend to transfer L1 structures which conform to the L2 reasonableness assumption and fail to transfer L1 structures if they do not conform to this assumption.

With regard to the criterion of **psychotypology**, the results of Jordens (1977) are often compared with the results available from Kellerman (1977) in relation to language-specificity/neutrality as evidence for learner's psychotypology or metalingual awareness of language distance. According to Jordens, first-year Dutch learners with low proficiency in German accepted Dutch idiomatic expressions translated into German and failed to distinguish expressions possible in German from those impossible in that language. Second-year learners, however, tended to reject Dutch-like idiomatic expressions in German regardless of their correctness. Third-year learners, on the other hand, were able to begin distinguishing between Dutch idiomatic expressions that were possible and impossible in German. Based on this finding, Jordens assumed that the first-year Dutch learners of German could not distinguish those expressions due to a lesser degree of psychotypological distance between Dutch and German. Those learners considered that the two languages were similar, as opposed to the Dutch learners of English in Kellerman (1977), who perceived a greater psychotypological distance between Dutch and English. (For 'language distance,' see also Ringbom, 1978, 1985.)

We must, however, be cautious in applying Kellerman's transferability criteria to specific L2 learning situations. The judgment of language-specificity/neutrality, reasonableness of L1 structures in a given L2, and language distance may change in accordance with learners' increased experience with the L2 and/or their experience with learning of languages other than the L2 (Faerch & Kasper, 1987; Kellerman, 1983). As a matter of fact, Kellerman (1984) and Sharwood Smith and Kellerman (1989) report some *U-shaped* behaviors observed in learners' transferability judgments according to their proficiency in the target language[1] (see also Jordens, 1977; Kellerman, 1979b).

One major problem of Kellerman's transferability criteria is that no clear-cut explanation has been provided as to the causal relationship (if any) between 'psycholinguistic markedness' and 'psychotypology.' Perceiving an L1 feature as specific or neutral (i.e., psycholinguistically marked or unmarked) might have been greatly influenced by the learner's psychotypology, and the learner's perception of language-specificity/neutrality may have influenced his/her psychotypology. At this stage of transferability research, however, we have very little evidence as to how these two criteria are related to each other, due to lack

of systematic studies on the relationship between the general perception of language-distance and the perceived language-specificity/neutrality of specific linguistic features in various combinations of languages. Yet, in spite of this problem, Kellerman has satisfactorily verified that certain aspects of crosslinguistic influence can be predicted and explained successfully and systematically.

Studies of Pragmatic Transfer

Focusing on five major speech acts--apology, refusal, gratitude, compliment, and request--I will now examine to what extent transferability (by which I specifically mean transferability determined by the constraints of **psycholinguistic markedness**) has been dealt with in the area of pragmatics as well as what findings on transfer are available in this area. Cohen and Olshtain have substantially investigated the transfer phenomena in apology. Olshtain (1983), for instance, attempted to describe nonnative deviations observed in apology performed by native English speakers and native Russian speakers learning Hebrew as L2. The major finding of this study is that the overall highest level of use for apology semantic formulas was attained by English speakers, somewhat lower by Russian speakers, and the lowest by Hebrew speakers. Additionally and more importantly for this review, Olshtain pointed out that speakers of English were found to have a **language-specific** perception concerning the apology speech act in general, whereas speakers of Russian were found to have a more **universal** perception of the apology act. Specifically, she found that English native speakers learning Hebrew tended to perceive spoken Hebrew as permitting fewer apologies due to Hebrew-specific conventions in performing this particular speech act. Russian native speakers learning Hebrew were more likely to assume that people need to apologize according to their feelings of responsibility, regardless of language and culture (see Cohen & Olshtain, 1981; Olshtain & Cohen, 1989).

Beebe, Takahashi, and Uliss-Weltz (1990) is one of the few transfer studies on IL refusals. They examined how refusals are carried out by Japanese learners of English. Their findings showed transfer in the order, frequency, and content of refusal strategies as well as in the learners' sensitivity to status (of the refusees). Within the same framework of Beebe et al., Takahashi and Beebe (1987) focused on the effects of learning contexts (ESL vs. EFL) and learners' proficiency on L2 refusals. They found that the EFL group tended to transfer Japanese rules of speaking to a greater extent than the ESL group. Additionally, the hypothesis that a greater amount of transfer will correlate with greater proficiency was not conclusively supported by their data. However, they claimed that there was some evidence in that direction.

Both refusal studies reviewed above only presented the fact of transfer and did not explore **transferability**. However, their hypothesized claim that advanced-level learners have considerable difficulty in performing target speech acts suggests that even highly-proficient learners may rely on their L1 features and transfer them to L2 contexts, thus implying the significance of a study to examine what feature is and is not transferable for those learners.

Based on Eisenstein and Bodman (1986), Bodman and Eisenstein (1988) analyzed the transfer phenomena observed in advanced Arabic-, Farsi-, and Punjabi-speaking learners of English. They found that those learners transferred their NL's ritualized expressions in thanking to their IL responses in written production questionnaires. However, there were few instances of those expressions in spontaneous role plays performed in their L2. According to Bodman and Eisenstein, the learners evinced considerable awkwardness, with many hesitations and pauses, in the face-to-face communicative contexts. Bodman and Eisenstein observed that the learners seemed to realize that they must avoid transferring expressions of gratitude literally from their native languages. This realization led to the learners' hesitation behavior in their role play performance.

Similar findings to those of Bodman and Eisenstein (1988) are reported by Wolfson (1981) in her study on compliments (see also Wolfson, 1989). Based on data gathered from conversations in Arabic and Farsi, advanced Arabic- and Farsi-speaking learners of English avoided direct translation of their NL's proverbs and other ritualized compliment expressions. Those studies, then, clearly supported Kellerman's claims that translations of idiomatic/formulaic expressions unique or specific to a particular language into another language is less likely to be accepted by L2 learners.

In the area of transfer studies of request, House and Kasper (1987) took a **nonuniversalistic** approach by claiming that the learners' decision on transfer is based primarily on L1 language-specificity. They focused on **directness** and **internal/external modifications** exemplified in L2 English indirect requests attempted by native speakers of Danish and German, respectively. They concluded that transfer from learners' NL operates differentially: "the learners avoid transfer of language-specific structures, thus indicating awareness of transferability constraints at the pragmatic level" (p. 1285) (see Faerch & Kasper, 1989).

A transfer study of requests was also attempted by Takahashi and DuFon (1989). They examined whether or not Japanese learners of English transfer L1 indirect request strategies to L2 communicative settings. Following Takahashi (1987), Takahashi and DuFon asked the learners to role play two situations where they ask fictional neighbors (who are older and have higher social status) to do something. Elicited L2 data were then compared with L1 English and L1

Japanese baseline data obtained in Takahashi (1987) and analyzed at three different levels of proficiency: beginning, intermediate, and advanced. Using the indirectness taxonomy developed by Takahashi (1987), data analysis revealed that Japanese ESL learners tended to proceed from less direct to more direct levels in their request choice on a developmental axis. Furthermore, the following findings were obtained: (1) in their attempt to make an explicit reference to a desired action, the learners favored a more direct English request than the American counterparts; and (2) when they decided to refer implicitly to an action to be taken, they relied on hinting strategies, showing preference for a more indirect approach than the Americans. Based on the above findings, Takahashi and DuFon identified a bimodal distribution of L2 indirectness strategies which was also detected in L1 Japanese request performance, but not in L1 English request performance in Takahashi (1987), thus providing evidence of transfer in their study.

Of the two findings entailing the bimodal distribution in Takahashi and DuFon, the first finding is noteworthy. Namely, the Japanese learners of English almost exclusively employed relatively direct strategies when performing English indirect requests intended to refer to the action explicitly. In contrast, the American control group participants (in Takahashi, 1987) favored relatively indirect strategies in making such requests. Those request strategies chosen by the Japanese learners of English and the native speakers of American English were represented by the following four conventions of usage constituting parts of the conventional indirectness level of the taxonomy (see Table 1)[2, 3]:

The requests made by the Japanese learners of English:

'Want' statement: Sentences stating S's (speaker's) wish or want that H (hearer) will do A (action). (e.g., 'I would like you to VP.')

'Willingness' question: Sentences asking H's will, desire, or willingness to do A. (e.g., 'Would you VP?', 'Would you be willing to VP?')

The requests made by the native speakers of American English:

'Mitigated ability' statement: Declarative sentences questioning H's doing A. (e.g., 'I wonder if you could VP.')

'Mitigated expectation' statement: Sentences concerning S's expectation of H's doing A in hypothetical situations. (e.g., 'I would appreciate it if you would VP.')

Why did the Japanese ESL learners prefer the above request strategies? A possible explanation could be that the indirectness strategies represented by the 'Want' statement and the 'Willingness' question are language-neutral and thus were transferred to L2 contexts. A question arises as to whether Japanese indirectness strategies represented by the 'Want' statement and the 'Willingness' question are really treated in that manner. Additionally, what predictions can be made as to other indirect request strategies? Are they equally transferable in those specific situations? In the light of the obtained results of proficiency effects in Takahashi and DuFon, it would also be worthwhile to investigate proficiency effects on the transferabilities of Japanese indirect request strategies to corresponding English request contexts.

On the whole, the studies presented above have centered on identifying transfer phenomena at the pragmatic level rather than exploring transferability of pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic knowledge. They have not examined systematically what kinds of speech act realization patterns are judged to be language/culture-specific and thus predicted as non-transferable and which are assessed as language/culture-neutral and thus predicted as transferable. In fact, a transferability study of this kind would provide psycholinguistically valid explanations of the bimodal distribution of indirectness strategies reported in Takahashi and DuFon (1989). Hence, systematic studies directly addressing the issue of transferability need to be undertaken.

Table 1

Components of the Conventional Indirectness Level of the Taxonomy in Takahashi (1987)
(from most direct to least direct)

(1) **'Want' statement**: Sentences stating S's (speaker's) wish or want that H (hearer) will do A (action). (e.g., 'I would like you to open the window.')

(2) **'Expectation' statement**: Sentences stating S's expectation of H's doing A. (e.g. 'Would you open the windows? 'You should open the window.')

(3) **'Willingness' question**: Sentences asking H's will, desire, or willingness to do A. (e.g., 'Would you open the window?', 'Would you be willing to open the window?')

(4) **'Ability' question**: Sentences asking H's ability to do A. (e.g., 'Can you open the window?', 'Could you open the window?')

(5) **'Reason' question**: Sentences asking reasons for H's not doing A. (e.g., 'Why don't you open the window?')

(6) **'Permission' question**: Sentences asking H's permission for S's requesting H to do A. (e.g., 'Can I ask you to open the window?')

(7) **'Mitigated ability'** question: Interrogative sentences embedding one of the clauses/gerunds concerning H's doing A. (e.g., 'Do you think that you can open the window?')

(8) **'Mitigated ability'** statement: Declarative sentences questioning H's doing A. (e.g., 'I wonder if you could open the window.')

(9) **'Mitigated expectation' statement**: Sentences concerning S's expectation of H's doing A in hypothetical situations. (e.g., 'I would appreciate it if you would open the window.')

THE STUDY

Purposes of the Study

The aims of the current study are twofold: (1) to examine the transferability of indirectness strategies realized by the conventions of usage (see Morgan, 1978; Searle, 1975) of Japanese indirect requests when Japanese learners of English

realize English indirect requests; and (2) to investigate the effects of language proficiency on transferability (see Sharwood Smith & Kellerman, 1989; Takahashi & Beebe, 1987). This study, then, is expected to answer the question of why the Japanese learners of English in Takahashi and DuFon (1989) favored particular levels of indirectness as noted above.

Hypotheses

Based primarily on the findings of Takahashi and DuFon (1989), the following hypotheses will be tested.

H 1: The Japanese indirectness strategy represented by the 'Want' statement (i.e., Sentence stating S's wish or want that H will do A) is relatively transferable to the corresponding English request context.

H 2: The Japanese indirectness strategy represented by the 'Willingness' question (i.e., Sentence asking H's will, desire, or willingness to do A) is relatively transferable to the corresponding English request context.

H 3: The Japanese indirectness strategy represented by the 'Ability' question (i.e., Sentences asking H's ability to do A) is relatively non-transferable to the corresponding English request context (or not realizable).

H 4: The Japanese indirectness strategy represented by the 'Mitigated ability' statement (i.e., Declarative sentences questioning H's doing A) is relatively non-transferable to the corresponding English request context (or not realizable).

H 5: The Japanese indirectness strategy represented by the 'Mitigated expectation' statement (i.e., Sentences concerning S's expectation of H's doing A in hypothetical situations) is relatively non-transferable to the corresponding English request context (or not realizable).

H 6: There is a difference between Low ESL (beginning/intermediate) and High ESL (highly advanced) learners in terms of their assessments on predicted transferability of indirectness strategies of requests.

Methodology

Subjects

37 female Japanese learners of English as a second language formed the subjects for the current study. In order to compare the results of this study with those of Takahashi and DuFon (1989), the variable of gender was controlled, using female learners only.

For the purpose of investigating the proficiency effect on transferability, the subjects were further divided into two groups based on their English proficiency. 20 subjects belonged to Low ESL Group (TOEFL scores 450 - 540; mean TOEFL score = 502) and 17 subjects were in High ESL Group (TOEFL scores 560 - 650; mean TOEFL score = 607).[4] The Low ESL subjects were enrolled in either Hawaii English Language Program (HELP) or the ESL program at Hawaii Pacific University. The High ESL subjects were graduate students at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. ESL learners whose TOEFL scores were 449 or below were not asked to participate in the present study because the task required a good knowledge of English vocabulary and grammar.

Materials

A questionnaire consisting of two parts (Part I and Part II) was constructed for this study. Each part was comprised of four situations: the 'Flute,' 'Questionnaire,' 'Airport,' and 'Moving Car' situations. All of them had already proved to elicit **requests** in the previous studies. Specifically, of the four, the 'Flute' and 'Questionnaire' situations were adapted from Takahashi (1987) and Takahashi and DuFon (1989) with minor modification. The remaining two situations were taken from a pilot study of Takahashi (1987).

Following Takahashi (1987) and Takahashi and DuFon (1989), all the situations were described so that a female requestor asks a not-so-familiar,[5] older, female neighbor with higher social status to do something (difficult) for her. For all of the situations, attention was duly paid to create a request context which might be encountered in both Japanese and American societies so that unfamiliarity of context would not affect the subjects' acceptability judgment on indirect requests. The situations were described as follows:

> **'Flute' situation**: You ask your female next-door neighbor (in her 50s) to practice the flute a little earlier in the evening because this neighbor has been practicing after ten o'clock at night, which has been disturbing your sleep.[6]

'Questionnaire' situation: You ask your female next-door neighbor (in her 50s) to fill out a questionnaire which she had previously agreed to fill out and return it as soon as possible since your paper is due in four days.

'Airport' situation: You ask your female next-door neighbor (in her 50s) to give you a ride to the airport so that you can catch an early flight.

'Moving Car' situation: You ask your female next-door neighbor (in her 50s) to move her car parked in front of your garage because you have to get your car out to go pick up your friend at the airport.

Each of the four situations was followed by a brief dialogue (two-to-three turns) in which the request was made.

In Part I, both the situations and the following dialogues were written in Japanese. A dialogue after each situation was further followed by five Japanese sentences which realized the request to be made in the dialogue with five different types of indirectness strategies (intended to refer to the action explicitly). Those five types of request strategies were actually employed by the Japanese subjects in Takahashi (1987) for each requestor-requestee relationship described above. Those five strategies were as follows:

(1) The strategy represented by the 'Want' statement. (e.g., V-site itadaki tai no desu ga (= I would like you to VP.)) (Hereafter, the indirectness strategy of 'I would like.')

(2) The strategy represented by the 'Willingness' question. (e.g., V-site itadake masu (masen) ka (= Would you VP?)) (Hereafter, the indirectness strategy of 'Would you.)

(3) The strategy represented by the 'Ability' question. (e.g., V-rare masu ka / V-site itadaku koto wa dekimasen ka (= Can you VP?)) (Hereafter, the indirectness strategy of 'Can you.')

(4) The strategy represented by the 'Mitigated ability' statement. (e.g., V-site itadake nai ka to omoimasi-te (= I wonder if you could VP.) (Hereafter, the indirectness strategy of 'I wonder.')

(5) The strategy represented by the 'Mitigated expectation' statement. (e.g., V-site itadakeru to arigatai no desu ga (= I would appreciate it if you would VP.))
(Hereafter, the indirectness strategy of 'I appreciate.')

The above set of five indirectness strategies were provided in each dialogue, using either of the two types of Japanese honorific auxiliary verbs, **itadaku** and **morau**, which differ from each other in politeness (**itadaku** is more polite than **morau**). Based upon the judgment of the researcher (a native Japanese speaker), the appropriate honorific auxiliary verb was selected for each set of the five indirectness strategies for each situation. Specifically, all of the five strategies for the 'Flute,' 'Questionnaire,' and 'Airport' situations were realized by the honorific auxiliary verb **itadaku**; and all of the five strategies for the 'Moving Car' situation was presented using the honorific auxiliary verb **morau**. Hence, the variable of politeness manifested in those two types of auxiliary verbs was controlled in each situation. It should be stressed here that the current research focus was on the **convention of usage** realizing indirectness strategies, not the politeness markers for those strategies.

For each sentence representing a particular indirectness strategy, a five-point scale of acceptability judgment was provided ('5' was the most acceptable, i.e., 'accept' and '1' was the least acceptable, i.e., 'reject'). This rating task was crucial for a transferability study at the pragmatic level since the degree of acceptability differs from one request to another in that particular situation. The presentation order of the five Japanese sentences was counterbalanced across the four situations.

Part II consisted of exactly the same situations and dialogues but, this time, was written in English. Each of the English situations was followed by five English request sentences, which were translation equivalents of the Japanese requests in Part I. For each English request sentence, a five-point scale of acceptability judgment was provided. [Note here that an additional request modification such as a politeness marker, **please**, was avoided. This was because some English requests did not require it, and thus we had to avoid cases where subjects judged the acceptability of the English requests solely on the basis of whether or not a certain modification was supplied.] The presentation order of situations and request strategies in Part II was different from that of Part I.

Design

Following Kellerman (1983), 'transferability' was defined as the probability with which a given L1 indirectness strategy in making requests will be transferred relative to other L1 indirectness strategies. Whether or not a given indirectness strategy is transferable from L1 to L2 was determined by acceptability judgments of both a Japanese (L1) indirect request and the corresponding English (L2) indirect request manifesting the same indirectness strategy as the Japanese one in

a particular request situation. Specifically, if a learner judges a given Japanese indirect request as acceptable in that particular request situation and she considers the corresponding English request strategy as acceptable to the same degree, the L1 request strategy in this situation is said to be transferable to the L2 context. The operational definition of 'transferability' in this study, therefore, was as follows: Transferability is defined as the transferability rate obtained by subtracting the acceptability rate of an English indirect request from the acceptability rate of its Japanese equivalent in a particular situation.

The transferability rate for each request type in each situation for each subject was computed by following the operational definition of transferability provided above. Then, the obtained transferability rate was interpreted in the following manner:

(1) If the transferability rate is closer to 'zero' (e.g., 5 (Jap) - 5 (Eng) = 0), the Japanese request strategy manifests a language-neutral nature and thus is predicted as highly transferable.

(2) If the transferability rate is closer to 'four' (5 (Jap) - 1 (Eng) = 4), the Japanese request strategy manifests an L1-specific nature and thus is predicted as non-transferable.

(3) If the transferability rate is below 'zero' (e.g., 3 (Jap) - 5 (Eng) = -2), the Japanese request strategy is not predicted as transferable. In this case, L2-based language-specificity rather than L1-based language specificity is considered to play a primary role in predicting transferability of a given indirect request strategy.

Whether or not an obtained transferability rate is closer to zero was determined by a one sample t-test (for more details about this statistical procedure, see the data analysis section).

By combining the statistically obtained assessment on transferability with the acceptability rate of a Japanese indirect request and the transferability direction represented by 'plus/minus' values, a more detailed interpretation scheme was formulated. This interpretation scheme was crucial for analyzing pragmatic transferability within the framework of the current study because the claim of 'transferable' or 'non-transferable' solely based on a statistical procedure does not provide a precise picture of transferability in real situations. Four possible sets of interpretation were established as shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Interpretation Scheme

Interpretation 1: High acceptability rate for a Japanese request / 'Plus' value for the transferability rate / Statistically non-transferable.

-------> L1-specific nature / Non-transferable from L1 to L2.

Interpretation 2: High acceptability rate for a Japanese request / 'Minus' value for the transferability rate / Statistically non-transferable.

-------> L2-specific nature / Non-transferable from L1 to L2.

Interpretation 3: High acceptability rate for a Japanese request / Statistically transferable (i.e., closer to zero for the transferability rate).

-------> Language-neutral nature / Transferable from L1 to L2.

Interpretation 4: Low acceptability rate for a Japanese request (regardless of statistically obtained transferability judgments).

-------> (Transfer) Non-realizable.

The cut-off point for the Japanese acceptability rate in determining whether the request manifests 'high' or 'low acceptability' was set at 2.5, i.e., the midpoint on a five-point scale. Of special concern was Interpretation 4. Japanese request strategies which did not attain 'high acceptability' were interpreted as non-realizable. A low acceptability rate for a particular Japanese request suggests that the Japanese request is not really conventionalized and thus expected not to be frequently used. It is not probable that people transfer from L1 to L2 a given strategy not conventionalized enough and thus not incorporated into their repertoire of indirectness strategies in their L1. Hence, it does not make sense to provide a transferability judgment for such relatively unacceptable Japanese requests.

Procedure

Subjects were first asked to conduct the acceptability judgment task in Part I. They were told to read a situation and, in relation to this situation, rate the acceptability of each of the following Japanese sentences that manifest a particular type of indirect request strategy or convention of usage of indirect requests.

After completing Part I, the subjects were asked to proceed to Part II. They rated the acceptability of the English translation equivalents of the Japanese request sentences in Part I. Providing subjects with two separate sections (i.e., Part I and Part II) for acceptability judgment tasks was essential. This prevented the acceptability rate of the English request sentence from being influenced by the acceptabilities of the corresponding Japanese request sentence and/or other Japanese request sentences for a particular situation in Part I.

Data Analysis

A **situation-based** data analysis was conducted.[7] For each situation, the following procedures were taken to test each hypothesis:

For Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5:

(1) The mean acceptability rate for each strategy of the Japanese indirect requests was computed in order to assess their appropriateness.

(2) The mean transferability rate for each strategy was computed as a dependent variable. Then, the null hypothesis stating 'transferable' was set out. One sample t-test was performed for each indirectness strategy to determine whether the null hypothesis should be accepted or rejected ($a = 0.05$, two-tailed). The result of 'transferable' was obtained by supporting the null hypothesis and that of 'non-transferable' was available by rejecting this hypothesis.

(3) The final transferability assessment was based on the interpretation scheme outlined above.

For Hypothesis 6:

(1) The procedures taken to test Hypotheses 1-5 above were repeated for Low ESL Group and High ESL Group, respectively.

(2) For each indirectness strategy, the transferability assessment obtained as a result of applying the interpretation scheme was listed for each proficiency group.

(3) Kappa (k), a coefficient of agreement for nominal scales, was computed to determine the degree of agreement between Low ESL Group and High ESL Group with respect to their assessment on predictable transferability of the five indirectness strategies. The null hypothesis of Kappa was set out as follows: There is no agreement between these two proficiency groups in terms of their assessment on predicted transferability of indirectness strategies. This null hypothesis was tested by referring to z score, which is obtained by dividing k by s_{k0} (α = 0.05, two-tailed).

Results and Discussion

The results of transferability assessment and those of hypothesis testing for H1 - H5 of each indirectness strategy for each situation are summarized in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. Table 7 presents the results of the degrees of agreement on transferability assessment between High ESL and Low ESL Groups for each situation, along with the results of hypothesis testing for H6.

The results obtained for the current study suggest several crucial points regarding the indirectness strategies which might be employed by Japanese learners of English in L2 communicative contexts. From the results related to Hypotheses 1-5, it was found that the five indirectness strategies examined here manifest different transferability constraints on Japanese ESL learners' L2 use. Furthermore, the findings concerning Hypothesis 6 revealed some proficiency effects on the transferabilities of those indirectness strategies. Questions arise as to why those indirectness strategies manifested differences in terms of transferability and why there were some proficiency effects on the transferabilities of those indirectness strategies. In what follows, each indirectness strategy will be scrutinized as for its nature of transferability. Subsequently, further attempts will be made to explore factors yielding the proficiency effects on the transferabilities and to seek the implications for the findings of Takahashi and DuFon (1989).

Table 3
Results of transferability assessment of each indirectness strategy and hypothesis testing for H_1 - H_5 for the 'Flute' situation

Strategies	Mean-Jap. (S.D.)	Mean-Tra. (S.D.)	t value	Trans Asses	Hypo.
I would like	3.757 (.955)	1.189 (1.469)	4.924***	L1 Spec./N-Trans (Non-Trans)	H1 Reject
Would you	3.189 (1.05)	- .027 (1.19)	- .138	L. Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H2 Conf.
Can you	2.108 (.994)	.027 (1.258)	.131	N-Real. (Transferable)	H3 Conf.
I wonder	2.000 (1.225)	-1.432 (1.849)	-4.712***	N-Real. (Non-Trans)	H4 Conf.
Appreciate	4.432 (1.042)	.432 (1.119)	2.351*	L1 Spec./N-Trans (Non-Trans)	H5 Conf

Note. df = 36
* $p < .05$ *** $p < .0001$ ( ) = Statistical judgment of transferability

L1 Spec. = L1-specific / L2 Spec. = L2-specific / L. Neut. = language-neutral / N-Real. = Non-realizable / Trans = Transferable / N-Trans = Non-transferable / Hypo. = Hypothesis testing / Conf. = Confirm

Table 4
Results of transferability assessment of each indirectness strategy and hypothesis testing for H_1 - H_5 for the 'Questionnaire' situation

Strategies	Mean-Jap. (S.D.)	Mean-Tra. (S.D)	t value	Trans Asses	Hypo.
I would like	2.541 (.9)	.108 (1.41)	.466	L. Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H1 Conf.
Would you	2.622 (1.255)	- .649 (1.703)	- 2.317*	L2 Spec./N-Trans (Non-Trans)	H2 Reject
Can you	2.703 (1.222)	.405 (1.363)	1.809	L. Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H3 Reject
I wonder	3.838 (1.214)	.243 (1.402)	1.055	L. Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H4 Reject
Appreciate	4.027 (1.067)	- .243 (1.09)	-1.357	L. Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H5 Reject

Note. df = 36
* $p < .05$ ( ) = Statistical judgment of transferability

Table 5
Results of transferability assessment of each indirectness strategy and hypothesis testing for H1 - H5 for the 'Airport' situation

Strategies	Mean-Jap. (S.D.)	Mean-Tra. (S.D.)	t value	Trans.Asses	Hypo.
I would like	3.676 (1.056)	1.297 (1.351)	5.84***	L1 Spec./N-Trans (Non-Trans)	H1 Reject
Would you	3.108 (1.149)	- .459 (1.556)	- 1.796	L.Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H2 Conf.
Can you	3.081 (1.341)	.892 (1.612)	3.365*	L1 spec./N-Trans (Non-Trans)	H3 Conf.
I wonder	3.622 (1.089)	.054 (1.353)	.243	L.Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H4 Reject
Appreciate	3.973 (1.067)	- .324 (1.334)	- 1.478	L.Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H5 Reject

Note. df = 36
* p < .05 *** p < .0001 ( ) = Statistical judgment of transferability

Table 6
Results of transferability assessment of each indirectness strategy and hypothesis testing for H_1 - H_5 for the 'Moving Car' situation

Strategies	Mean-Jap. (S.D.)	Mean-Tra. (S.D.)	t value	Trans.Asses	Hypo.
I would like	3.583 (.874)	.556 (1.275)	2.615*	L1 Spec./N-Trans (Non-Trans)	H1 Reject
Would you	3.194 (1.142)	- .333 (1.549)	- 1.291	L.Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H2 Conf.
Can you	1.833 (1.108)	- .611 (1.337)	- 2.743*	N-Real. (Non-Trans)	H3 Conf.
I wonder	3.889 (1.036)	.778 (1.495)	3.122*	L1 Spec./N-Trans (Non-Trans)	H4 Conf.
Appreciate	3.806 (1.261)	.222 (1.376)	.969	L.Neut./Trans (Transferable)	H5 Reject

Note. df = 35 * p < .05 ( ) = Statistical judgment of transferability

Table 7
Results of the degrees of agreement on transferability assessment between Low ESL Group and High ESL Group for each situation and results of hypothesis testing for H_6

		Situations			
Strategies	Prof	Flute	Questionnaire	Airport	Moving Car
I would like	Low	N-rans (L1-spec.)	Trans (L. Neut.)	N-Trans (L1-spec.)	Trans (L. Neut.)
	High	N-Trans (L-1 spec.)	N-Real	N-Trans (L1-spec.)	N-Trans (L1-spec.)
Would you	Low	Trans (L. Neut.)	N-Real	Trans (L. Neut.)	Trans (L. Neut.)
	High	Trans (L. Neut.)	Trans (L. Neut.)	Trans (L. Neut.)	Trans (L. Neut.)
Can you	Low	N-Real	N-Trans (L1-spec.)	N-Trans (L1-spec.)	N-Real
	High	N-Real	N-Real	Trans (L.Neut.)	N-Real
I wonder	Low	N-Real	Trans (L.Neut.)	Trans (L.Neut.)	N-Trans (L1-spec.)
	High	N-Real	Trans (L. Neut.)	Trans (L. Neut.)	Trans (L. Neut.)
Appreciate	Low	Trans (L. Neut.)	N-Trans (L2-spec.)	Trans (L. Neut.)	Trans (L. Neut.)
	High	N-Trans (L1-spec.)	Trans (L. Neut.)	Trans (L. Neut.)	Trans (L. Neut.)
Agreement		$\kappa = .71$ ($p < .05$)	$\kappa = -.18$	$\kappa = .55$	$\kappa = .29$
Hypothesis Testing		Reject	Confirm	Confirm	Confirm

Indirectness Strategies and their Transferabilities

Strategy of 'I would like you to do A'. Except for the 'Questionnaire' situation, relatively high mean acceptability rates were obtained for the Japanese indirect requests using the strategy of 'I would like.' In the 'Flute,' 'Airport,' and 'Moving Car' situations, this strategy was found to be non-transferable relative to the other indirectness strategies. In particular, in the 'Flute' and 'Airport' situations, this strategy was found to be relatively non-transferable at the significance level of $p < .0001$ and showed large 'plus' values in transferability ('Flute' = 1.189; 'Airport' = 1.297). Taken together with the obtained high mean acceptability rates for the Japanese requests in those two situations, this strategy in these particular situations can be said to be **highly** L1-specific and **highly** non-transferable.

One explanation of this finding could be that the Japanese requests realized by this strategy do not require the explicit reference to **you** (**anata** in Japanese), as seen in the example 'yuugata, moo sukosi hayame ni (anata ni) renshuu o site itadaki tai no desu ga (= I would like (you) to practice a little earlier in the evening),' and thus are perceived to be less imposing on requestees. In contrast, in English, requestors are required to refer to **you** explicitly. This linguistic requirement of mentioning **you**, as in 'I would like you to practice a little earlier in the evening,' could entail a greater degree of imposition on requestees perceived by Japanese learners of English in those three situations. In fact, Hijirida and Sohn (1986) comment on the different use of the second person pronoun **you** between English and Japanese/Korean as follows: "while 'you' in E (English) can be used to any superior or inferior person, both J (Japanese) and K (Korean) do not have any second person pronoun to refer to a socially superior person. That is, unlike the use of *you* in English ..., J (Japanese) and K (Korean) do not allow a speaker of a lower status to use any of the second person pronouns toward a higher status addressee, except in such marked cases as when fighting" (p. 369, parentheses mine). Therefore, to the learners, the Japanese requests realized by this strategy, which allow the omission of **you**, are perfectly acceptable both socially and psychologically, whereas some sort of hesitation must be felt by the learners in using the strategy of 'I would like' in English by explicitly referring to **you**. Hence, it is reasonable to claim that this strategy in Japanese is psycholinguistically marked as L1-specific and non-transferable to corresponding English contexts.

However, how can we interpret the case of the strategy of 'I would like' in the 'Questionnaire' situation, where the result of 'transferable' was obtained? The

result from Takahashi and DuFon (1989) for this same situation also showed the relatively frequent use of this strategy in English by their Japanese ESL learners. Compared to the other three situations, the 'Questionnaire' situation is marked as **second-time around**, i.e., requesting what was previously asked for. Then, one possible explanation would be that the learners have made up their mind to rely on more aggressive means by explicitly referring to **you** in the English context in order to accomplish what was requested earlier as soon as possible. This is really speculative and thus empirical evidence should be obtained for the above interpretation by examining the relationship between the situational factor (second-time around) and transferability.

Strategy of 'Would you do A?'. In contrast to the indirectness strategy of 'I would like' above, the strategy of 'Would you' was found to be relatively transferable for the following three situations: the 'Flute,' 'Airport,' and 'Moving Car' situations. From this, a complementary distribution is observable between this strategy and the strategy of 'I would like.' That is, where the strategy of 'I would like' was identified as transferable, the strategy of 'Would you' was found to be non-transferable, and vice versa. Again, compared with findings available from Takahashi and DuFon (1989), it seems that the obtained results of transferability in this study correspond to those of their study. Specifically, the Japanese ESL learners in Takahashi and DuFon tended to employ the indirectness strategy of 'Would you' much more often than the strategy of 'I would like' for the 'Violin' situation (i.e., the 'Flute' situation, in the current study); however, the opposite tendency was observed for the 'Questionnaire' situation. The relatively transferable nature of the strategy of 'Would you' in the 'Flute,' 'Airport,' and 'Moving Car' situations and the relatively non-transferable tendency of this strategy (with L2-specificity) observed in the 'Questionnaire' situation might be attributable to contextual factors. Specifically, the request contexts for the 'Flute,' 'Airport,' and 'Moving Car' situations were featured with **first-time around**. For the 'Questionnaire' situation, however, the request was made in the **second-time around** context. This is, again, speculative in nature and more research would be needed to clarify this point.

Strategy of 'Can you do A?'. For the strategy of 'Can you,' the 'non-transferable' assessment was obtained for the 'Airport' situation; and the 'non-realizable' assessment was made for the 'Flute' and 'Moving Car' situations. Regarding the 'Questionnaire' situation, this strategy was found to be transferable. However, we must be cautious in interpreting the nature of transferability for this particular strategy. This is because some researchers claim that there is no

Japanese request which takes the form of asking the requestee's ability/potentiality. Among them is Matsumoto (1988).

Matsumoto (1988) claims that the request in the form of 'Can you do A?' would not normally be perceived as a request in Japanese. This claim may be applicable to the 'Moving Car' situation, in which the relatively low mean acceptability rate (1.833) was obtained for the Japanese indirect request. However, how can we account for the high mean acceptability rate for the Japanese requests in the 'Airport' situation (3.365) (and also the marginally high rate (2.703) for the 'Questionnaire' situation)?

Specifically, the results in this study indicated that the strategy of 'Can you' for the 'Airport' situation was substantially L1 (Japanese)-specific. Regarding the 'Questionnaire' situation, this strategy was found to be transferable; yet, the transferability rate showed a larger 'plus' value (.405) compared to the other two 'plus'-value strategies (i.e., the strategies of 'I would like' (.108) and 'I wonder' (.243)). Hence, this strategy for the 'Questionnaire' situation shows the possibility of learners' psycholinguistically marked perception of this strategy as L1 (Japanese)-specific. The feature shared by the Japanese indirectness strategy for those two situations is that both of them take the form of 'V-site itadaku **koto wa** *dekimas*-en ka?' The **dekimas**- is a free morpheme indicating **potentiality**. Here, compare this form with the request form in the 'Flute' situation. It contains this free morpheme but lacks the phrase **koto wa** (*koto* = a summational epitheme) (e.g., 'Yuugata, moo sukosi hayameni renshuu-*dekimas*-en desho ka'). Note that this request form in the 'Flute' situation received a relatively low mean acceptability rate (2.108) (and thus was predicted as non-realizable). Based on this observation, it is plausible to claim that, if a request is made in Japanese using this free morpheme following the phrase, koto wa, the form is totally acceptable and perceived as a request. In this case, however, a more relevant English translation equivalent (in terms of a strategy or a convention of usage) may have been 'Is it possible that you would do A?', rather than 'Can you do A?', which was used in the current study. This suggests that, if the learners had been asked to rate the English request sentence, 'Is it possible that you would do A?', instead of 'Can you do A?', for the 'Airport' situation, in particular, they would have provided a higher acceptability rate for this English request, and thus the 'transferable' assessment would have been obtained for this situation as well.

In contrast, the Japanese indirectness strategy for the 'Moving Car' situation here takes the form of 'Verb-C-*e* masen desho ka? (C = consonant, see Martin, 1975)'. This **e** is a bound morpheme which also indicates potentiality (a potential passive morpheme). 'Can you do A?' is the most relevant English translation equivalent of the question containing this morpheme after a verb. Considering the relatively low mean acceptability rate for the Japanese request for this situation

(1.833), it might be reasonable to claim that the Japanese sentence containing this bound morpheme **e** is much less likely to be accepted as a request. In fact, Matsumoto's (1988) claim above is made by referring to this type of sentence as an example ('Mot-*e*-masu ka' = 'Can you hold this?'). Hence, it could be assumed that the learners considered this Japanese request used in the 'Moving Car' situation to be inappropriate and thus judged transfer of this strategy from L1 to L2 as non-realizable.

Strategy of 'I wonder if you could do A'. In the 'Questionnaire' and 'Airport' situations, it was found that the strategy of 'I wonder' was highly transferable from Japanese to English as well as highly appropriate as Japanese requests. However, this same strategy for the 'Flute' situation showed a tendency of being non-realizable and that for the 'Moving Car' situation was judged to be non-transferable with L1-specific features. What made the difference between these two groups of situations, i.e., the 'Questionnaire'/'Airport' group and the 'Flute'/'Moving Car' group, in terms of the transferability of this strategy? One possibility would be the different degrees of psychological burden felt by the requestors when confronting the requestees. More specifically, in the case of the 'Questionnaire' and 'Airport' situations, the requestor is required to ask her requestee to do what is not really beneficial to the requestee. In other words, the requests are relatively imposing on the requestees. Hence, the relatively greater degree of psychological burden must be experienced by the requestor. Under these circumstances, then, it seems that the strategy of 'I wonder' is judged to be relatively appropriate both in English and in Japanese. This is because it manifests a relevant degree of mitigation of imposition, as compared to 'I would like,' 'Would you,' and 'Can you.' In short, the psycholinguistically unmarked nature perceived for this strategy yielded the findings of 'transferable' for these two situations.

In contrast, in the 'Flute' and 'Moving Car' situations, the requestor does not have to feel such psychological burden vis-à-vis the requestee. Rather, the request intentions for these two situations connote 'complaining.' It is reasonable to assume, then, that the requestor takes for granted the requestee's accomplishing what is requested. However, it is highly speculative that this contextual factor influences the transferability for these two situations and leads to the obtained results of 'non-realizable' (for the 'Flute' situation) and 'non-transferable' (for the 'Moving Car' situation). Are there any substantial differences between Japanese and English in making requests to cope with the situations like 'Flute' and 'Moving Car' which might explain the 'non-realizable/non-transferable' results? There might be some other factors affecting the transferability of the strategy of 'I wonder' for the 'Flute' and 'Moving Car' situations, respectively. On the

whole, then, further research is needed in order to find out what factors contribute to the results obtained for the transferability of this indirectness strategy.

Strategy of 'I would appreciate it if you would do A'. The strategy of 'I appreciate' was found to be highly transferable for all the situations, except the 'Flute.' With regard to this strategy for the 'Flute' situation, however, the paired t-test showed that there were not statistically significant differences in transferability between the strategy of 'I appreciate' and the strategies of 'Would you' and 'Can you,' both of which were found to be transferable for this particular situation. Hence, it might be reasonable to claim that the strategy of 'I appreciate' for the 'Flute' situation was marginally non-transferable with the L1-specific nature due to the relatively high mean acceptability rate for the Japanese request (4.432). On the whole, for all the situations, the mean acceptability rates for the Japanese requests realized by this strategy were relatively high as compared to those realized by the other strategies in those situations. Taken together with the overall results of 'transferable' tendency of this strategy for those situations, it could be assumed that learners frequently use this strategy for such situations in Japanese as a relatively appropriate conventionalized form of request and are more likely to experience this indirectness strategy as psycholinguistically unmarked (language-neutral).

Proficiency Effects on the Transferability

For the 'Questionnaire,' 'Airport,' and 'Moving Car' situations, Hypothesis 6 was confirmed, evidencing that there was a difference between Low ESL and High ESL learners in terms of their judgments on predicted transferability of indirect request strategies. As a matter of fact, those situations manifest several cases in which the two proficiency groups conflicted with each other regarding their assessments on transferability at a simple bi-polar level, i.e., 'transferable vs. non-transferable (or non-realizable).' This observation is particularly true for the 'Questionnaire' situation: Four out of the five cases (the strategies of 'I would like,' 'Would you,' 'Can you,' and 'I appreciate') showed conflicting predictions.

The 'disagreement' tendency between the two proficiency groups found for the above three situations further revealed that High ESL learners consistently provided 'non-transferable (or non-realizable)' assessments for the strategy of 'I would like' and 'transferable' assessments for the strategies of 'Would you,' 'I wonder,' and 'I appreciate' across the three situations. Low ESL learners did not attain such consistency. Of special concern were the 'transferable' assessments made by High ESL learners for the strategies of 'I wonder' and 'I appreciate.'

Advanced ESL learners' prediction of appropriate request performance in their L2 in those situations was well supported by the real request performance elicited from native American English speakers in Takahashi (1987). As a general finding in Takahashi (1987), native speakers of American English most favored the strategies of 'I wonder' and 'I appreciate' in situations identical with or similar to those employed in the current study. In this sense, we might claim that those advanced learners attained native-like pragmalinguistic competence for these three situations. In contrast, Low ESL learners' prediction of relevant patterns of L2 request realization appeared to be unstable, suggesting that they had not yet achieved a satisfactory degree of pragmalinguistic competence. Based on this observation, it could be claimed that, as far as the 'Questionnaire,' 'Airport,' and 'Moving Car' situations were concerned, proficiency effects were operative in the learners' assessment of pragmatic transferability. [Note that the difference in proficiency or pragmalinguistic competence between High ESL and Low ESL groups here might be attributable to different length of residence (LOR) in the U.S. (the difference between the mean LOR of High ESL Group (51.1 months) and that of Low ESL Group (13.6 months) was found to be significant ($t = -4.71$, $p < .0001$)). Namely, High ESL learners might have had more opportunities to encounter L2 situations similar to the 'Questionnaire,' 'Airport,' and 'Moving Car' situations due to their longer stay in the target-language community and thus succeeded in familiarizing themselves with those situations. This in turn led to attaining more correct judgments on acceptability of indirectness strategies than Low ESL learners (cf. Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1986).]

With regard to the 'Flute' situation, however, it was found that there was an agreement tendency between the two proficiency groups ($k = .71$, $p < .05$). Besides, the following finding was obtained: High ESL learners provided the 'non-realizable' assessment for the strategy of 'I wonder' and the 'non-transferable' assessment for the strategy of 'I appreciate.' Since the native speakers of American English in Takahashi (1987) most frequently relied on the strategies of 'I wonder' and 'I appreciate' in their role play performance in the identical situation, it can be claimed that those advanced learners failed to make correct transferability predictions on those two indirectness strategies. How can we account for this phenomenon for this particular situation? Despite the obvious difference in proficiency and length of residence, both High ESL and Low ESL learners might happen to experience the same (and insufficient) amount of exposure to an L2 request situation similar to the 'Flute' situation in this study. In other words, the same degree of familiarity with the target situational context perceived by those learners assumed to yield the agreement tendency in their transferability assessment. This suggests that a familiarity factor could override such factors as linguistic proficiency and length of residence in the target-language

community (see Eisenstein & Bodman, 1986 and Bodman & Eisenstein, 1988 for their similar claim on 'learners' familiarity with the target contexts' in expressing gratitude in L2). However, it goes without saying that some empirical evidence should be obtained before making a conclusive claim on the effects of contextual familiarity in pragmatic transferability.

Implications for Takahashi and DuFon (1989)

One of the aims of the current study was to explicate the tendency which the Japanese learners of English presented regarding the indirectness strategies for the particular communicative contexts provided in Takahashi and DuFon (1989). Specifically, the Japanese learners of English in Takahashi and DuFon employed almost exclusively the indirectness strategies represented by the 'Want' statement ('I would like') and the 'Willingness' question ('Would you'). The present study then examined, through Hypotheses 1 and 2, whether those two L1 indirectness strategies really manifested language-neutral nature and were predicted as transferable from L1 to L2 contexts. The relevant answer to this issue is that the transferabilities of those two strategies are primarily determined by contextual factors (see the previous discussion section of **Indirectness Strategies and their Transferabilities**). However, the following tendency observed in the current study should be noted here. With regard to the 'Flute' and 'Questionnaire' situations, which were examined in Takahashi and DuFon (the 'Violin' situation in their study for the current 'Flute' situation), results similar to those of their study were obtained. That is, for the 'Flute' situation, it was found that the strategy of 'Would you,' which was frequently employed by the Japanese ESL learners in Takahashi and DuFon, was relatively transferable from L1 to L2. On the other hand, for the 'Questionnaire' situation, the strategy of 'I would like,' which was favored by the Japanese learners of English in the earlier study, was found to be relatively transferable.

The current study, however, revealed the following as well: The strategies of 'I wonder' and 'I appreciate' were also likely to manifest language-neutral nature; and thus a greater degree of their being transferable from Japanese to English was predictable. A question arises here as to why most Japanese learners of English in Takahashi and DuFon did not equally use those two strategies in their L2. In fact, only one subject (out of nine) relied on the strategy of 'I wonder' for the two situations examined in their study.

A possible explanation would be that the strategies of 'I would like' and 'Would you' were relatively automatized in their speech act performance in English. Thus those two indirectness strategies were far more likely to be available to them

under the psychological pressure which they must have experienced in the role-play data-eliciting conditions adopted by Takahashi and DuFon. Contrary to those two automatized strategies, the strategies of 'I wonder' and 'I appreciate' might have been insufficiently automatized in the subjects' L2. In other words, their processing mechanism in performing English requests using those two strategies was still immature and could not function in an appropriate manner. To use Bialystok's (1982, 1988) model of two dimensions of language proficiency, the 'immaturity' here can be specified as follows: The learners could analyze the strategies of 'I wonder' and 'I appreciate' as having requestive forces but did not attain fluent access to that information or knowledge. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that, in their role play performance, the strategies of 'I wonder' and 'I appreciate' were not (or less likely to be) employed. It should be noted here that, in the current study, such automaticity in English request performance was not required because the five indirectness strategies examined here were prepared by the researcher, and the subjects were just asked to rate their acceptabilities. This methodological advantage for the subjects in the current study might have provided them with more opportunity or time to assess the acceptability of each indirectness strategy, i.e., including the strategies of 'I wonder' and 'I appreciate' (cf. Edmondson & House (1991)). In sum, the findings of the current study lead us to realize the crucial and essential difference existing between production under real-time conditions and receptive pragmatic judgment (as represented by the acceptability judgment in this study) and provide a base for exploring the nature of processing constraints in real-time conditions, a still neglected issue in interlanguage pragmatics.

CONCLUSION

In the current study, an effort was made to investigate the nature of transferability at the pragmatic level. In so doing, the transferabilities of five indirectness strategies of request were examined and interpreted. The overall results showed that a given strategy was language-neutral and transferable for a certain request context but not for other contexts. Or some indirectness strategies were L1- or L2-specific and predicted as being non-transferable for given contexts, but these same strategies were found to be transferable for other request situations. Since the variables of interlocutors' familiarity and gender and a requestee's social status were strictly controlled in the current study, some contextual factors other than the above variables seem to play a major role in determining the transferabilities of those indirectness strategies. Those contextual

factors may include the content of the situations and/or request imposition. On the whole, however, at this stage of research in this area, what kind of or which contextual factors most affect pragmatic transferability is hard to decide. In fact, various factors must be taken into account whenever this type of research is conducted--the relationship of the interlocutors in a given situation (e.g., familiarity, status difference/equal, gender difference/equal, age difference/equal), the position of request realization in the discourse (e.g., a pre-request performed at the beginning of the discourse versus an overt request made in a requestor's next turn),[8] the content of the situation (e.g., requests for the 'first-time around' versus 'second-time around'), and the request imposition manifested through the content of the situations. In particular, as discussed earlier in the strategy of 'I wonder,' it is highly conceivable that the request imposition would affect transferability of each indirectness strategy to a great extent. Failure to investigate this point in this study surely compels us to conduct further research.[9] The variables attributable to subjects, such as gender, age, and proficiency, must also be investigated thoroughly. In particular, as an immediate study, the proficiency effect on transferability, which was found to be a controversial factor against the effect of familiarity with a target situational context, should be further pursued in a more systematic manner. It is expected that those future studies on pragmatic transferability will enable us to help L2 learners develop their awareness of the potential illocutionary force of any conventional speech act form in the target language.

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NOTES

[1] According to Sharwood Smith and Kellerman (1989), there are three stages which characterize the U-shaped behavior in language performance. At Stage 1, learners tend to show target like performance in some limited linguistic domain. Stage 2 is characterized by performance in this same area which is now deviant (in terms of omission or commission) as compared to the target model and thus different from performance at Stage 1. At Stage 3, those structures present in Stage 1 but to some extent suppressed in Stage 2 appear again.

[2] For the convenience of the reader, the labeling system different from that employed in Takahashi (1987) is used for those nine indirectness levels. For the labeling of each indirectness level in Takahashi (1987), see Appendix A.

[3] Takahashi (1987) established the taxonomy based on Leech's (1980, 1983) Tact Maxim. Briefly, the taxonomy is interpreted in the following manner in the case of directives (i.e., requests) with the forms of 'You should open the window' ('Expectation' statement - Second level), 'Will you open the window?' ('Willingness' question - Third level), and 'Can you open the window?' ('Ability' question - Fourth level).

The directive 'Will you open the window?' (Third level) is more tactful than the directive 'You should open the window' (Second level) since its yes/no question form overtly allows the hearer to have freedom of response, i.e., the freedom to say 'yes' or 'no,' according to his/her 'will' or 'desire' to do the requested action. With this directive, however, the hearer does have some difficulty answering, 'No, I won't,' because such a negative answer will make him/her appear uncooperative and unwilling to carry out his/her part of the interaction. To put it another way, the freedom to refuse is not perfectly guaranteed to the hearer. In this sense, the directive 'Can you open the window?' (Fourth level) is more tactful than 'Will you open the window?' in that the speaker gives the hearer the freedom to refuse because the negative answer can be justified by the inability on the part of the hearer to do the desired action.

The Tact Maxim claims a positive correlation between tactfulness and indirectness, i.e., the more tactful forms are more indirect. Hence, in the above, 'Will you open the window?' (Third level) is more indirect than 'You should open the window' (Second level) but less indirect than 'Can you open the window?' (Fourth level). Note here that **indirectness** as a result of **tactfulness** does not necessarily correlate with **politeness** (see also Blum-Kulka, 1987). As Leech (1980) claims, the utterance 'Would you mind leaving the room?' is a tactful attempt to avoid conflict, but can be extremely impolite on certain occasions. Hence, Takahashi's taxonomy of indirectness excludes the notion of politeness.

Also note that this taxonomy is a purely theoretically motivated attempt and some empirical support remains to be obtained. Furthermore, it is also relevant here to note that this taxonomy is only effective between English and Japanese directives and may not be applicable to English-Korean or Japanese-Chinese comparisons of indirect directives, as opposed to the claim of Fraser (1975) on the universal strategies for realizing speech acts.

[4] The difference in the mean TOEFL scores between those two proficiency groups was found to be significant ($t = -6.691$, $p < .0001$). Hence, it can be claimed that the cut-off point for the TOEFL scores in creating the two groups in this study marked a real difference between the groups.

[5] The familiarity factor was specified in the instructions of the acceptability rating task, which was attached to each questionnaire, instead of being specified in each request situation. The subjects were informed of the degree of familiarity with their neighbor as the extent to which they say hello to her whenever they see her.

[6] In the corresponding 'Violin' situation in Takahashi (1987) and Takahashi and DuFon (1989), the situation was described in a way that a requestor must ask her next-door neighbor to change 'her daughter's violin practice time.' In this study, however, due to an advantage for providing a uniform format for the questionnaire-filling-out instruction (applicable to all of the four situations), the form of asking the next-door neighbor to change 'her own practice time' was taken.

[7] The situation-based data analysis was done because the four situations could not be collapsed for the following four reasons. First, this study was expected to provide an account for the observed tendency that the Japanese learners of English in Takahashi and DuFon (1989) favored particular levels of indirectness. Since Takahashi and DuFon followed a 'situation-based' data analysis, it was advisable to proceed in the same way in this study. Second, the 'content' of each situation was judged to manifest different degrees of imposition on the requestee. While status, familiarity, and gender of interlocutors were strictly controlled, imposition could thus be an intervening variable. Third, the Japanese request sentences in the 'Flute,' 'Questionnaire,' and 'Airport' situations contained the honorific auxiliary verb *itadaku*, whereas the honorific auxiliary verb *morau* was used in the 'Moving Car' situation. Since these two auxiliary verbs are different in their degree of politeness, honorifics could thus constitute another intervening variable. Fourth, in view of the operational definition of transferability and the entailed interpretation scheme for this study, it was judged that a situation-based data analysis could yield a more precise picture of the transferability of indirectness strategies in requesting.

[8] The factor of the position of request realization in the discourse (a pre-request versus an overt request made in a requestor's next turn) is currently being examined in my doctoral dissertation research.

[9] The factor of request imposition is currently being studied in my doctoral dissertation research.

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A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Requestive Speech Act Realization Patterns in Persian and American English

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This study examines the similarities and differences in the realization patterns of the speech act of requesting between Persian speaking students and American speakers of English, relative to the same social constraints (cross-cultural variation).

The subjects of this study were 52 native American English speaking undergraduate students at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign and 50 native Persian speaking university undergraduate students studying at the University of Isfahan, Iran.

The data was collected by a controlled elicitation procedure called "open questionnaire." The data was then categorized based on the coding system developed by the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper, 1989). In order to analyze the directness level of requests a t-test was performed with mean level of directness as the dependent variable and nationality as a grouping variable. A chi-square analysis was performed where frequencies of different components of the requestive speech act (parts other than the head act) were compared between the two languages.

Our analysis revealed that Persian speakers are considerably more direct when making requests compared to American speakers. The result also showed that Persian speakers used considerably more alerters, supportive moves, and internal modifiers compared to American speakers. It is suggested that in some languages like Persian, speakers may compensate for the level of directness in their requestive speech acts by using more supportive moves, alerters, and internal modifiers.

These differences in requestive speech act realization patterns may cause some cross-cultural communication problems for speakers of these languages. In this sense the study has some pedagogical implications for teaching ESL/EFL. In particular there appears to be a need to assist

Persian speaking learners of English in developing cross-cultural and cross-linguistic awareness concerning the appropriate degrees of indirectness in American English.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most compelling notions in pragmatics is the notion of speech acts. Speech acts have been claimed by some (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969, 1975) to operate by universal pragmatic principles, and by others to vary in conceptualization and verbalization across cultures and languages (Green, 1975; Wierzbicka, 1985b). Their modes of performance carry heavy social implications (Ervin-Tripp, 1976) and seem to be ruled by universal principles of cooperation and politeness (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Leech, 1983). And yet cultures have been shown to vary drastically in their interactional styles, leading to different preferences for modes of speech act behavior. Culturally colored interactional styles create culturally determined expectations and interpretative strategies, and can lead to breakdowns in intercultural and interethnic communication (Gumperz, 1978). Each culture or subculture poses a different set of constraints; and, for a second language learner, the formidable task is that of learning the target language within this framework of constraints.

The cross-cultural comparison of speech acts has recently attracted considerable interest. Perhaps the fascination that the study of cross-cultural pragmatics holds for language teachers, researchers, and students of linguistics stems from the serious trouble to which pragmatic failure can lead.

One of the most recent efforts to collect and analyze cross-cultural speech act data is the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (CCSARP) undertaken by an international group of researchers. CCSARP, initiated in 1982, represents the first attempt to analyze speech acts across a range of languages and cultures to investigate whether there are universal pragmatic principles in speech act realization, and what the characteristics of those universals might be. The authors of this study point out the need to move away from Anglo-cultural ethnocentricity in the study of speech acts by widening the scope of languages and cultures studied. The need to expand the scope of speech act studies to include non-Western languages has been expressed by several other researchers (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1985b; Cottrill, Forthcoming; Flowerdew, 1988, 1990 and Rose, 1992). This study is a response to such a need. The scope of cross-cultural speech act studies will be expanded to include a non-Western language through a contrastive study of requests in Persian and English.

METHODOLOGY

Subjects

The first group of subjects, Group A, consisted of 52 native American English speaking university students studying at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign. This group consisted of 21 males and 31 females, ranging in age from 18 to 22. They were university students enrolled in different academic disciplines (other than Linguistics and ESL).

The second group, Group B, consisted of 50 native Persian-speaking university students studying different academic majors (except English and Linguistics) at the University of Isfahan in Iran. This group consisted of 26 male and 24 female students ranging in age from 18 to 35 years old. The decision to conduct this phase of our data-elicitation in Iran resulted from our concern that the use of subjects residing in U.S. would produce biased results because of the influence of the subjects' acculturation to the American culture on the realization patterns of performed directive acts. Consequently, subjects were chosen who have never been to the U.S. or to other English speaking countries, although they have studied English for about seven to eight years in a formal classroom setting in Iran.

The decision to choose only university students in both groups of subjects was intended to attain as strict a comparison as possible of the different strategies used by these subjects in performing directives.

Data Collection

One major concern of sociolinguistic research is the manner in which data are to be collected. Ideally, all data should come from "natural" conditions: "our goal is then to observe the way that people use language when they are not being observed"--the observer's paradox (Labov, 1972, p. 209). Unable to achieve this we might settle for "authentic" data, recorded by participant observers during natural interactions. However, in this study we are interested in getting a large sample of one specific speech act used in the same contexts. This would be virtually impossible under field conditions. These demands for comparability have ruled out the use of ethnographic methods, invaluable as they are in general for gaining insights into speech behavior.

Beyond the practical methodological advantages, elicited data have theoretical advantages as well. As pointed out by Hill et al. (1986, p. 353) "the virtue of authenticity in naturally occurring speech must be weighed against its reflection of speaker's sociolinguistic adaptations to very specific situations." Our use of written elicitation techniques enables us to obtain more stereotyped responses, i.e., "the prototype of the variants occurring in the individual's actual speech" (p. 353).

Because of the above mentioned reasons, we decided to obtain the data by the use of a controlled elicitation procedure. We designed an experiment in which a corpus of directives were collected from two different groups of subjects by an "open questionnaire form," which is a modified version of the Discourse Completion Test (DCT) used in CCSARP. The questionnaire used in our study differs from the DCT used in the CCSARP in several aspects. First, hearer response was not included. All dialogues of the Discourse Completion Test developed by the CCSARP contain a hearer's response to the request, i.e., the missing turn to be filled in by the subject. The hearer's response included in each CCSARP dialogue is designed to signal the desired act by providing co-textural clues for the speech acts needed to complete the dialogues. For example, the following dialogue is said to occur after a meeting in which Tony and David have taken part.

> Tony and David live in the same neighborhood, but they only know each other by sight. One day, they both attend a meeting held on the other side of town. Tony does not have a car but he knows that David has come in his car.
> Tony:_____
> David: I'm sorry but I'm not going home right away.

The hearer response, the line of dialogue given after the blank line, was eliminated because as Rintell and Mitchell (1989, p. 251) say, it might in some way influence the response of the subjects other than to clarify what is expected of them to provide. It is possible that having this response in the dialogue and granting or not granting the request will limit the range of responses as requests by our subjects. The inclusion of an uptake by the other "participant" in the dialogue may encourage subjects to choose a particular form corresponsive with that uptake instead of some other form that might be equally possible in the situation described. Another modification made in our questionnaire was that the gender of the speaker was not specified. In the DCT used in the CCSARP, situations were set up with the gender of the participants indicated. Males filling out the questionnaire, then, were asked to report what females would say and females filling out the questionnaire were asked to report what males would say. Given the troublesome nature of speakers' assumptions concerning their own language use, pointed out by Wolfson et al. (1989), it seemed best not to specify gender. Also, since in Iranian culture speakers from the opposite sex will not make requests from each other as freely as speakers of the opposite sex in American culture, the gender of the hearer was not specified except in one situation (speaker making a request from his/her brother). These considerations were also the reason for the third modification, in which subjects were asked only how they would respond, not how they thought someone else would respond in a situation. In the CCSARP, subjects were asked what they thought someone else

(e.g., a professor, a policeman) would say in a given situation. This was avoided in our questionnaire by designing only situations in which subjects were placed in different roles which a university student would normally encounter in everyday situations (not in imaginary roles like being a policeman).

Our instrument (DCT) consists of six socially differentiated situations. In each situation we specified the setting and the social distance between the participants and their status relative to each other. Subjects were asked to respond to each situation, on the assumption that in doing so, they would provide the speech act desired. (See Appendix A for the English version of the questionnaire.)

A Persian version of the questionnaire was constructed, consisting of basically the same situations and same variables as the English version, but with the cultural context surrounding the dialogues modified from an American one to one appropriate to an Iranian setting. Accuracy of the translation was determined by relying on the investigator's own judgment as a native Persian speaker as well as on the judgment of other Persian-English bilinguals with whom she consulted. The investigator translated the questionnaire and then gave it to two other Persian speakers who are fluent speakers of English and who also are graduate students in linguistics, to check the translation so as to ensure authenticity and accuracy.

Data Analysis

All of our data is analyzed within a shared analytical framework, using the coding system developed by CCSARP. The coding scheme is based on frames of primary features expected to be manifested in the realization of requests. The frame provides the meta-paradigm for the analysis of the data, allowing for both "zero" realizations for each feature, as well as subclassifications of listed features. The primary features for the coding of requests included a measure for directness level, alerters, perspective, supportive moves, and internal modifications.

The unit of analysis for our data is the utterance or sequence of utterances supplied by the informant in completing the test item.

The first problem in looking at the sequence is in deciding whether all of its parts are of equal importance or if they serve equal functions in realizing the speech act aimed at. Based on the CCSARP coding scheme, we have dealt with this problem by analyzing the sequence into the following segments: (a) address term(s), (b) head act, and (c) adjunct(s) to head act. The segmentation is meant to delimit the utterance(s) that constitute the nucleus of the speech act (the 'head act'), i.e., that part of the sequence which might serve to realize the act independently of other elements. The segmentation in Head acts and Adjuncts is based on sequential, as well as contextual and functional criteria.

A t-test was performed to analyze the directness level of requests with level of directness as a dependent variable and language as a grouping variable. A chi-square analysis was performed where frequencies of different components of the requestive speech act were compared.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Strategy Types

The different situations given to subjects to respond to could elicit from them nine different strategy types which form a scale of indirectness for making a request according to our categorization. The distribution of strategy types on the scale is meant to yield the relative degree of directness preferred in making requests in these two languages.

Table 1 shows the distribution of the main requesting strategy types for two languages in six situations. A t-test was performed with the mean level of directness on the scale of 1-9 as the dependent variable and nationality as an independent variable. The result reveals a significant effect of language for all 6 situations at $p < .001$.

Table 1

Percentage Distribution of Main Request Strategy Types in Two Languages and Six Situations

Situation	Strategy Type	English	Persian
S1	1	.00	64.00
Student to Student	7	94.23	34.00
request to borrow a pen	8	5.77	2.00
S2	1	.00	76.00
Friend to friend	5	3.85	.00
request to borrow notes	7	94.23	24.00
	8	1.92	.00
S3	0	1.92	0.00
Older brother to	1	67.31	96.00
younger brother	6	1.92	.00
request to close	7	28.85	2.00
the window	8	.00	2.00
S4	0	1.92	.00
Student to professor	1	1.92	66.00
request for an extension	5	.00	2.00
	7	88.46	28.00
	8	7.69	4.00
S5	0	1.92	.00
Student to waiter	1	1.92	72.00
request for the menu	7	96.15	18.00
	8	.00	10.00
S6	0	.00	2.00
Student to professor	1	.00	46.00
request for help	5	.00	2.00
	7	71.15	46.00
	8	28.85	4.00

Note. Significant level of difference in each situation is found at $p < .001$ (t-test).

As shown in Table 1, Persian speaking students use significantly more direct strategies in all six situation compared to English speakers, i.e., these two cultures disagree on the specific directness level appropriate for a given situation, reflecting overall cross-cultural differences in directness level. More than half of the requests in the Persian data (70.00%) fall into the most direct category (1) vs English which is only 11.86% in this category. Furthermore, in English 78.85% of the requests fall into category 7 (conventionally indirect) compared to 25.33% in Persian. In English, subjects used hints (the most indirect strategies) 7.37% of the time compared to 4.67% in Persian. In both languages the least frequent strategy used was hints, which is the most indirect strategy type for making a request. The mean level of directness for all Persian requests in the data is 2.80 compared to English which is 6.279. These results seem to indicate a relatively high overall level of directness in the use of requestive speech acts among the Persian speaking subjects compared to English speaking subjects. See Appendix B for some actual examples of these strategies in English and Persian.

Alerters

Alerters can serve as attention getters, which in turn can affect the social impact of the utterance (Blum-Kulka et al., 1985). In their sociopragmatic role, they may act either as downgraders, meant to mitigate (soften) the act or alternatively as upgraders that intensify its degree of coerciveness.

Requests were further analyzed for the presence or absence of alerters. If an alerter was used, its function was specified as upgrader or downgrader based on the semantic properties of the alerter (e.g., you fool vs. excuse me) and other contextual features of the request sequence. Table 2 shows the distribution of alerters in two languages across the six situations. A chi-square analysis was performed and significant results were found in all six situations at $p < .05$ level.

Persian speaking students used significantly more alerters in all six situations compared to English speaking students. Overall Persian students used alerters 73.67% of the time when making a request compared to English which is only 40.06%.

In English five out of six situations alerters were used with the mitigating function (e.g., dear, excuse me,...). In situation #3 (request to a younger brother to close the window) 11.54% of alerters in English were used to intensify the force of the request (e.g., jerk, you fool,...). In Persian no alerters were used with the intensifying function. See Appendix B for some actual examples of alerters in English and Persian.

Table 2

Percentage Distribution of Alerters Used in Two Languages across Situations

Situation	English	Persian
S1 $x^2 = 3.71$ $p < .054$	55.77	74.00
S2 $x^2 = 6.933$ $p < .008$	23.08	48.00
S3 $x^2 = 16.5$ $p < 0.0001$	11.54(-) 5.57(+)	56.00
S4 $x^2 = 43.906$ $p < 0.0001$	25.00	90.00
S5 $x^2 = 14.890$ $p < 0.0001$	40.38	78.00
S6 $x^2 = 9.009$ $p < .003$	78.85	98.00

Note. + = Downgrader (softening the act)
- = Upgrader (intensifying the act)

Supportive Moves

The speaker may choose to support or to aggravate the speech act by external modifications (supportive moves). Supportive moves do not affect the utterance used for realizing the act, but rather affect the context in which it is embedded, and thus indirectly modify illocutionary force (Edmondson, 1981).

Table 3 shows the distribution of supportive moves in two languages across six situations. A chi-square analysis was performed and significant results were found in three out of six situations at $p < .05$ level.

Table 3

Percentage Distribution of Supportive Moves Used in Two Languages Across Six Situations

Situation	English	Persian
S1 $x^2 = 2.542$ $p < .111$	13.46	26.00
S2 $x^2 = .126$ $p < .723$	84.62	82.00
S3 $x^2 = 5.892$ $p < .053$	36.54(+) 26.92(-)	60.00(+) 20.00(-)
S4 $x^2 = 4.709$ $p < .030$	90.38	74.00
S5 $x^2 = 5.126$ $p < .024$	7.69	24.00
S6 $x^2 = 1.030$ $p < .310$	50.00	60.00

Note. + = Downgrader (softening the act)
- = Upgrader (intensifying the act)

In situations 3, 4, and 5 significant differences were found between the English and Persian speakers. In situations 3 and 5, Persian speakers used significantly more supportive moves than English speakers, but in situation 4 English speakers used more supportive moves. In the other three situations, although no significant differences are found, there seems to be a tendency for Persian speaking students to use more supportive moves than English speakers.

In five out of six situations supportive moves were used to soften the force of the request. The only situation where we have some supportive moves used as upgraders (to intensify the force of the request) is in situation #3 (request to younger brother), in which both English and Persian speaking students used some supportive moves to intensify the force of their request. In this case, English speakers used slightly more supportive moves as upgraders compared to Persian speakers (26.92% vs. 20.00%).

Another important factor to consider here is the fact that Persian speakers modify their supportive moves with adjectives and adverbs more frequently than Americans; therefore, the length of the utterances by Persian speakers is, in most cases, longer than Americans. See Appendix B for some actual examples of supportive moves in English and Persian.

Internal Modifiers

Internal modifiers are defined as those elements which are linked to the head act, whose presence is not essential for the utterance to be potentially understood as a request (Faerch & Kasper, 1989). Internal modifiers can affect the social impact of the utterance. They may act as downgraders, softening the impact of the act, or as upgraders intensifying its force.

Table 4 shows the distribution of internal modifiers in two languages across six situations. A chi-square analysis was performed and significant results for four out of six situations at $p < .005$ were found.

In three out of six situation Persian speakers used significantly more internal modifiers compared to English speakers. But in situation #3 (request to younger brother) English speakers used significantly more internal modifiers compared to Persian speakers. In five out of six situations internal modifiers were used to soften the force of the request, but in situation #3 some of the internal modifiers were used to intensify the force of the request (English 26.92% vs. Persian 12.00%).

Table 4

Percentage Distribution of Internal Modifiers Used in Two Languages Across Six Situations

Situation	English	Persian
S1 $x^2 = 31.167$ $p < 0.0001$	36.54	90.00
S2 $x^2 = 9.764$ $p < .002$	48.00	78.00
S3 $x^2 = 8.058$ $p < .018$	36.54(+) 26.92(-)	24.00(+) 12.00(-)
S4 $x^2 = .333$ $p < .564$	78.85	74.00
S5 $x^2 = 3.764$ $p < .152$	80.77(+) 1.92(-)	68.00
S6 $x^2 = 3.923$ $p < .0048$	40.38	60.00

Note. + = Downgrader (softening the act)
- = Upgrader (intensifying the act)

Overall, Persian speakers used slightly more internal modifiers than English speakers (65.67% vs 53.53%). See Appendix B for some actual examples of internal modifiers in English and Persian.

Perspective

Choice of perspective presents another source of variation in requests. When making a request, speakers may choose to emphasize the role of the agent (can you help me...), their own role as recipients (could I ask for your help...), or they may avoid the issue by using an inclusive "we" (can we do...), or the impersonal (this needs to be done.). Languages may differ not only in their general preferences in choice of perspectives, but also in the conventionalization of perspectives within specific strategy types (Blum-Kulka, 1989).

The distribution of different perspective types used by the two different groups is shown in Table 5. A chi-square analysis was performed and a significant level of difference at $p < 0.0001$ was found for four out of six situations (situations 1, 2, 4, 5).

Table 5

Percentage Distribution of Perspective Types used in Two Languages Across Six Situations

Situation	English			Persian		
	0	1	2	0	1	2
S1 $x^2 = 94.305$ $p < 0.0001$ df=2	1.92	94.23	3.85	.00	.00	100.00
S2 $x^2 = 97.198$ $p < 0.0001$ df=2	5.77	94.23	.00	4.00	.00	96.00
S3 $x^2 = 1.335$ $p < .513$ df=2	1.92	1.92	96.15	4.00	.00	96.00
S4 $x^2 = 86.792$ $p < 0.0001$ df=2	21.15	76.92	1.92	2.00	4.00	94.00
S5 $x^2 = 91.491$ $p < 0.0001$ df=2	1.92	96.15	1.92	4.00	2.00	94.00
S6 $x^2 = 1.489$ $p < .222$ df=2	.0	3.85	96.15	2.00	.00	98.00

Note. 0=Impersonal 1=1st person 2=2nd person perspective

The distribution of requestive speech acts by perspective indeed indicates cross-linguistic differences in the use of perspective types. An important factor to consider here is that in those cases where speakers have used strategy #1 (the most direct strategy) the choice of perspective type is a linguistic reflex of the specific strategy and not an option. However, in those cases where the speakers had the option of choosing any of the three different strategy types, Persian speakers have used the second person perspective relatively more than English speakers, who have a tendency to use the first person perspective more often.

Discussion

So far we have seen that there are significant differences between Persian and English in all the features of requestive speech acts. We will now discuss some possible explanations for these observed differences.

The results for the distribution of main request strategy types, presented in Table 1, clearly show that the Persian speakers are more direct compared to American speakers. In the Persian data 70% of requests are phrased as impositives (most direct), more than 25% are phrased as conventionally indirect, and only about 4% as hints. The other extreme of directness is manifested by speakers of American English. In the English requests, direct impositives constitute 11.86%, conventional indirect strategies 78.85%, and hints 7.37%.

Our findings indicate that Modern Persian shares with English a rich repertoire of requesting strategies which is fully exploited in actual use. Yet, if viewed from a cross-cultural perspective, the general level of directness in Persian speaking society is relatively high.

This difference in directness level does not necessarily imply that the speakers of one language are more polite than the speakers of the other language. There is evidence to suggest that indirectness and politeness are not necessary correlates of each other universally or for any given culture (Blum-Kulka, 1987). In politeness ratings of request strategies by native speakers of American English, Hebrew, British English, and German respectively, Blum-Kulka (1987) found that the highest ratings for politeness were granted to conventional indirect strategies and not to hints, which are still more indirect.

Another related issue to the above discussion to consider in the interpretation of observed cross-cultural variations in linguistic behavior concerns the social meanings carried by these behaviors in each of the respective cultures. Choices made along the continuum of directness-indirectness may not necessarily mean the same to members of two cultures; thus, though directness is usually associated in the literature with impoliteness, its exact social meaning may also be a cross-cultural variant. Brown and Levinson (1978) convincingly argue for two types of politeness: negative politeness, manifested by verbal strategies that express the effort not to be heard as imposing, and positive politeness, expressed by verbal strategies that emphasize in-group membership and an assumption of reciprocity.

In the Western world, politeness is usually associated with negative or deference strategies. The show of deference is expressed by the nonassumption of compliance, by leaving the hearer options for noncompliance (Cottrill, Forthcoming; Matsumoto, 1988; Wierzbicka, 1985a, 1985b).

It is possible that certain cultures favor positive politeness as a way of dealing with others, more than some other cultures. Positive politeness or, to use Scollon and Scollon's (1983) term, solidarity politeness, is expressed by verbal strategies that emphasize in-group membership and the assertion or assumption of reciprocity.

This view of regarding solidarity politeness as encompassing directness is supported by our findings on the use of direct strategies for making requests and also by the use of mitigating elements in request strategies. Alerters with a mitigating function (e.g., dear friend, excuse me, forgive me tremendously,....) were used quiet frequently in all situations. Also many lengthy and elaborate external and internal modifiers were used for softening the impact of the direct approach.

The use of positive politeness strategies in Persian stems from the value of group orientedness in Iranian culture. In Iran, people tend to depend upon their relationship with others, and this dependency upon others is especially common within the family. Children often remain financially and psychologically dependent upon their parents even into their graduate studies. The concept of individualism is truly alien to the Iranian culture. In fact, there is no satisfactory translation for "individualism" in Persian. Words like [xososiyat], which is the common translation for individualism, seem to be limited to scholarly circles, and are certainly not a part of the working vocabulary of the vast majority of people. Even this translation of "individualism" into Persian has the negative implication of "everyone acting for himself" in a somewhat selfish, chaotic way. The importance of group harmony is illustrated in the concept of [mæšværæt], which translates as "consulting with others at all times". A sense of "groupness" also manifests itself in the way that Iranians refer to older men as [pɛdær] (father), older women as [mɑðær](mother), and slightly older acquaintances as [xɑhær] (sister) and [bæræðær](brother).

It seems in cultures like the Iranian culture, where the acknowledgement of one's status as a member of the group has greater importance in determining norms of interaction than considerations of individual freedom (cf. Wierzbicka, 1985a, 1985b), the politeness strategies used would be more of the positive politeness than negative politeness.

So far, this discussion has mainly focused on the relationship between levels of directness and levels of politeness. But according to research (Brown and Levinson, 1978; Levinson, 1983) indirectness is certainly not the only dimension of requesting behavior which affects politeness. The presence or absence of various internal and external modifiers also plays a role in this respect. Using more supportive moves, internal modifiers, and alerters, with more mitigating

elements to further modify the alerters or supportive moves (e.g., dear friend, excuse me tremendously), have caused Persian utterances to be longer compared to English utterances. Double and triple marking does discriminate between the Persian and English data. As Rintell and Mitchell (1989) mention, having more and longer modifications in requests can be attributed to the native speakers' perceptions of request as more elaborate and therefore more polite. Also different address forms used by Persian speakers have different levels of formality in Persian (e.g., dear friend, Mr. Excellency, respectful Mr...) which in turn can add to the politeness of utterances.

Clearly, the conventional expression of requests in the Persian data is hardly indirect. Rather, the conventional expression of requests in Persian is extremely direct compared to English, and it reflects a culturally specific interactional style in the requestive behavior of the two languages examined. But, as mentioned before, directness is only one feature of the request sequence which is related to politeness. When considering other components of the request sequence (i.e., alerters, supportive moves, internal modifiers, perspective), it was found that Persian speakers use these components more frequently and possibly compensate for their directness by the use of more supportive moves, alerters, and internal modifiers.

CONCLUSION

One of the important goals of this study was to expand the scope of empirical work investigating speech acts across cultures, as it is one area of language use which urgently needs further research (Rintell, 1981; Blum-Kulka et al., 1989; Flowerdew, 1988, 1990). This study was also a response to the need to move away from Anglo-cultural ethnocentricity in the study of speech acts by widening the scope of the languages and cultures investigated and, thereby, testing the basic concepts on which the study of speech acts have so far been based, to see the extent to which they are appropriate to describe non-western societies.

I hope to have shown that, due to the narrow scope of the CCSARP research, its claims regarding the universality of a preference for conventionally indirect requests are not completely warranted. The Persian language deviates from this pattern in that direct request forms are used by a preponderance of the subjects in all of the situations studied here. Also, the observed differences discovered here between English and Persian strategies for requests justify a culture-specific description of at least some aspects of speech-act forms across languages, i.e., level of directness and proportion of components related to the head act. This does not mean, of course, that there are no universal, or at least cross-culturally shared properties of speech acts. It does mean, however, that further comparisons between languages on these lines will have to be alert to universal and culture-specific factors as they attempt to account for the complex nature of the interdependence among pragmatic considerations, linguistic meaning, and social

rules of usage that govern speech act realization in any particular language. The issue as to what facets of particular speech acts should be considered universal and what is culture-specific definitely needs more research.

Our findings indicate also that the relation of politeness and directness should be reconsidered. In some societies politeness is achieved by means other than directness/indirectness, e.g.,, by the proportion of supportive moves, alerters, internal modifications involved, the length of utterance, and the use of different pronoun and verb forms.

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APPENDIX A

ENGLISH VERSION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

AGE: _____ SEX:_____

DEGREE: _____ MAJOR: _____

NATIVE LANGUAGE: _____

Please read the following descriptions of situations and then write what you would say in each situation.

1. For registration you need to fill out a couple of forms. You search all of your pockets and cannot find a pen. You want to ask another student who is sitting next to you in the department hall. What would you say?

2. You were sick and missed your class yesterday. You need to borrow a friend's notes. What would you say?

3. You are studying at home. Your younger brother opens the window and the cold wind blows right into your face and bothers you. You want to ask him to close it. What would you say?

4. Your term paper is due, but you haven't finished it yet. You want to ask your professor for an extension. What would you say?

5. You and your friend go to a restaurant to eat. You want to order and need to ask the waiter for the menu. What would you say?

6. You want to make some copies on the machine down the department hall but find the instructions confusing. Just then you see one of the department's professors whom you haven't spoken to before passing by. You want to ask for help. What would you say?

APPENDIX B: Sample Responses

Direct Requests:

(1) Menu, please.
(2) Close the window.
(3) Lotfan ghalameto yek lahzeh be man bedeh.
please pen your one moment to me give
'Please give me your pen for a mement'
(4) Dirooz kelas boody? jozvetoon ra bedin man
yesterday class were you? your notes give me
benevisam. Mibagkshida.
write I. Excuse me.
'Were you in class yesterday? Give me your notes to write. Excuse me.'

Conventionally Indirect Requests:

(5) Excuse me, could you help me with this machine?
(6) Could I have an extension on my paper because "so-and-so" has happened?
(7) Dooste aziz, dirooz shoma tu kelas boodid?
friend dear yesterday you in class were
Lotfan mishe jozvetoon ra be man
please possible notes your OBJ to me
bedahid ta man ham benevisam?
give so me too write
'Dear friend, were you in class yesterday? Can you please give your notes to me, in order for me to write it too?'
(8) Agha ozr mikham, momkene liste ghaza ra
Mr. excuse me, possible menu OBJ
biyarin?
bring
'Mr. excuse me, is it possible to bring the menu?'

Hints:

(9) Do you have a pen?
(10) I could really use a little more time to finish my paper.
I've been really busy.
(11) Agha ghaza chi darind?
Mr. food what you have
'Mr. what do you have for food?'
(12) Bebakhshid ostad shoma midoonid ke
Excuse me professor you know that

in machin chetor kar mikonad?
this machine how works Do?
'Excuse me, Prof. do you know how this machineworks?'

Alerters:

(13) **Excuse me,** may I borrow your pen?
(14) **Little brother,** close the window or I'll kill you.
(15) **bebakhshid ostad,** shoma middonid ke.....
excuse me, Professor, you know that....
(16) **Dooste aziz:** agar momkene.....
Dear friend: if possible.....

Supportive Moves:

(17) Kevin, would you please close the window? **It is too cold in here.**
(18) Excuse me, do you have an extra pen that I could borrow? **I can't believe I forgot to bring one.**
(19) Lotfan mishe jozveto be man bedi? **man**
please possible notes to me give I
mariz boodam va be kelas natoonestam
sick was and to class could not
beyam.
come.
'Would you please give me your notes? I was sick and could not come to class?'
(20) Un panjere ra beband. **Sardam shod. Zood**
that window Obj close. Cold Do Hurry
bash.
Do
'Close that window. I got cold. Hurry up.'

Internal Modifiers:

(21) Excuse me, can I borrow your pen **for a second?**
(22) Can I **please** borrow your notes?
(23) **Lotfan** ghalametoon ra **yek lahzeh** bedahid.
please your pen OBJ one moment give
'Would you please give me your pen for a moment'
(24) Dadash **lotfan** panjereh ra beband.
brother please window OBJ close
'Brother, please close the window.'

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Closing Kiswahili Conversations: The Performance of Native and Non-native Speakers

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This paper reports on how speakers of Kiswahili, native and non-native, close conversations. In this paper I show that 1) closings in Kiswahili are quite elaborate and may extend to over five turns at talking, 2) an exchange of 'goodbyes' does not usually signal the end of a conversation, 3) there is no strict ordering of features and 4) some closing features are linked to the opening part of the conversation.

Analysis of non-native speaker closings, in this case American learners of Kiswahili, shows that 1) learners perform minimal closings, 2) they are often 'unwilling' to reopen a closing once 'goodbyes' have been produced and 3) they rarely use features that link closings to openings. Learners' performance on 'closing' the conversation is compared to their performance on 'opening' it (Omar 1991; 1992). The results show that learners are more 'successful' at closing a conversation in Kiswahili than at opening one. The question why this is so will be addressed in the paper.

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of Kiswahili Conversational Closings is based on the work done by Button (1987), Hartford and Bardovi-Harlig (1992), Kasper (1989), Knapp, Hart, Friedrich and Schulman (1973), and Schegloff and Sacks (1973) on English closings. These analyses can be partially applied to Kiswahili Conversational Closings (CCs): some of the features found in English CCs, such as the continuation feature 'see you later', the appreciation feature 'thanks', and features like 'OK' or the equivalent are also found in Kiswahili CCs. In Kiswahili,

however, these features do not have a strict order of occurrence as they do in an English CC. In Kiswahili, they can pre-close the conversation, i.e., signal the beginning of a closing, as well as terminate a conversation.

THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIVE SPEAKERS

Data Collection

Native speaker data were obtained from five different sources: 1) participant observation and field notes, 2) recording of face to face interactions wherever possible, 3) recording telephone conversations, 4) reconstructing dialogues from personal experience, and 5) analyzing video plays from Zanzibar Television. Participant observation and the taking of field notes were done by the researcher for a period of one month in Zanzibar.[1] I observed and taped people interacting at home, in the streets, and in offices. When it was not possible to get recorded data, I reconstructed the dialogues shortly after the conversations. Native speakers, male and female, of a variety of ages, participated in this study. Telephone conversations were recorded by S, a native speaker of Kiswahili from Zanzibar. He recorded incoming and outgoing telephone conversations to and from his residence. All examples used in this paper indicate the source of data. The conversational exchanges I have analyzed here are between acquainted participants.

Initiating and Terminating Kiswahili Closings

Kiswahili Conversational Closings (CCs) are initiated by the use of the equivalent of 'OK', *haya*.[2] But it is also possible to find *haya* in combination with features of **Continuation** (statements expressing desire to see the other again in the future), **Phatic Inquiries (PIs)** (routine expressions inquiring about the well being of the other), **Declaration to leave** (statements expressing intention to leave), and **Appreciation** (expressions of thanks). Examples (1) to (5) are examples of closings initiated by this combination. The closings in Examples (1) to (5) were terminated without the actual exchange of 'goodbyes'.[3]

1) 40 year old man, D, talking to an older woman L (taped telephone conversation).

D:	Haya basi, *inshallah*	OK then, if God
	nikipata fursa	wishes if I get time,
	nitakuja huko.	I'll pass by there.
L:	Inshallah baba.	If God wishes, baba.[4]
D:	Haya asante.	OK, thanks.
L:	Haya.	OK.
	[end of conversation]	

2) W and Q are women friends (taped street encounter).

W:	Haya *tutaonana.*	OK, we will meet.
Q:	Tutaonana.	We will meet.
W:	Inshallah.	If God wishes.
	[end of conversation]	

The CCs in Examples (1) and (2) are initiated by the use of continuation features. These continuation features are specific in (1) and general in (2).

Another feature that may initiate a CC is a PI, a feature also found in a Kiswahili Conversational Openings (CO). One example of the use of a PI in pre-closing a conversation is seen in Example (3).

3) M is talking to Z (taped telephone conversation).

M:	Haya *bibi na watoto*	OK, are the wife and the
	hawajambo?	kids fine?
Z:	*Hawajambo*, alhamdulillah.	They are fine, thank God.
M:	Haya.	OK.
Z:	Haya asante.	OK thanks.
	[end of conversation]	

The pre-closing in Example (4) is an explicit declaration of leaving, produced by K after talking to T in a street interaction. K wanted to go on his way after stopping to talk to a friend. This kind of pre-closing is also used in intended interactions.

4) K accompanied by another person talking to a friend T (taped street encounter).

K:	Haya *bwana* tunakwenda.[5]	OK bwana, we are going.
T:	Haya. Karibuni.	OK. Welcome.
	[end of the conversation]	

The pre-closing in Example (5) uses the appreciation feature *asante*. The use of this feature to initiate a closing does not seem to have the same function as when used at other places in the conversation. Here, it does not necessarily mean 'thanks for calling' or 'thanks for a certain service rendered' as would have been the case in English.

5) N talking to his friend U (taped telephone conversation).

U:	OK.	
N:	OK. *Asante*.	OK. Thanks.
U:	Haya.	OK.
N:	Haya.	OK.
	[end of conversation]	

Some cues which are used for pre-closing may also be used to terminate a conversation. That is to say, features of continuation, appreciation, and 'OK' are found in both the pre-closing and terminating sequence turns of a Kiswahili CC. There are other additional cues found in terminating a conversation. One of these cues is that of **Welcome** (statements expressing desire for the other to visit again). The welcome feature is seen in Example 4 above.[6] Other terminating features are **Regards** (sending greetings to others) and **Leave-taking** (the equivalent of 'good-bye') as shown in Examples (6) and (7) respectively.

6) X, a 30 years old man talking to an older woman, Y (taped street encounter).

X:	Haya	OK.
Y:	Haya *nisalimie*.	OK my regards.
X:	Haya asante.	OK thanks.
	[end of conversation]	

7) Boss (S) talking to his employee (E); male participants (taped telephone conversation).

S:	Sawa?	OK?
E:	Sawa.	OK.
S:	Haya.	OK.
E:	Haya.	Ok.
S:	*Kwaheri.*	Goodbye.
E:	Haya.	OK.
	[end of conversation]	

A participant can also say 'goodbye' to others who are not present at the time of closing the conversation but who were there at the opening part as seen in Example (8).

8) A has been visiting B and C; C is not present at the closing part of the conversation; male participants (Zanzibar Television play).

A:	Haya bwana.	OK bwana.
B:	Karibu bwana A.	Welcome bwana A.
A:	*Niagie.*	Say 'goodbye' for me.
B:	Haya tutaonana.	OK, we will meet.
	[end of conversation]	

Table 1 shows the closing cues found at the initiating stage and at the terminating stage.

Table 1. Features that occur in pre-closing and terminating turns of a Kiswahili Conversational Closing.

Cue	initial stage	terminal stage
1. continuation	+	
a. general *tutaonana* 'see you later'		+
b. specific *nitakuja mara nyingine* 'I'll come another time'	+	—
2. The use of *haya* 'OK'	+	+
3. Appreciation *asante* 'thanks'	+	+
4. PIs and PRs *habari zaidi?/nzuri* 'More news?/good	+	—
5. Intention to leave *nakwenda* 'I'm going'	+	—
6. Welcome *karibu* 'welcome'	—	+
7. Regards *nisalimie* 'my regards'	—	+
8. Leave taking *kwaheri* 'goodbye'	—	+

+ = occurrence; — = no occurrence

The Link Between Closings and Openings

Conversational Closings in Kiswahili must be understood in relation to Conversational Openings (COs). There are features that occur in COs as well as CCs in Kiswahili. The presence of these features in both COs and CCs provides an important symmetry between these two aspects of discourse. The common features found in both COs and CCs are Phatic Inquiries (PIs) and Phatic Responses (PRs), the welcome feature karibu, the PR salama, and the regard feature nisalimie.[7]

The motivation for the use of PIs in the closing is linked with the opening section of the conversation. As discussed in Omar (1992), one of the participants in a conversation does not usually get the chance to ask PIs because the production of PIs is usually dominated by the other participant--in both 'age difference' and 'same age' exchanges. Therefore, the participant who does not get the opportunity to produce PIs at the opening part of the conversation will do so at the first possible place in the conversation. This is usually the first possible pre-closing or following the first pre-closing turn and thus causes movement out of the already initiated closing. X, in Example (9), did not accept the pre-closing produced by Y and decided to produce a PI which he was not able to produce at the opening part of the conversation.

9) X, who is 30 years old, is talking to an older person, Y; male and female participants (taped telephone conversation).

	[pre-close 1]	
Y:	Haya bwana.	OK bwana.
X:	*Je salama?*	Is (everything) alright?
Y:	Alhamdulillah	Praise be to God.
	[about 10 turns at talk]	
	[pre-close 2]	
X:	Haya	OK.
Y:	Haya nisalimie.	OK my regards.
X:	Haya asante.	OK thanks.
	[end of conversation]	

X, who is younger than Y, did not have the opportunity to ask PIs during the opening part of the conversation. X had initiated the opening by using the respectful form *shikamoo* and Y had the active role of asking PIs. Y asked 5 PIs before she started the first pre-closing *haya*. X took this opportunity to take the questioning role and asked one PI. Then he initiated pre-close 2 which was accepted by Y and the conversation was terminated by *haya, asante*--a feature which was also used to initiate a closing elsewhere. The whole exchange between X and Y is reproduced in Example (10).

10) 30 year old man, X, passes a 55 year old female acquaintance Y; Different age; PI domination (taped street encounter).

X:	Shikamoo	Shikamoo
Y:	Marahaba. Habari?	OK. News?
X:	Nzuri.	Good.
Y:	Hujambo?	Are you fine?
X:	Sijambo.	I am fine.
Y:	Habari za kwenu?	News of your home?
X:	Nzuri.	Good.
Y:	Watu wote hawajambo?	Is everybody fine?
X:	Hawajambo.	They are fine.
Y:	Watoto?	The children?
X:	Hawajambo.	They are fine.
Y:	Haya bwana.	OK, bwana.
X:	*Je salama?*	Peaceful?
Y:	Alhamdulillah	Praise be to God.
	[about 10 turns at talk]	
	[pre-close 2]	
X.	Haya	OK.
Y.	Haya nisalimie.	OK my regards.
X.	Haya asante.	OK thanks.
	[end of conversation]	

Another feature that can occur at the beginning and at the end of a conversation is the welcome feature *karibu*. The reply *karibuni* or *karibu* (if it had been one person) 'welcome' in Example (4) reproduced here as Example (11) is also used in the opening part of a conversation to welcome a person inside a house, an office, or a store as in Example (12). When used at the end of the conversation, *karibu* means 'welcome again some other time'; and when used at the beginning, it means 'welcome now'.

11) K accompanied by another person talking to a friend T (face-to-face).

K:	Haya bwana tunakwenda.	OK bwana we are going.
T:	*Haya. Karibuni.*	OK. Welcome (later).
	[end of conversation]	

12) Unique opening *hodi*. (A is visiting his friend B; dialogue obtained from Television Zanzibar video play).

A:	Hodi, hodi	Knock, knock.
B:	*Karibu* bwana.	Welcome (now) bwana.
	Oho! Nini hali?	Oho! What condition?

Some non-native speakers of the language (observed in the Comoro Islands) would come back in again right away when they hear the word *karibu*.

A third feature that may occur at the beginning and end of a conversation is the PR *salama* 'peace'. At the beginning of the conversation it responds to the PI about the other participants' news--*habari?/salama*. At the end, it is used to respond to an intention to leave feature as seen in Example (13).

13) ID is leaving for school in the morning; L is his grandmother (reconstructed).

ID:	Haya nakwenda.	OK, I'm going.
L:	Haya baba. Nenda *salama*.	OK, baba. Go in peace.
	[end of conversation]	

Another feature found in both COs and CCs is *nisalimie* meaning 'greet me' in the opening part of the conversation, and 'my regards to...' or 'my greetings to...' in the closing part. *Nisalimie* is used as a regard feature in Example (14) below.

14) W and H are two women of the same age (taped street encounter).

H:	Haya asante	OK, thanks.
W:	Haya	OK.
H:	Tutaonana.	We will meet.
W:	*Haya. Nisalimie.*	OK. My regards.
H:	Haya.	OK.

Nisalimie is used as an opening feature when a child forgets to greet an older person. The child is reprimanded and is required to greet by using the respectful form as seen in Example (15).

15) Child MS has not used the respectful form to greet L, an adult (reconstructed).

L:	We mtoto hebu nisalimie.	O, child greet me.
MS:	Chei chei bibi.[8]	Chei chei madam.
L:	Chei chei.	Chei chei.

Summary

I have shown in this section that closing the conversation in Kiswahili is elaborate but not as elaborate as opening one (Omar 1991; 1992). Neither does it seem to be governed by strong cultural constraints. It does not seem to matter who initiates the closing by producing the first possible pre-closing. A participant of any age can initiate a closing and there seem to be several options to take. I have also shown that closing features do not have a strict order of occurrence and that there are features that occur in a CC as well as a CO in Kiswahili.

THE PERFORMANCE OF NON-NATIVE SPEAKERS

This part of the paper compares the performance of learners of different proficiency levels: beginning, intermediate and advanced learners. Beginning learners had one semester of Kiswahili classroom instruction at the beginning of data collection, intermediate learners had three, and advanced learners had more than six semesters of classroom instruction, as well as exposure to the target language environment.

Data Collection

The closing data were obtained from role play situations, recording of office hour conversations and telephone conversations used in Omar (1991; 1992). Specifically, I used recorded verbal role plays: low proficiency learners were given ten invented situations to role play in class, while high proficiency learners presented an impromptu play in class, also recorded. All learners participated in office hour conversations, but only advanced learners participated in telephone conversations. The description of learners' CCs will be drawn from these different tasks.

The Performance of Beginning and Intermediate Learners

Beginning and intermediate learners use the same kind of options to close a conversation. Their preference for terminating a conversation is the leave-taking option *kwaheri* 'goodbye'. Example (16) is a role play in which beginning learners, S1 and S2, meet accidentally in the street. So their conversation is made up of an opening part and a closing part only. After a few turns of exchanging PIs and PRs, S2 proposes termination of the conversation by saying *kwaheri* and S1 agrees to terminate the conversation by producing another *kwaheri*.

16) S1 meets a friend S2. They haven't seen each other since last week (role play; beginning class).

S1:	Na watoto hawajambo?	And are the children fine?
S2:	Hawajambo. Kwaheri.	They are fine.
S1:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
	[end of conversation]	

Intermediate learners also prefer the leave taking option. Example (17) is a role play situation between S3 and S4 who is a friend of S3's father. At the beginning of this conversation S3 acted non-native like by not producing the respectful greeting form even though she is younger than S4. In the closing part, she also acts non-native like by not verbally replying to the leave-taking feature *kwaheri* 'goodbye'. S4 says *kwaheri* while S3 terminates the conversation non-verbally by the wave of her hand.

17) Talking to father's friend (verbal role play; intermediate learners).

S3.	Hodi. Hodi.	Knock. Knock.
S4:	Karibu.	Welcome.
S3:	Hujambo?	How are you?
S4:	Sijambo. Na wewe je?	I'm fine. How about you?
S3:	Sijambo. Na Habari zako?	I'm fine. And your news?
S4:	Nzuri. Na wewe?	Good. And yours?
S3:	Nzuri. Habari za baba?	Good. News of your father?
S4:	Nzuri lakini ana kazi nyingi.	Good but he has a lot of work.
S3:	Yuko wapi?	Where is he?
S4:	Yuko kazini.	He's at the office.
S3:	Nitakupa neno umwambie baba yako kwamba nataka	I'll give you a message to tell to your father

	kumwona.	that I want to see him.
S4:	Kwanini?	Why?
S4:	Kwasababu ya kazi. Kwaheri.	Because of work. Goodbye.
S3:	[waves hand only]	
	[end of conversation]	

Leave-taking in Examples (16) and (17) is abruptly done. In native speaker closings, when the leave-taking option is used it usually occurs with at least one other closing feature. In Example (16), for example, a native speaker would have responded with *haya, kwaheri* 'OK, goodbye' or use other terminating features from the available options.

In the office with their instructors, learners typically used general continuation feature *tutaonana* 'see you later'. In Example (18), one would think the conversation was terminated when S responded non-verbally by leaving the room. The student, however, wanted to use the general continuation feature but had forgotten and did not recognize it when FT used it the first time. So the student returned to the office and asked how to say 'see you later' and used it to terminate the conversation.

18) Instructor FT's office (intermediate student).

FT:	Haya.	OK.
S:	Haya.	OK.
FT:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
S:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
FT:	Tutaonana.	We will meet.
S:	[goes away and returns immediately]	
	Alwiya, unasemaje 'see you later'	Alwiya, how do you say 'see you later?'
FT:	'Tutaonana'	'See you later.'
S:	Haya. Tutaonana.	OK. We will meet.
FT:	Tutaonana.	We will meet.
	[end of conversation]	

The above example shows that the student is ready to learn the continuation feature.

In addition to the continuation feature, another feature that is exhibited in the closings of both beginning and intermediate learners is the appreciation option.

Example (19) is a closing taken from office hour conversation between a beginning student and instructor MT. The student initiates the closing.

19) Instructor MT's office (beginning student).

S:	OK. Asante.	OK. Thanks.
MT:	Asante. Kwaheri.	Thanks. Goodbye.
S:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
	[end of conversation]	

An option that intermediate students rarely used and was not used at all by beginning students is the intention to leave. Out of the 40 verbal role plays from beginning and intermediate learners, intention to leave was used only twice by intermediate students. One such use is seen in Example (20).

20) A visited her friend B and is about to leave (role play; intermediate class).

S5:	Ninaondoka karibu.	I'll soon go.
S6:	Mara hii.	So soon.
S5:	Ndiyo. Asante kwa chai na keki. Kwaheri.	Yes. Thanks for the tea and the cake. Goodbye.
S5:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
	[end of conversation]	

One learner in the intermediate class was able to engage in a lengthy closing as seen in Example (21). She moved out of the closing by remarking on the weather. She was able to do this easily even though *kwaheri* had been exchanged. Other learners from all levels find it hard to open up a closing after *kwaheri*, even though it is done by native speakers. Out of the 27 closings obtained from the office hour conversations between the instructors and the learners (beginning and intermediate students), this is the only extended closing recorded.

21) Instructor FT's office (intermediate student).

FT:	Vizuri.	Good.
S:	Asante.	Thanks
FT:	Tutaonana, basi, kesho.	We will meet tomorrow then.
S:	Kesho.	Tomorrow.
FT:	Asante. Kwaheri.	Thanks. Goodbye.

S:	Kwaheri. Unafikiri kwamba. [pointing at the snow outside]	Goodbye. Do you think that..
FT:	Theluji nzuri.	Snow is good.
S:	Sikutegemea theluji.	I didn't expect snow.
FT:	Ndiyo.	Yes.
S:	Nitakwenda darasani ya hesabu.	I'll go to the Math class.
FT:	Haya. Kwaheri.	OK. Goodbye.
S:	Kwaheri. Asante pia.	Goodbye. Thanks also.
FT:	Tutaonana. [end of conversation]	We will meet.

In this part of the survey, learners have in most cases used successfully the closing features which are also found in English. These features are: continuation, appreciation, and leave-taking. Only two learners tried the feature 'intention to leave'. Learners used the strategy of repeating the previous turn, mentioned in Kasper (1989), and successfully close the conversation.

The Performance of Advanced Learners

In this section, I describe the performance of advanced learners who have had target language exposure. These learners are more familiar with each other and with their instructor than the lower proficiency learners were. Therefore, the advanced learners are able to use all the options available to close a conversation in Kiswahili. They are able to use these closing features in combination which is unusual for beginning and intermediate learners. Example (22) is the end of a conversation in a role play and we see five closing features used: intention to leave, welcome, regards, continuation, appreciation, and leave-taking.

22) At a friend's house (role play; advanced learners).

S1:	Asante sana. Lazima niende mjini sasa.	Thanks a lot. I must go downtown now.
S2:	Karibu tena. Nisalimie.	Welcome again. My regards.
S1:	Asante. Tutaonana.	Thanks. We will meet.
S2:	Kwaheri. [end of conversation]	Goodbye.

These features are used in elicited conversations as well as in natural conversations as seen in Example (23) in a telephone conversation between an advanced student and instructor MT.

23) L2 calls MT (advanced student; recorded telephone conversation).

L2:	Sawa. Asante sana.	Fine. Thanks a lot.
MT:	Haya.	Ok.
L2:	Na tutaonana.	And we will meet.
MT:	Haya. Kwaheri.	Ok. Goodbye.
L2:	Kwaheri.	
	[end of conversation]	

Some advanced learners take appreciation literally and respond with a non-native speaker equivalent of 'Don't mention it'. As mentioned earlier, the appreciation feature in a Kiswahili CC is not used literally. It does not mean that a native speaker participant is thanking another participant for a service rendered. Even when it is literally used to mean 'thank you for a service,' elsewhere in a conversation, native speakers will respond with another *asante*, or *haya* 'OK' as MT has done in Example (24) above. Many learners use *si kitu* 'it's nothing' using the minimizing feature used in English CCs in response to the appreciation feature. But no such reply is given in Kiswahili. L2 in Example (24) responds to *asante* by modelling her response on the English minimizing feature. But in the same closing, she uses 'Ok' in response to another *asante* produced by L5. Thus showing variable performance within the same learner.

24) End of a telephone conversation between L5 and L2.

L5:	OK. Asante sana.	Ok. Thanks a lot.
L2:	OK. Sikitu. Asante.	Ok. It's nothing. Thanks.
L5:	Na tutaonana Ijumaa.	And we will meet on Friday.
L2:	Ndiyo.	Yes.
L5:	Asante sana.	Thanks a lot.
L2:	OK.	OK.
L5:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
L2:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
	[end of conversation]	

Advanced learners use the specific continuation feature as well. L4 in Example (25) begins the pre-closing by specifying that she will call FT.

25) End of a conversation between FT and L4 (office hour).

L4:	Sawa. Nitakupigia simu.	Fine. I will call you.
FT:	Sawa.	Fine.
L4:	Baada ya..	After the...
FT:	Haya.	OK.
L4:	Asante.	Thanks.
FT:	Tutaonana.	We will meet.
L4:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
	[end of conversation]	

In Example (26), L3 uses the regard feature. The ability to use this feature shows familiarity between participants. All the advanced learners have contact with their instructors and their families outside the classroom. Because of this shared knowledge between the advanced learners and their instructors, it is easier for the advanced learners to use the regard feature. Low proficiency learners do not have much contact with each other or with their instructors. Therefore, they could not be expected to use the regard feature.

26) End of conversation between FT and L3 (office hour).

FT:	Haya. Tutaonana.	OK. We will meet again.
L3:	Nisalimie.	My regards.
FT:	Haya. Kwaheri.	OK. Goodbye.
L3:	Mmm	
FT:	Tutaonana kesho darasani.	We will meet tomorrow in class.
L3:	Leo tuta...	Today we will...
FT:	Leo hakuna. Nimesahau kukwambia.	Today, it's canceled. I forgot to tell you.
L3:	Haya.	Fine.
FT:	Haya. Asante. Kwaheri.	OK. Thanks. Goodbye.
L3:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
	[end of conversation]	

In Example (26), L3 probably finds it hard to open up the closing. To him the conversation has been terminated because FT has said *kwaheri*. But there was something important that he needed to ask but he did not know how to reopen the conversation. FT noticed this and helped out by mentioning what was supposed to be mentioned earlier.

Linking Closings to Openings

Linking COs with CCs was mainly done by advanced learners. An example of the welcome feature was used in Example (22) reproduced here as Example (27), one example among many others used by advanced learners.

27) At a friend's house (role play; advanced learners).

S1:	Asante sana. Lazima niende mjini sasa.	Thanks a lot. I must go downtown now.
S2:	Karibu tena. Nisalimie.	Welcome again. My regards.
S1:	Asante. Tutaonana.	Thanks. We will meet.
S2:	Kwaheri. [end of conversation]	Goodbye.

In Example (27), S2 used the regard feature *nisalimie*. This feature is only used in the closing part of the conversation by advanced learners. In native speaker interactions *nisalimie* 'Greet me' is used when an older native speaker challenges a younger one. It is not expected of learners to challenge each other.

In all of the non-native speaker closings examined (ten recorded telephone conversations between the advanced learners) only one advanced student used a PI to pre-close a conversation. A native speaker usually uses this option if she did not have a chance to ask PIs at the beginning of the conversation or had forgotten to ask about a friend or family member of the other participant. L4 in Example (28) initiates the closing by asking about JP who is L5's friend. This is pre-closing 1. L4's motivation for using a PI to pre-close in the above example is like that of a native speaker of Kiswahili: she did not ask about JP at the beginning of the conversation.

28) L5 calls L4 (advanced learners; recorded telephone conversation).

	[phone rings]	
L4:	Hallo.	
L5:	Hallo	
L4:	Hujambo?	How are you?
L5:	Sijambo P. Habari yako?	I'm fine P. Your news?
L4:	Nzuri.	Good.
L5:	Habari za leo?	News of today?
L4:	Salama.	Peaceful.
	[about seventeen turns at talk]	
	[pre-close 1]	
L4:	Habari za JP?	News of JP?
L5:	Sawa. Ana kazi nyingi.	OK. He has a lot of work.
L4:	Nisalimie.	Give him my regards.
	[about seven turns of more talk]	
	[pre-close 2]	
L5:	Sawa.	OK.
L4:	Haya.	OK.
L5:	Ok, nitarudi kupiga typing.	I'll go back to typing.
	[about five turns at talk]	
	[pre-closing 3]	
L5:	Haya. Tutaonana.	Ok. We will meet.
L4:	Ndiyo. Kwaheri.	Yes. Goodbye.
L5:	Kwaheri.	Goodbye.
	[end of conversation]	

The closing in Example (28) is the longest closing recorded with three pre-closings. After *kwaheri* has been exchanged, the learners terminated the conversation.

About her experience in the target language environment, L4 mentioned how she liked the way speakers of Kiswahili greeted each other in the streets, at homes, and even in classrooms. She mentioned how she would stop and greet people on her way to class in Zanzibar. And when she got to class, the instructor would stop and exchange more routine formulae with her. It is very likely that she was exposed to the use of PIs in closings during her eight week stay in the target language environment.

Comparing Learners' Performance

The ability to use all the options available for closing the conversation depends on the proficiency of the learners. Beginning learners have fewer options, intermediate learners have a few more, and advanced learners have the most options. Learners may choose two or three options and use only those. They are able to close the conversation successfully even with limited options. This is mainly because there are no hard and fast rules as to what closing option is to be used and by whom. Beginning and intermediate learners do not usually use the regard option because of the lack of familiarity between each other and between them and their instructors. Advanced learners have the ability to create situations in which they can meet outside of the classroom, and they can also meet the instructors and their family. Therefore, advanced learners have the motivation to use the regard feature while the beginning and intermediate learners do not have it. Table 2 compares the performance of learners in using the closing features.

Table 2. Use of closing features across learners.

Feature	BNNS	INNS	ANNS
Use of PIs	—	—	0
Intention to leave	—	0	0
Regards	—	—	+
Welcome	—	—	+
Continuation			
1) Specific	—	0	0
2) General	+	+	+
Appreciation	+	+	+
Leave-taking	+	+	+

— = no occurrence; + = occurrence; 0 = rare occurrence; BNNS = Beginning non-native speaker; INNS = Intermediate non-native speaker; ANNS Advanced non-native speaker

Target language environment does not seem to be a principle factor in the ability to successfully close a conversation. This is because closing the conversation in Kiswahili is not heavily constrained by cultural norms as opening the conversation is.

While learners often have difficulty opening the conversation, they are generally successful in closing one. Learners may appear rude or unfriendly if they are not able to follow the opening norms in Kiswahili as shown in Table 3. They do not have this problem in closing the conversation.

Table 3. Learners' problems in performing Kiswahili COs.

Status	The norm	Learner's performance	Results
Age difference	form of respect used	form of respect not used	appears rude
Same age	highly involved (compete for PIs)	is not highly involved (do not compete for PIs)	appears unfriendly

The reason for the learners' success in closing the conversation is possibly that 1) there are no compulsory features in closing the conversation in Kiswahili; 2) there is a variety of options to choose from; 3) there is no strict order of occurrence of these options; 4) participants are not explicitly divided into two dissimilar roles as they are in opening the conversation; and 5) participants do not compete for any particular turn.

CONCLUSION

I have shown in this paper that 1) Kiswahili closings are quite elaborate; 2) Closing features are not strictly ordered: some features have a dual function of pre-closing and terminating a conversation; 3) the equivalent of **goodbye** is not the terminal pair in Kiswahili: it may not be used at all; and 4) Kiswahili closings can be understood by making reference to the opening part of the conversation.

I have also demonstrated that learners are generally more successful in closing a conversation than in opening one. The reason behind this success is that learners can repeat what the other participant has said and be able to close the conversation without any problems; learners can choose a few of the available options and use just those and still close the conversation successfully; and there is no strict ordering of closing features nor are there compulsory features.

There are features that are specifically found in Kiswahili closings that learners, especially, lower proficiency learners, do not use. The lack of these features (namely specific continuation, regard, and Phatic Inquiry), however, does not affect the learners' success in closing the conversation.

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NOTES

[1] The researcher, a native speaker of Kiswahili participated as participant W in the native speaker examples and as FT (Female teacher) in the non-native speaker examples. MT is a male teacher who participated in the collection of non-native speaker data.

[2] Schegloff and Sacks (1973) refer to the initiation of a closing section as a 'pre closing' move, or a 'possible pre-closing' move when it is not accepted by the other speaker who may decide to introduce a new topic and therefore move out of the initiated closing. If the pre-closing is accepted then the conversation is led to its termination.

[3] Closing features under discussion are underlined in the native speaker examples.

[4] The word *baba* literally means 'father'. In Example (1), however, it is used as an expression of endearment by L. L is the same age as the parents of D.

[5] The address term *bwana* means 'mister' in official situations. In unofficial situations, it means 'friend'. It is this second meaning that *bwana* refers to in the examples used in this paper.

[6] The closing in Example (4) is made up of two turns only. K pre-closes in the first turn and T accepts the pre-closing and terminates the conversation in the next turn.

[7] Lioba Moshi (pc) brought to my attention the use of *nisalimie* 'greet me' in the opening part of the conversation. An alternative way of saying 'greet me' is *niamkie*.

[8] *Chei chei* is the baby talk for *msalkheri* 'good evening' and *sbalkheri* 'good morning' which are respectful greeting forms used by adults in Zanzibar.

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The Use of Lexical Certainty Modifiers by Non-Native (Finnish) and Native Speakers of English

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This paper investigates the use of lexical certainty modifiers. The term refers to expressions with either a mitigating or an emphasizing function, for example *I suppose*, *sort of*, *obviously*, and *very*. Although certainty modifiers add little to the referential information of messages, they can be quite important interpersonally, particularly in terms of linguistic politeness. Knowing how and when to modify one's messages is one part of pragmatic competence; even fluent foreign language speakers may fail to use modifiers where it would be appropriate. This can at its worst result in unfavourable judgments of the speakers; they may be regarded as intentionally impolite or offensive, for example.

The paper focuses on the use of certainty modifiers by fluent non-native (Finnish) speakers of English. Their conversations will be compared with native (British) speakers of English and with their own conversations in Finnish. The purpose is to describe how much the way non-native speakers use certainty modifiers differs from native speaker performance, and whether the differences are as great as to possibly affect successful communication in English. The effect of the learners' L1 on the way they use modifiers in English will also be dealt with.

MODIFICATION: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In most everyday encounters, speakers are constantly modifying what they are saying rather than delivering categorical assertions. This paper focuses on one aspect of modification: the way speakers either mitigate or emphasize the force of their messages. Such modifications do not actually add anything to the

propositional content of utterances, but they can have quite important interpersonal functions. For example, speakers may wish to attenuate threats to face, which communication often entails, by expressing face-threatening acts in a mitigated form (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1978). Conversely, emphasizing can in certain contexts convey that the speaker is interested in the co-participants or in the topic at hand.[1]

There are various ways in which speakers can mitigate or emphasize their speech, ranging from facial expressions and other nonverbal means to complex linguistic constructions. This paper focuses on the use of lexical modifiers, which play a crucial role in verbal modification. The term lexical is used here in opposition to, for example, prosodic modification strategies or syntactic choices, such as passivization or impersonalization which also can have modifying functions. Mitigating devices include, for example, expressions like *I suppose*, *perhaps*, or *sort of*. *Certainly*, *I'm positive* and *very* are examples of devices that have an emphasizing function. *Certainty modifier* will be used as a cover term for both mitigating and emphasizing expressions.

Mitigating and emphasizing form a part of pragmatic competence, affecting how appropriate, rather than how grammatically correct, speakers are in a given situation. The use of modifiers is in close connection to the interpersonal function of language (see Halliday, 1973) in that modifiers can reflect something about the speakers' evaluations of what they are saying, and about their attitudes towards the co-participants and towards the situation as a whole. More particularly, they often play a salient role in linguistic politeness.

Native speakers of any language are usually pragmatically competent: they know, to a great extent subconsciously, when and how to mitigate and emphasize what they are saying. But the situation is more complicated for those who speak a foreign language. Non-native speakers easily concentrate only on the content of their messages, without paying attention to the interpersonal aspects of what they are saying. One probable reason for this is the fact that up till now, pragmatic aspects of language have not received very much attention in language teaching and non-native speakers are thus easily unaware of their importance. This may lead to pragmatic failure (see Thomas, 1983). For example, foreign language speakers may fail to use mitigating certainty modifiers in contexts where native speakers would expect them to occur. Such pragmatic failures are not necessarily seen as language problems. Rather, they may reflect unfavourably on non-native speakers, especially if the speakers are fluent as far as the surface correctness of language is concerned: they may be judged as intentionally rude or standoffish rather than having linguistic problems.

THE DATA

This paper is concerned with the use of lexical certainty modifiers by Finnish speakers of English. The focus of interest is on how much the way they use certainty modifiers differs from the native speaker use, and whether the differences might be as great as to potentially affect successful communication in English. The question of how much the learners' L1 affects the way they use modifiers in English will also be dealt with.

The data on which the findings are based consists of three kinds of recorded and transcribed conversations: by Finnish speakers of English, by native speakers of English, and by native speakers of Finnish. These situations can best be described as informal conversations between acquaintances. The main focus is on conversations by Finnish speakers of English (abbreviated as NNS conversations from now on). The participants in these conversations are students of English at the university level and thus quite fluent speakers as far as the mastery of grammar and vocabulary are concerned. There are four conversations altogether, with three to four participants in each; the total number of non-native speakers is fourteen. The duration of each conversation is approximately 30 minutes. The discussants were given a general topic with which to start the conversation, but in order to attain as natural conversations as possible the participants were encouraged to change the topic whenever they would feel like it. Note that there are no native speakers present in these conversations. This may have some effect on the non-native speakers' linguistic behaviour, but given that the use of modifiers apparently remains to a large extent outside speakers' conscious awareness (see e.g., Faerch and Kasper, 1989, p. 243), it is quite likely that the non-native speakers would use lexical modifiers in much the same way also in authentic encounters with native speakers of English.

The data also contains four 30-minute conversations by native (British) speakers of English (NS(E) conversations). The participants are university students of linguistics, of roughly the same age as the Finnish speakers of English. There are thirteen speakers altogether, in groups of three or four. These groups were similarly given a general topic at the beginning of the recordings with the information that the participants are free to change the topic during the conversations. As in the case of the NNS conversations, the situations were not otherwise controlled.

The third set of conversations is in Finnish (NS(F) conversations), by the same speakers and by exactly the same groups whose conversations in English constitute the non-native data. This means that there are also four conversations in Finnish; these conversations last about 30 minutes as well. The Finnish

conversations were in each case recorded after the students' conversations in English. Table 1 illustrates the data.

As the table indicates, there are comparable sets of IL (interlanguage), L1 and L2 data (L2 from the Finnish speakers' point of view). In other words, non-native speakers' performance is compared not only with native speakers of the target language but also with their native language. As Kasper and Dahl (1991, p. 225) point out, this is more informative than comparing only non-native and native speakers with each other.

TABLE 1
Illustration of the data

Conversations	NNS	NS(F)	NS(E)
Speakers	14 Finnish speakers of English	14 native speakers of Finnish	13 native speakers of English
	The same speakers in both groups		
Type of data	IL	L1	L2

CERTAINTY MODIFIERS

Mitigating and emphasizing expressions are called certainty modifiers because they can be interpreted as reflecting degrees of certainty. Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between two kinds of certainty. On the one hand, modifiers signal degrees of propositional certainty. That is, speakers indicate by the use of modifiers the extent to which they are committed to the truth of the proposition. For example, *I suppose* signals lack of full commitment while *certainly* indicates full commitment.[2] On the other hand, certainty modifiers are also capable of signalling degrees of interactional certainty. This has to do with how confidently speakers want to put their views across, whether they want to remain vague and fuzzy or to be explicit about what they are saying. For example, the use of *sort of* can reflect vagueness, and the use of *especially* explicitness.

No attempt will be made, however, to distinguish between different kinds of certainty modifiers on the grounds of whether they reflect propositional certainty or interactional certainty. This is because certainty modifiers are usually

ambiguous and multifunctional in that they can be interpreted in both ways. For example, it is often impossible to say whether speakers modify their message with *probably* because they are not fully committed to the truth of what they are saying or because they choose to remain vague for interpersonal reasons.

Certainty modifiers will be divided into three subcategories. *Hedges* have a mitigating function; the group contains expressions like *I suppose*, *apparently*, *sort of* in English, and *ehkä* 'maybe', *varmaan* 'probably', *vähän* 'a bit' in Finnish.[3] The function of *emphatics* is to boost or aggravate speaker's messages; they include, for example, expressions like *sure*, *obviously*, *very* in English, and *varmasti* 'certainly', and *tosi* 'really' in Finnish. The third category is called *implicit modifiers*. Implicitness refers to the fact that unlike with hedges and emphatics, it is difficult to tell the meaning of implicit modifiers from their surface form alone. Their meaning becomes evident only in the context, and it remains often ambiguous even then. Speakers can exploit this ambiguity and multifunctionality because it leaves room for meaning negotiations. The core members of this category are the expressions *I mean*, *you know*, *well* and *like*, which have also been called pragmatic particles or discourse markers (see Östman, 1981; Schiffrin, 1987). When comparing, for example, *I assume* and *I mean*, the function of the former can be inferred from its semantic content, whereas *I mean* is implicit in that the function in which it is used is rarely in close connection to the meaning of the verb 'to mean'. Rather, it is used in a particle-like fashion, and whether it functions as a downtoning or as an aggravating device depends on its context of occurrence. There are similar particle-like expressions in Finnish, the most frequently occurring ones in the present data being *niinku(n)* and *sillee(n)* (the rough meaning equivalents in English are 'as it were' and 'such a/in such way,' respectively).

FINDINGS EMERGING FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Table 2 shows the number of hedges, emphatics, and implicit modifiers in the three sets of conversations and their relative distribution.

TABLE 2
The distribution of hedges, emphatics and implicit modifiers

	NNS		NS(E)		NS(F)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
HEDGES	301	58	705	46	501	51
EMPHATICS	94	18	255	16	154	16
IMPLICIT MODIFIERS	127	24	587	38	320	33
Total	522	100	1547	100	975	100

As the table shows there is a clear difference in the use of certainty modifiers between the non-native and the native speakers of English as far as the number of modifiers is concerned, in that the non-native speakers, quite expectedly, use them much less. The total number of certainty modifiers is 1,547 in the NS(E) conversations and 522 in the NNS conversations. The difference seems at first quite striking, but it has to be borne in mind that during the same amount of time, the number of words produced by the native speakers is much bigger than by the non-native speakers. But even after relating the number of certainty modifiers to the total number of words the difference is clear: certainty modifiers constitute 13% of all the words spoken in the NS(E) conversations, in the NNS conversations the corresponding figure is 8%. The non-native speakers thus resort to modifying devices more sparingly, which supports the assumption that mastering pragmatic aspects of a foreign language is indeed difficult even for fluent non-native speakers. In the native speaker data especially, expressions of personal opinions and interpretations are heavily modalized, and complex combinations of modifiers are also quite frequent. The non-native speakers are more likely to use only a couple of modifiers in an utterance, and quite often long stretches of talk go totally unmodified. Compare the following examples:

(1) NNS

S2 you have to let your mind rest to, in order to learn at all
S1 mm it's true (pause) *I don't know I think* that the studyweeks shouldn't be so restricted
S2 *I think* it's funny to study on loans in general
S1 yeah [*really* funny
S2 it's in] students are only group of people who study who live on loans
S1 mm
S3 these old people complained about their pensions two weeks ago in Helsinki and, they demanded that they should have at least three thousand marks per month to (-) and think about students
S1 yeah
S2 you have less than a thousand mark for free and loan
S1 *I think* that the students should have a free er free money
S2 yeah...

(2) NS(E)

S3 mm and if we think about *I mean* the students take advantage of the community as much if no more than anybody else *you know* we're not *like* exempt [from the rest of all we *just* pay for it
S2 yeah *I suppose* so but *I still think*] you could once you've finished studying *or whatever* you're still gonna *you know* you're gonna have to pay the full whack then and *I think* you're gonna make up for then *I just think* they shouldn't make students pay *I mean* I *kind of* agree- I can see the point of a poll tax in general *and everything* even though I don't agree with it cos *I think* the better off you are you should pay more *and everything*

Example (2) above shows that the native speakers usually modalize their views with hedges and implicit modifiers which have typically a downtoning function. The role of emphatics is much smaller, which suggests that mitigating is interpersonally more important in these conversations (emphatics will be discussed in more detail later in the paper). When considering the interpersonal function of such downtoning devices, they can quite often be interpreted as markers of negative politeness: Speakers do not want to impose their views on others because it can be perceived as a threat towards their negative face, and therefore they rather put their views across tentatively. But speakers may also choose to express

themselves in a vague and fuzzy way because they want to protect their own face from the reactions of others. This shows that it is difficult to determine whether certainty modifiers are directed more towards the speaker's own face or towards the face of others. As Goffman (1967, p. 6) puts it, one's own face and the face of others are indeed "constructs of the same order."

In comparison to the native speakers of English, the non-native speakers' contributions are more direct. Directness may in certain contexts be interpreted as bluntness, as a threat towards the addressee's negative face. Such an interpretation, obviously, depends on the context but it seems, on the basis of the present data, that at least sensitive topics on which there are likely to be differing opinions among speakers, and expressions of personal opinions require some level of indirectness. Even if the non-native speakers were not necessarily regarded as impolite because they are more direct, the small amount of modifying material makes their expressions seem more matter-of-fact than those of the native speakers, and they may therefore be perceived as too formal for the context of informal face-to-face conversation.

The fact that the learners use certainty modifiers so scarcely seems to be an interlanguage phenomenon rather than resulting from L1 influence, judging from the fact that when the same speakers use Finnish, they also make abundant use of lexical certainty modifiers. There are 975 certainty modifiers in the four NS(F) conversations. These constitute over 10% of all words, but it is difficult to compare this figure with the proportional amount of certainty modifiers in the conversations in English because English and Finnish are structurally very different languages. Due to its agglutinative nature, one word in Finnish may express a meaning that needs to be expressed by several words in English (e.g., *talo+i+ssa+mme+kin*: noun+plural marker+case ending+possessive suffix+clitic 'also in our houses').[4] Yet the figure is illustrative enough to show that the use of modifying expressions is frequent in the Finnish conversations as well. In other words, the Finns do not seem to be any more direct than the native speakers of English. Rather, the performance of the non-native speakers differs both from the NS(E) conversations and from their own performance in Finnish. Example (3) illustrates the use of certainty modifiers by the native speakers of Finnish:

(3) NS(F)

S1 vaikka tuolla kadulla keskenämme ruvettais englantia puhumaan niin *tuntus vähän* ouvolle

S2 *mä taas oon sitä mieltä että mun mielestä ihan* mä tykkään puhuu nii *niinku* suomalaisten kans *niinku* vaikka tämmösissä tilanteissa ni tykkään puhua englantii ja ruotsii et musta se on kiva *jotenki* keskustella tälleen koska siinä on just se että kaikki ollaan *niinku tavallaan* samassa jamassa siinä

S3 joo

S1 niin on eikä sitä *silleen* kuuntele

S2 eikä *niinku sillä tavalla* välitä *niinku* on *jotenkin* vapaampi ku on saman ikäsiä ja ei *niinku* kiinnitä *sillä tavalla* huomiota puhumiseensa mut heti jos tulee joku opettaja ni mä ainakin muutan heti *niinku jotenkin ehkä vähän* puhettani sillä tavalla *niinku* että valitsen sanani ei kirosanoja *ja näin edespäin*
(...if we started to speak English with each other on the streets, for example, it would *seem a bit* strange
in my opinion I think I *quite* enjoy speaking *you know* with other Finns *like* in these kinds of situations I enjoy speaking English or Swedish *I find* it nice *somehow* to discuss like this because there's the fact that we are all *like in a way* in the same situation yeah
that's right and you don't *sort of* pay attention
and *like in a way* you don't care *you know* you feel *somehow* more free when there's people of the same age *like* you don't *sort of* pay attention to what you're saying but if there's a teacher present at least I change *you know somehow maybe a little* the way I talk *like* choose my words no swear words *and so on*)[5]

The non-native speakers not only use modifiers less than the native speakers of English, they also resort to a smaller variety of modifiers. They favour certain expressions that seem to function as kind of all-purpose modifiers. The most frequently occurring modifiers in the NNS data include, for example, *I think*, *I don't know*, *or something like that*, and *really*. It is, of course, understandable that the non-native speakers have a more restricted vocabulary at their disposal simply due to their non-nativeness. It is interesting from the viewpoint of pragmatic transfer, however, that all the modifiers mentioned above have close semantic equivalents in Finnish, also are used quite often as modifiers in the same speakers' conversations in Finnish (*musta/mun mielestä*, *en mä tiedä*, *tai jotain sellaista*, *tosi*, respectively). This seems to be in accordance with Selinker's

(1992, p. 259) suggestion that translation equivalents form an important learning strategy for foreign language speakers.

Of the modifiers discussed above, *I think* is the most frequently occurring one in the non-native speakers' conversations; there are 65 occurrences altogether. This modifier is very frequent in the NS(E) conversations as well (112 occurrences) but, proportionally, the non-native speakers use it more than the native speakers (13% versus 7% of all certainty modifiers). What is more, there are certain differences in the way the non-native and the native speakers of English use this hedge. The native speakers typically use *I think* together with other hedges, as a part of multiple hedging, in which case it is easy to interpret it as a mitigating device as well because multiple modifiers tend to reinforce each other rather than be in conflict with each other. The non-native speakers, on the other hand, usually use *I think* as the only modifier in the whole utterance, or at least not immediately accompanied by other hedges. They also typically begin their turns with *I think*. Compare the following examples:

(4) NS(E)

S1 yeah *I mean* he is *sort of* he is concerned about architecture I mean I think his views are good
S2 I don't know how they do it, get a flight over to Britain some way *I don't know I mean* these days *I think* it's *quite* difficult to get in now

(5) NNS

S1 *I think* four years is okay *like* in linguistics for us, but I just heard about a guy who is going to finish his studies in psychology he studied two years and is finishing the studies and I *just* have my doubts about him being a good psychologist
S2 how l- how old was he when he started
S1 he was *something* twenty *something*
S2 yeah
S1 not very old
S3 I think the people who don't go to university directly after school they're much more motivated

As the examples indicate, *I think* tends to be in a very prominent position in the learner's utterances. It may in fact be interpreted as bringing the speaker's views into focus rather than attenuating them, especially when used utterance-initially (see Holmes, 1985, p. 34). This can be problematic in encounters with native speakers where non-native speakers may appear as trying to impose their views on others. In other words, the frequent use of *I think* by the non-native speakers seems to be a mixed blessing in terms of negative politeness. It has to be borne in mind, however, that this paper focuses only on the use of lexical certainty modifiers; the non-native speakers might well use some other mitigating strategies along with the use of *I think*, such as tentative tone of voice, for example, which would soften the potential assertory effect of the hedge.

The tendency of the non-native speakers to use certainty modifiers which have Finnish equivalents can be compared to another, contrary finding: in comparison to the native speakers they use quite rarely certain modifiers that are among the most frequently occurring ones in the NS(E) data. These include, for example, *sort of/kind of* (7 occurrences), *you know* (56 occurrences) and *I mean* (25 occurrences). These modifiers are used 83, 173, and 263 times, respectively, in the NS(E) conversations. These modifiers are certainly familiar for the non-native speakers, yet they do not incorporate them into their own speech very often. These expressions do not have so close semantic equivalents in Finnish as the ones discussed earlier, which may be one reason for the learners using them so little. There are functional equivalents in Finnish, though. For example, the use of clitics[6] often has similar functions as the use of implicit modifiers in English, and the hedge *semmonen/tämmönen* (roughly 'such a') is used in much the same ways as *sort of* and *kind of* are used by the native speakers of English. Such functional similarity seems to be more difficult for the learners to perceive than semantic similarity. It is also important to bear in mind that the fact that the non-native speakers resort to these particular expressions more rarely than the native speakers is certainly partly language-teaching induced. That is, the learners have simply not had much opportunity to practice the use of these expressions that are very much part of informal face-to-face encounters in the context of formal language teaching.

Implicit modifiers in general seem to be quite difficult for the non-native speakers, at least if judged by the fact that they make fairly scarce use of them; whereas in the native speaker data, both in English and in Finnish, implicit modifiers constitute the biggest subtype of certainty modifiers. There are 587 occurrences of implicit modifiers in the NS(E) data, 320 in the NS(F) data, and 127 in the NNS data. *I mean* and *you know* are the most usual implicit modifiers in the conversations of native speakers of English (see above); in the Finnish conversations *niinku(n)* with its 256 occurrences is clearly the most frequent one

(literally 'as it were', functionally close to *you know* in English). The frequent use of implicit modifiers by native speakers of Finnish and English is illustrated by the following examples:

(6) NS(E)

S1 it's still a lot of money it's over a over a hundred pounds
S2 yeah yeah but there again *I mean you know*, it's true *I mean* obviously *you know* some people can't afford to pay but they were paying something before surely *I mean you know* [not everybody] no
S1 [no they weren't]

(7) NS(F)

S1 alkaako englanti *niinku silleen*, pikkasen *niinku* menettää näitä asemiaan
S2 mutta *niinku* englannin kieltä pitää varmaan Amerikka *niinku sillai* paljon yllä tai [*sillai* että *niinku*
S1 nii tekee] joo

(I wonder if English will *like you know* start losing its position a bit but *like* America probably keeps *like you know* the English language strong *you know like* that's true yeah)

Implicit modifiers are problematic in the sense that they do not necessarily always function as interpersonally motivated modifiers. They can also be interpreted as pause fillers that occur due to language processing efforts as well as be a part of a speaker's idiosyncratic speech style. It is, however, difficult to tell in which function the speaker really uses implicit modifiers because they can often be interpreted in many ways. This multifunctionality is probably the reason why the non-native speakers use implicit modifiers quite rarely: they are not sure what kind of meanings these modifiers convey and find it, therefore, best to resort to more explicit devices that do not cause so much doubt as to what exactly they mean, such as *I think*, for example (see also Kärkkäinen, 1990, p. 74). In general, the use of implicit modifiers seems to convey certain informality of style and signal the speaker's involvement with the situation as a whole. Therefore, the fact that the non-native speakers use them so little adds to the overall impression that they remain more detached, less involved with each other than the native speakers of either English or Finnish.[7]

This far, the paper has been concerned mainly with the use of hedges and implicit modifiers which are mostly used in downtoning functions. This is because the use of emphatics is much rarer in all sets of data. In both sets of native speaker conversations emphatics constitute only 16% of all certainty modifiers (235 occurrences in the NS(E), and 154 in the NS(F) data). In the NNS conversations emphatics occur only 94 times (18% of all modifiers). It was expected that the speakers would use emphatics as positive politeness markers, signalling mutual solidarity and involvement. For example, they could emphasize agreements and thus signal solidarity with each other. As it turned out, lexical mitigating appears to have a more important interpersonal role in these conversations than lexical emphasizing. It has to be remembered, however, that the conversations are rather artificial in that they take place in a classroom and the participants are aware of the recording taking place. Furthermore, they are acquaintances rather than close friends, and as pointed out earlier in this paper (see endnote 1), speakers may find it risky to emphasize their messages if they are not sure of the opinions of others. It is therefore likely that emphatics would have a more important role in situations where speakers are close friends with each other and where there would thus be more genuine need to show affect explicitly.

Even though emphatics are used considerably less than hedges and implicit modifiers, certain differences emerge between the way the non-native and the native speakers use them. In general, the same applies to emphatics as to other modifiers: the non-native speakers use fewer types of emphatics, tending to favor only certain expressions, notably *very*, *really* and *of course*. It is also worth pointing out that in both sets of native speaker conversations, speakers make use of quite expressive emphatics, often in connection with words that are strong and emotive in themselves. Expressions like *incredibly stupid*, *extremely unfair* or *hirveen ärsyttävää* 'terribly irritating', *kamalan tylsää* 'awfully boring' can easily be found in the speech of native speakers of English and Finnish. The emphatics that the non-native speakers use tend to be more neutral in meaning (*very*, *really*). This brings to mind Thomas's (1983, p. 96) suggestion that foreign-language speakers are often confined to a 'reduced personality' in that they use, and are often expected to use, a rather conventional type of language where extreme markings of personal involvement are avoided. This tendency is apparent in the present data as well, and it further adds to the detached atmosphere of much of the non-native speaker data.

CONCLUSION

The findings indicate that even though the non-native speakers are otherwise quite fluent speakers of English, they are to a large extent unaware of the significance of certainty modifiers. This has the result that they seem, on the whole, more detached, more matter-of-fact, and less involved with each other and the topic at hand than the native speakers of either English or Finnish. This raises the question of whether learners should be made aware of the significance of certainty modifiers in foreign language teaching. Teaching pragmatic aspects of language is, however, a very delicate matter. This is because pragmatic principles are closely connected to speakers' values and beliefs, to how they view the world and what they consider as appropriate behaviour, and speakers may be reluctant to change such principles when speaking a foreign language (see also Thomas, 1983, p. 99). Littlewood (1983, p. 184) also points out that providing foreign language learners with more and more things to remember every time they use a foreign language may increase communicative anxiety rather than facilitate communication. Yet certain level of consciousness raising seems to be the only way to prevent people from being unintentionally offensive when speaking a foreign language, or more formal or more detached than what they intend to.

It would perhaps be best to start this consciousness raising from learners' L1. Once learners become alerted to the fact that their own language has a lot of material that may seem meaningless at the outset, but that still has important interpersonal functions, maybe it will be easier for them to appreciate that the same applies to foreign languages as well (see also Bardovi-Harlig et al., 1991, p. 10). How such consciousness raising can best be achieved is, however, a complicated question; more research is required before definite answers can be given.

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NOTES

[1] The interpersonal functions of mitigating and emphasizing modifiers depend eventually on the context, on the kind of speech act they modify, and on the relationship between the speakers. For example, if speakers do not know each other very well, emphasizing one's expressions may be perceived impolite. As Brown and Levinson (1975, p. 121) point out, expressing strong opinions is risky unless the speaker is sure of the hearer's views.

[2] Propositional certainty is thus in close connection to the concept of *epistemic modality*, which has to do with speakers signalling their degree of commitment to the truth of the propositions in various verbal or non-verbal ways (see e.g. Lyons, 1977,p.797).

[3] Hedges, as understood in this paper, thus involve both hedges as Lakoff (1972) sees them, that is, linguistic devices which add to the fuzziness of linguistic expressions (e.g., *sort of, somewhat*), and markers of epistemic modality (e.g., *probably, might*).

[4] This structural difference also makes it difficult to compare modification strategies across the two languages because modifying functions that are expressed lexically in English can sometimes be realized by morphological means in Finnish, by adding affixes and clitics to word stems, for example. In this paper, however, attention is paid only to lexical modifiers in the NS(F) conversions.

[5] The English translations should be seen as only rough equivalents of the Finnish extracts because it is very difficult to translate pragmatic expressions like certainty modifiers from one language to another. This applies to implicit modifiers in particular.

[6] Especially the clitic-hAn is often used in a modifyiing function. In the following it mitigates the force of the question *Mitähän kello on*? 'What+clitic is time?' It can also signal shared knowledge and thus lessen the imposition of an utterance, corresponding roughly to *you know* in English: *Eihän me voida muutaa mitään* (No+clitic we can change anything) "We can't change anything you know."

[7] Chafe (1985, pp 116-118) discusses the properties of spoken and written language, and he maintains that while written language is usually detached, spoken language shows a variety of manifestations of involvement. Whafe discusses many involvement signals but the use of *you know*, emphatic particles such as *just* and *really*, and expressions like *I think*, and *I mean* are relevant for the presnt approach.

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Refining The DCT: Comparing Open Questionnaires and Dialogue Completion Tasks

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This study compares the influence of two forms of discourse completion tasks on the elicitation of rejections of advice. An open questionnaire which provides scenarios alone is compared with a classic dialogue completion task in which a conversational turn is provided. Both native and nonnative speakers show task influence, although for nonnative speakers the influence is greater. In many cases nonnative speaker responses are more similar to those of native speakers on the dialogue completion task. We conclude that, for the elicitation of reactive speech acts such as rejections, the inclusion of conversational turns is the preferred format.

With the widespread use of questionnaires to elicit data in interlanguage pragmatics research, it is important to know how specific types of questionnaires affect participant responses. Because of the nature of this research, it is also important to know whether native and nonnative speakers are influenced differentially by the type of questionnaire. The use of questionnaire data is so common that out of the 35 studies of speech act production reviewed by Kasper and Dahl (1991), 11 studies, or 31%, used Discourse Completion Tasks (DCTs) as the sole source of data and an additional 8 studies used them as one means of collecting data. Thus, DCTs were used in 54% (19 out of 35) of the studies. In contrast, only 2 of the 35 studies, or just under 6%, used observation of natural language exclusively.

In the present study, we compare two types of DCTs: an open questionnaire and a classic dialogue completion task. While both types are considered to be DCTs, an open questionnaire asks participants to respond to a scenario, and a dialogue

completion task gives at least one conversational turn and may also give a scenario (Kasper, 1991). Examples are given in (1) and (2), respectively.

(1) *Open Questionnaire* Your advisor suggests that you take a course during the summer. You prefer not to take classes during the summer.

You say:_____

(2) *Dialogue Completion Task* Your advisor suggests that you take a course during the summer. You prefer not to take classes during the summer. Advisor: What about taking Testing in the summer?

You say:_____

Other studies have compared the responses to DCTs and natural data (e.g., Beebe & Cummings, 1985; Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig, 1992), oral role play data to DCT data (e.g., Rintell & Mitchell, 1989), and different types of DCTs (Rose, 1992). Rose tested the effect of providing a hearer response for initiated requests (that is, a response to the turn provided by the participants). In this study we examine the effect of providing a turn to which the participants respond.

Our earliest work on rejections was based entirely on natural conversational data drawn from academic advising sessions between faculty advisors and native and nonnative English speaking graduate students (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1991). We employed questionnaires as a supplement to conversational data because there were not enough native speaker rejections in the natural corpus to establish a native speaker norm with certainty (Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig, 1992). The questionnaires proved quite useful for that purpose and permitted the testing of additional hypotheses as well.

When we analyzed the questionnaire data for both the native (NS) and nonnative speakers (NNS) we found that certain scenarios elicited rejections which were very different from those which occurred in the natural data. Since the open questionnaire did not provide advisor turns (see Example 1), we hypothesized that NS and NNS respondents might have been responding to an imaginary advisor whose suggestions were different from those which advisors have been observed to use. This led us to the present inquiry in which we compare the use of open

questionnaire (scenarios alone) to dialogue completion tasks (scenarios with authentic advisor suggestions).

We hypothesized that explicitly providing the advisors' suggestions could influence the responses which participants provided. We further hypothesized that NS and NNS may respond differently to the two types of questionnaires. If this were true, there would be two possible outcomes: 1) that changes in the questionnaire format affect NS more than NNS or 2) that changes in the questionnaire format affect NNS more than NS. If NS show more task influence than NNS, it may be interpreted as showing that NS are more sensitive to details and that NNS respond more to the global situation specified by the prompt. If, on the other hand, NNS show greater task influence than NS, this may be interpreted as indicating that NS are more familiar with the situations provided and that they do not need the same degree of specificity in the prompt. If NNS are affected more by the additional details in the prompt, it may be because the scenarios which the NNS construct for themselves, given a less specific prompt, are different from those constructed by the NS on the basis of the same prompt.

Method

Materials

We used an open questionnaire based on our previous work (Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig, 1992) and constructed a dialogue completion task with comparable items. Each instrument provided scenarios which were modeled after the advising sessions in the natural corpus. Reasons for rejecting courses were also taken from the conversational data. The dialogue completion task also included advisor suggestions based on those which occurred in the advising sessions.

Items on the questionnaires differed along three features: the status of the course in the program (required or elective), the reason for rejecting the course, and for the dialogue completion task, the type of suggestion given by the advisor as well (directive or non-directive). The questionnaires are given in Appendix A and an overview of their content in Appendix B.

The reasons for rejecting a course varied along a continuum from reasons which are accepted readily by advisors and can be stated explicitly by the student, to reasons which the NS tend not to give in the advising sessions in the natural corpus. Three readily acceptable reasons were included in the task: the course conflicts with another course, the course has already been taken, and the course is a summer course. Three difficult situations presented reasons which NS tend not to express directly: that they are not interested in the advisor's own course, that they do not want to take a course from a particular professor, and that they

do not want to take a course as a result of having previously dropped that course without permission. The other items on the questionnaires fell in between, with reasons including the difficulty of the course (too difficult or too easy), lack of relevance, overlap with a similar course, and unwillingness to commit to an elective.

The open questionnaire. The open questionnaire consisted of 11 items. For each scenario the status of the course and a reason for rejecting the course where given.

The dialogue completion task. The dialogue completion task presented the same course descriptions and reasons for rejections as the open questionnaire, and an advisor recommendation as well. The advisor suggestions were of two types: directives and nondirectives. Advisor directives include suggestions such as *In order to graduate you need to take Traditional Grammar semester after next* and *If you're interested in Phonology, I strongly suggest that you take Professor Smith's L410.* Nondirectives include suggestions such as *Well, there's Syntax and What about taking Testing in the summer?* Because of the balance between directive and non-directive suggestions, the relevant portion of the dialogue completion task consisted of 18 items.[1] Two of the scenarios involving the advisor's own courses included only nondirective suggestions because in the actual advising sessions we observed that advisors did not address directives to the students where their own courses were concerned. In fact, advisors generally seemed reluctant to recommend their own classes strongly. Likewise, nondirective suggestions appear in all cases concerning electives (which includes summer school courses). In the scenario in which the advisor tells the student that a required course that he dropped will not be available until the semester after he had planned to graduate, only the directive form is used.

Procedure

The tasks were administered to 32 graduate students (19 NS and 13 NNS) who had completed at least one academic advising session. Seventeen students responded first to the open questionnaire and completed the discourse completion task the following week. The remaining 15 students completed the discourse completion task first and a week later they responded to the open questionnaire.

ANALYSIS

All responses were coded for types of semantic formulas. Semantic formulas represent the means by which a particular speech act is accomplished in terms of the primary content of an utterance, such as an explanation, or an alternative, or

an apology (Fraser, 1981; Olshtain & Cohen, 1983; Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz, 1990). Our analysis is based on the semantic formulas proposed for rejections by Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990) and modified by Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford (1991). The five most frequent semantic formulas were Explanations *(I have another class at the same time)*, Alternative Declaratives *(I was thinking about taking Testing instead)*, Alternative Questions *(Could I take Methods?)*, Direct Rejections *(No, I can't*, or *I don't want to take Syntax this semester)* and Agree But (agreement followed by rejection as in *Yeah, but...)*. (Henceforth semantic formulas are indicated by capital letters.)

The mean number of semantic formulas was used to determine the length of the responses. The mean number of semantic formulas used in response to any single item was calculated by dividing the number of semantic formulas produced by the number of responses (total # semantic formulas / N).

The frequency of semantic formulas was also calculated. Frequency is given as the percentage of the total number of semantic formulas produced by the respondents ([particular semantic formula / total semantic formulas] x 100).

We also analyzed the responses for use of introducers (such as, *Well, Mmmm, Oh gosh*, and *Shoot!*) and explicit address to the advisors (i.e., the use of *you*, as in *Do you think it's OK? What should I do? Before you do that...*) as indicators of naturalness.

RESULTS

This section is presented in two parts. In the first part the open questionnaire and the dialogue completion task are compared for all respondents. In the second part the responses of the NS and NNS are compared across tasks.

Group results

The questionnaires elicited 916 rejections: 349 in the open questionnaire and 567 in the dialogue completion task. The 349 responses to the open questionnaire consisted of 806 semantic formulas. The 567 responses to the dialogue completion task yielded 1,447 semantic formulas.

Mean number of semantic formulas. Overall talk as measured by the mean number of semantic formulas increased on the dialogue completion task. The mean length of response in the open questionnaire was 2.31 semantic formulas and 2.55 for the dialogue completion task. Out of the 32 respondents, 22 (or 69%) showed an increase in the mean number of semantic formulas.

Naturalness of Talk. Another factor which changed with the task was the naturalness or talk-like responses they produced. We measured this by two features: introducers and responses which explicitly addressed the advisor by including "you".

Introducers are kinds of hedges such as "well" and "ummm" which occur at the beginning of a response, delaying the actual response. We hypothesized that the dialogue completion task would elicit more such introducers, and that proved to be the case. There was an overall increase from inclusion in 18% of the responses on the questionnaire to 25.9% on the dialogue completion task.[3] There was also a slight use of "you" on the dialogue completion task (13.5% to 16.5%).

Changes in semantic formulas. The distribution of semantic formulas for the open questionnaire and the dialogue completion task overall (i.e., for all items) is very similar. For both tasks, the most commonly used semantic formulas are Explanations, Alternative Declaratives, Alternative Questions, Direct Rejections, and Agree But. Explanations and the two types of Alternatives account for nearly two-thirds of the semantic formulas. Direct Rejections are more common than the use of Agree But on the open questionnaire, but slightly less common on the dialogue completion task (Table 1).

Table 1. Five most frequently used semantic formulas for the OQ and DCT

	Open Questionnaire		Dialogue Completion	
	Raw	Percent	Raw	Percent
Explanation	321	39.8	544	37.6
Alternative D	115	14.3	245	16.9
Alternative Q	96	11.9	151	10.4
Direct Reject	65	8.1	102	7.1
Agree But	40	5.0	116	8.0
Total	806		1447	

The one semantic formula which shows the greatest proportionate change from the open questionnaire to the dialogue completion task is Agree But. This increased from 5.0% of the semantic formulas in the open questionnaire to 8.0%

in the dialogue completion task. In general, however, the change in the use of semantic formulas is best understood by comparing the NS and NNS responses to individual items.

Native vs. Nonnative Responses

In addition to the task influence on the group results, the two sub-groups, NS and NNS, showed different degrees of task influence. NNS responses often changed in the same direction as those of the NS, but more dramatically.

Mean number of semantic formulas. Both NS and NNS showed an increase in amount of talk in the dialogue completion task (Table 2). NS had a slightly higher mean number of semantic formulas on the open questionnaire than did the NNS (2.34 vs. 2.26). NS increased from 2.34 to 2.54 semantic formulas per rejection whereas NNS increased from 2.26 to 2.57 semantic formulas. In addition, a greater proportion of the NNS used more semantic formulas: 77% (or 10 of 13) used more semantic formulas while only 63% (12 of 19) of the NS did so. With respect to mean number of semantic formulas, the NNS showed a greater task effect and looked more like the NS on the dialogue completion task.

Table 2. Mean Number of Semantic Formulas

	Open Questionnaire	Dialogue Completion
Total	2.31	2.55
NS	2.34	2.54
NNS	2.26	2.57

Naturalness of talk. The greater task effect for NNS continues for the use of introducers. NNS showed a greater increase in "natural" responses than did NS. NS showed an increase in the number of responses which begin with Introducers on the dialogue completion task (21.5% vs. 26.5%), but NNS almost doubled in their use of them (12.8% vs. 25.0%). Thus, as with length of response, while the NNS do not look like the NS on the open questionnaire, they come to look more like them on the dialogue completion task. Examples (3) and (4) show the typical differences on the two tasks.

(3) OQ, NNS #28 (Japanese) I'd rather not take classes in summer because I was planning to go back to my home country in summer. Can I take that course in fall or spring semester?

(4) DCT, NNS #28 (Japanese) Well, I'd rather like not to take summer courses because I'm planning to go back to my home country.

One place where NS seem to be more strongly affected by the difference in task than the NNS is in the use of "you" in responses. NNS did not really change across the task on this measure (14.7% vs. 14.4%), while NS increased from 12.7% to 18.4%.

Changes in semantic formulas. When NS and NNS responses are compared we find that Explanations, Alternative Declaratives, and Alternative Questions constitute two-thirds of the semantic formulas across tasks. Explanations continue to be the most frequently used semantic formula by the two groups (Table 3). The NS responses were very close for the use of Alternative Declaratives and Alternative Questions in both tasks, while the NNS favored the use of Alternative Declaratives. The differences between NS and NNS were maintained across tasks. Regarding the other two most frequently used formulas, the use of Direct Rejections (such as, *I'd like not to take this course* or *I don't want to take this course this semester*) dropped from the open questionnaire to the dialogue completion task for both groups, although more for the NNS (8.4% to 6.9%) than for the NS (7.9% to 7.2%). The use of Agree But increased, again more for the NNS (5.0% to 9.4%) than for the NS (5.0% to 7.1%).

Table 3. Five most frequently used semantic formulas for the OQ and DCT by NS and NNS (in percent)

	NS		NNS	
	Open	Dialogue	Open	Dialogue
Explanation	38.7	36.5	41.5	39.1
Alternative D	12.2	14.1	17.3	21.0
Alternative Q	14.7	12.7	7.7	7.2
Direct Reject	7.9	7.2	8.4	6.9
Agree But	5.0	7.1	5.0	9.4

Change in semantic formulas by item. In this section we present the results from six items: three which provided acceptable reasons for rejecting a course and three which are less easily stated directly. Examining individual items also shows that semantic formulas which are not common overall are employed in certain instances. The less sensitive situations are examined first.

In the situation in which the advisor recommends a required course which is at the same time as another course the student wants to take, Explanation is the favored semantic formula, seen in Examples (5) and (6).

(5) OQ, NNS #2 (Chinese) Professor xx, can I take this course till next semester: Because I've got my personal plan to fulfill.

(6) DCT, NNS #2 (Chinese) Yes, Professor xxx, I know I've got to take this course because it's a required course. But, can I take it next semester?

For both NS and NNS the use of Explanations decreased from the open questionnaire to the dialogue completion task (Table 4). The change is noticeably greater for the NNS (48.5% to 29.3%) than for the NS (51.9% to 46.6%). The use of all Alternatives remained constant for the NS although it increased dramatically for the NNS (27.3% to 46.7%). The use of Agree But increased for both groups. Information Questions were used by NNS only in response to the open questionnaire (9.1% of the semantic formulas) and by NS only in response to the dialogue completion task (5.1%).

Table 4. Five most frequently used semantic formulas for the OQ and DCT by NS and NNS, Time Conflict

	NS		NNS	
	Open	Dialogue	Open	Dialogue
Explanation	51.9	46.6	48.5	29.3
Alternative D	21.2	21.2	27.3	46.7
Alternative Q	15.4	13.6	3.0	6.7
Agree But	1.9	5.9	3.0	10.7
Information Q	-.-	5.1	9.1	-.-

In the cases of the summer school course and the course which has already been taken, we expected high use of Direct Rejections because students are not required to take summer courses nor are they required to repeat courses under normal circumstances. The rate of Direct Rejections was understandably higher for the repeated course than for the summer course.

The highest use of Direct Rejections in any response was found in response to the course already taken. NS and NNS alike used this semantic formula most frequently. Both showed a decrease from the open questionnaire to the dialogue completion task with the NS going from 53.6% to 42.7% and the NNS moving from 40.0% to 32.6% (Table 5). Although both NS and NNS showed decreased use of Direct Rejections in response to advisor talk, they showed different directions of change in their use of Explanations. Explanations increased for the NS responses (10.7% to 19.1%) but decreased for the NNS responses (35.0% to 26.1%). This change makes the groups look more similar on the dialogue completion task. Both types of Alternatives are low on this item because students do not need to negotiate their way out of the course. Information Questions (e.g., *What was that course?* or *When does it meet?*) were used by NS in 7.1% of the semantic formulas on the open questionnaire, but this dropped to 2.9%. The NNS did not use this formula on either task.

Table 5. Five most frequently used semantic formulas for the OQ and DCT by NS and NNS, Repeated Course

	NS		NNS	
	Open	Dialogue	Open	Dialogue
Explanation	10.7	19.1	35.0	26.1
Alternative D	7.1	4.4	5.0	8.7
Alternative Q	8.8	-.-	-.-	2.2
Direct Reject	53.6	42.7	40.0	32.6
Record	10.7	-.-	-.-	-.-
Information Q	7.1	2.9	-.-	-.-
Challenge	-.-	-.-	10.0	-.-

Unique to this item is the use of a semantic formula which we call Record in which the student asks the advisor to check his or her academic record to make sure that the course in question has been properly credited, as in Example (7).

(7) OQ, NS #21 I took 'X' during...semester, is there a mistake in my record file?

The NS used this in 10% of all semantic formulas in the open questionnaire but dropped to 2.9% in the dialogue completion task. In the open questionnaire the NNS employed a semantic formula which we call Challenge in which they confront the advisor as in Example (8).

(8) OQ, NNS #32 (Italian) I've already taken this course. Why do you suggest me to take it twice?

The NNS used this in 10.0% of the semantic formulas on the open questionnaire, but dropped it entirely in response to the advisor's turn on the dialogue completion task.

In response to the summer course item, Explanation was the most commonly used semantic formula, as in Example (9).

(9) OQ, NS #14 I need the summer to work. Is the course offered next fall?

NS showed relatively constant use of Explanation in the open questionnaire and the dialogue completion task (45.2% and 46.3%, respectively), but NNS increased slightly from 37.5% to 43.8% becoming more native-like (Table 6).

Table 6. Five most frequently used semantic formulas for the OQ and DCT by NS and NNS, Summer Course

	NS		NNS	
	Open	Dialogue	Open	Dialogue
Explanation	45.2	46.3	37.5	43.8
Alternative D	-.-	7.3	6.3	6.3
Alternative Q	9.5	2.4	3.1	6.3
Direct Reject	28.6	31.7	28.1	18.8
Agree But	7.1	2.4	3.1	3.1
Request Advice	2.4	-.-	9.4	3.1

The next most common semantic formula was the Direct Rejection with the NS showing 28.6% on the open questionnaire and 31.7% on the dialogue completion task. As was the case with the course already taken, NNS decreased their use of Direct Rejections in response to the advisor's turn, going from 28.2% on the open questionnaire to 18.8% on the dialogue completion task. In both responses, the NNS are noticeably lower in their use of Direct Rejections than what seems to be allowable based on the NS replies. In this case NS and NNS responses were essentially identical on the open questionnaire (28.6% and 28.1%, respectively), but were different with the more specific prompt.

The use of other semantic formulas were marginal and scattered. The next most common semantic formula for NS was Agree But used in 7.1% of the semantic formulas on the open questionnaire, dropping to 2.4% on the dialogue completion task. For the NNS, Request Advice comprised 9.4% of the semantic formulas on the open questionnaire, but dropped to 3.1% on the dialogue completion task. Example (10) shows a Request Advice.

(10) OQ, NNS #5 (Korean) Well, I don't think I can study well during the summer. It's so hot and everybody will be gone somewhere then. What would you say?

Rejecting a course which the advisor is scheduled to teach is relatively sensitive. From the open questionnaire to the dialogue completion task there was a drop in Explanations from 42.0% to 25.5% for the NS and a similar drop for NNS from 44.8% to 28.1% (Table 7). Example (11) shows a typical Explanation for this item.

(11) OQ, NS #9 Hmm, sounds interesting, but I might have a slight problem here, since I was planning to take an elective outside the department, which meets at the same time.

The use of Alternative Questions was low for both groups. The use of Alternative Declaratives moved in different directions for NS and NNS from the open questionnaire to the dialogue completion task, increasing for NS (4.0% to 18.2%) and decreasing for NNS (from 17.2% to 12.5%). Agree But, a semantic formula which ranked fourth or fifth overall (see Table 3) moved into second place in response to this item. On the open questionnaire NS used Agree But in 14.0% of the semantic formulas, increasing to 21.8% on the dialogue completion task. In contrast, the NNS used Agree But much less frequently (3.5%) on the open questionnaire, but they increased their use of this formula to 21.9%, a level comparable to that of the NS. The contrast can be seen in Examples (12) and (13).

(12) OQ, NNS #6 (Mandarin) Well, I have no interest in this topic. It's not my concentration. Can you suggest me another course?

(13) DCT, NNS #6 (Mandarin) I know sociolinguistics is very interesting, but considering my career goal, I think I should take...first.

The presence of the advisor talk caused all respondents to mitigate their rejections more often.

Table 7. Five most frequently used semantic formulas for the OQ and DCT by NS and NNS, Advisor's Elective

	NS		NNS	
	Open	Dialogue	Open	Dialogue
Explanation	42.0	25.5	44.8	28.1
Alternative D	4.0	18.2	17.2	12.5
lternative Q	10.0	5.5	3.5	3.1
Direct Reject	4.0	3.6	3.5	12.5
Agree But	14.0	21.8	3.5	21.9

Direct Rejection stayed the same for NS, but increased for NNS on the dialogue completion task, becoming less native-like, at 12.5% of the semantic formulas used. This seems surprising given that we had expected students to want to avoid rejecting an advisor's course outright. Example (14) shows such a rejection.

(14) OQ, NNS #1 (Chinese)
I don't think that sociolinguistics is
interesting to me, so I'm not going to take it.

Rejecting a course because of the professor might not be as difficult as rejecting the advisor's own course, but we expected it to also be a sensitive situation because the student would have to reject the advisor's colleague. As in rejecting the advisor's course, a much higher use of Agree But than on the instruments overall occurred (see Table 3), particularly in response to the nondirective suggestion. There is also a relatively high rate of the general category of Alternatives which makes up no less than 41.3% under any condition (Table 8).

The high use of Alternatives suggests that, for students, not taking a course with a particular (somehow undesirable) professor is very important, and so they work hard by making counter proposals to the advisor. We had not anticipated this degree of investment from the respondents to this item. The use of Explanations dropped from the open questionnaire to the dialogue completion task with the difference being greater for the NNS (44.8% to 28.4%) than for the NS (37.5% to 32.0%).

Table 8. Five most frequently used semantic formulas for the OQ and DCT by NS and NNS, Undesirable Professor

	NS		NNS	
	Open	Dialogue	Open	Dialogue
Explanation	37.5	26.1	44.8	28.5
Alternative D	47.5	30.4	31.0	31.0
Alternative Q	2.5	10.9	17.2	11.9
Agree But	7.5	13.0	3.4	19.0

The dropped course item is difficult for the students because they caused their own problem in part by dropping a required course. They learn that it will not be offered again until the semester after they had planned to graduate. For NS Explanations constituted 41.3% and 42.1% of the total semantic formulas on the two forms, showing virtually no change, while the NNS only offered Explanations for 33.3% of the semantic formulas on the open form. However, the percentage of NNS Explanations rose to 48.7% on the dialogue completion task, surpassing, as in other cases, their use by NS (Table 9).

Alternative Declaratives were used very little by the NS on this item, in contrast to their use of Alternatives on the task as a whole where they ranked second (Table 1). Perhaps NS recognize that they are not in the position to offer Alternatives directly since it was their own actions that resulted in their situation. For NS the use of Alternative Questions, the less direct form of the Alternative, is similar in the open questionnaire and the dialogue completion task (27.6% and 26.3%). The NNS responses were much more similar to those of the NS on the dialogue completion task. The use of Alternative Declaratives on the open questionnaire (12.1%) fell to zero on the dialogue completion task and the use of Alternative Questions increased from 9.1% on the open questionnaire to 25.6% on the dialogue completion task.

Table 9. Five most frequently used semantic formulas for the OQ and DCT by NS and NNS, Dropped Course

	NS		NNS	
	Open	Dialogue	Open	Dialogue
Explanation	41.3	42.1	33.3	48.7
Alternative D	1.7	3.5	12.1	-.-
Alternative Q	27.6	26.3	9.1	25.6
Request Advice	6.9	3.5	21.2	7.7
Request Empathy	3.4	3.5	9.1	-.-

NS Requests for Advice were at 6.9% on the open form and dropped to 3.5% on the dialogue completion task, while the NNS requested such advice at 21.2% on the open form as in Example (15) and also dropped on the dialogue completion task, to 7.7%. In this case, both groups are affected similarly by the task, but, as we have come to expect, the NNS show a greater sensitivity.

(15) OQ, NNS #1 (Chinese) Although I understand this course is necessary for my graduation, I don't have adequate financial support for next semester. What am I supposed to do?

Finally, the two groups differ in their Requests for Empathy. On both instruments, the NS tried to elicit empathy for their plight from the advisor in about the same ratio (3.4% vs. 3.5%). The NNS, on the other hand, only used this formula on the open form (9.1%) and completely dropped such requests on the dialogue completion task. Example (16) shows a NNS Request for Empathy, while Example (17) shows an extended NS response to this item.

(16) OQ, NNS #4 (Japanese) Could you help me? I am in very difficult situation.-- Blah blah--I'm wondering if I could have this course waived or I could take any substitute?

(17) OQ, NS #20 I thought dropping that course was the correct thing to do at the time, but I see now it was a big mistake. An extra semester to take that course will be more time and money than I have. Is there a way I can replace the course or do a special assignment or fulfill the requirements. I'm at a real loss as to

what to do. Can you help me with any suggestions--I'm willing to do anything that would help me graduate on time.

Responses to directive and nondirective suggestions. In general, the influence of the directive and non-directive forms of the suggestions provided on the dialogue completion task was not as great as the presence of speech itself. The exception to this is the use of Alternatives by NS. While the presentation of Alternatives in some form (Declaratives or Questions) remained constant at 29.4% (adding the Alternative categories together), NS adjusted the form of their Alternatives to suit the directness of the advisor's suggestion (Table 10).

Table 10. Five most frequently used semantic formulas on the dialogue completion task for directive and nondirective prompts by NS and NNS

	NS		NNS	
	Direct	Nondirect	Direct	Nondirect
Explanation	39.4	45.2	43.4	38.2
Alternative D	11.6	19.5	23.2	25.9
Alternative Q	17.8	9.9	4.2	7.8
Direct Reject	7.5	8.1	6.3	7.3
Agree But	5.1	7.7	7.4	10.8

NS provided more Alternative Declaratives in response to the nondirectives (19.5%) than to the directives (11.6%), and they offered more Alternative Questions to the directives (17.8%) than to the nondirectives (9.9%). Thus, the NS used a more deferential form in response to the more authoritative directive than to the nondirective. In contrast, the NNS showed little sensitivity to the change in advisor talk.

Both groups used a slightly higher proportion of Agree But responses and Direct Rejections to the nondirectives. We conclude that in the present task, the presence of an advisor's turn is in general more important than the form of the turn itself.

CONCLUSION

The addition of the advisor turn on the dialogue completion task results in a task effect. The dialogue completion task more clearly defines the situation for the participants causing the NS and the NNS to use semantic formulas more similarly with respect to distribution in many cases. This often means that the NNS show greater task effects as they move toward the NS response on the dialogue completion task.

In general, NNS showed a quantitatively greater difference in response across the instruments than did the NS. Moreover, the change for the NNS was often in a direction on the dialogue completion task which brought them more in line with the NS profiles (such as length of response, use of introducers, and use of certain semantic formulas), although in some cases they moved further in this direction than the NS did. The task influence indicates that the turn or turns which may be provided by a dialogue completion task help the respondents to frame their replies. The presence of talk makes less difference for the NS who are more adept at imagining a plausible conversational turn given a scenario than the NNS. Similarly, NNS may be less able to construct plausible conversational turns given a scenario. The increased specificity of the dialogue completion task over the open questionnaire is particularly important to the NNS.

These findings seem to be at odds with those of Rose (1992) who found that the presence of speech made little difference, but the results are easily reconciled when one takes into account the types of speech acts investigated. Rose examined requests which are initiating speech acts and thus may stand alone. This study investigated rejections which are reactive speech acts, which never stand alone. Providing hearer responses to participant initiated speech acts is not as important as supplying interlocutor turns to which the participants reply. Thus, the presence of preceding turns for the elicitation of reactive speech acts, such as rejections, acceptances, replies to compliments, and medial turns in openings and closings, to name a few, are expected to influence the data.

Different forms of DCTs elicit different responses especially from NNS. This finding is important for interlanguage studies, and should be kept in mind by investigators utilizing this kind of task, since their results may be quite strongly affected by the type of instrument they use. Providing authentic utterances as prompts in DCTs is particularly important when the speech act under investigation is a response (such as rejections or responses to compliments) rather than an initiation (such as a compliment or an invitation). We conclude that, although DCT elicitations cannot entirely replace the study of natural conversation in inter-language pragmatics, DCTs can be refined to elicit more natural responses by including authentic speech.

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NOTES

[1] Two additional items were designed to elicit statements of responsibility or blame. We will not discuss those here as they are not directly relevant to this study. There were 20 total items on the dialogue completion task.

[2] Recently we were discussing with a faculty colleague whether a particular student had enrolled in that colleague's seminar. Our colleague, who was also the student's advisor, explained that the student had not enrolled in the seminar and offered as further explanation the fact that when one is both the advisor and the instructor, one is reluctant to insist that the student take the course.

[3] For introducers, as well as the use of "you," occurrence in number of responses is calculated rather than percentage of total number of semantic formulas because a given reply can only have one introducer. In contrast, a single response may show two or more of the rejection formulas such as Explanations or Alternatives.

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APPENDIX A

Discourse Completion Tasks

[Please note that the lines for the student responses have been removed from all but the first example. To derive the Open Questionnaire, delete the advisor's turn on the items with the asterisk.]

In the following situations, imagine that you are a graduate student who has gone to see an advisor to register for courses for next semester.

*1. Your advisor suggests that you take a required course. You want to try to have the course waived because you don't think it's relevant to your career goals.

Advisor: Now you need thirty credits of which you have to take L530. So, um, I'm going to go ahead and write that down for fall.

You say: _____
_____
_____

*2. Your advisor suggests that you take a course which you would rather not take because you think that it will be too difficult for you.

Advisor: Well, there's Syntax.

*3. During your advising session you find out that a required course which you had dropped from your schedule the previous semester will not be offered until the semester after you had planned to graduate. This is a real financial burden for you.

Advisor: In order to graduate you need to take Traditional Grammar semester after next.

*4. Your advisor suggests that you take a required course. You want to try to have this course waived because you have already taken a course that you think is similar to the one that's being suggested.

Advisor:

*5. Your advisor suggests that you take a course during the summer. You prefer not to take classes during the summer.

Advisor: What about taking testing in the summer?

*6. Your advisor suggests that you take a course which you would rather not take because you think that it will be a waste of your time since it will be too easy for you.

Advisor: Well, there's Syntax.

*7. [Not analyzed in this study]

*8. Your advisor suggests that you take an elective class that he's teaching, but you are not interested in the topic.

Advisor: You could take Sociolinguistics...so, um...you know, I'm teaching Sociolinguistics in the fall.

*9. Your advisor suggests that you take a required class that he's teaching, but you are not interested in the topic.

Advisor: Yeah, Phonetics is taught in the fall. And then in the spring there's Phonology. So, after you take Phonetics then you can take Phonology...so, um... you know, I'm teaching Phonology.

*10. Your advisor suggests that you to take a required course (which is offered every semester) which conflicts with a course in another department which you have been wanting to take ever since you started your program.

Advisor: You need to take Second Language Acquisition this semester.

*11. Your advisor suggests that you take a course that you have already taken.

Advisor: If you're interested in Phonology you can take Professor Smith's L410.

*12. Your advisor suggests that you take a particular required course next semester. You know that the timing is good, but you would prefer not to take the course from the professor who is teaching it. If you wait one more semester you can take it from someone else.

Advisor: You probably want to take Second Language Acquisition.

*13. Your advisor offers you the choice between two electives that he thinks that you should take. You do not want to commit yourself to either course at this time.

Advisor: Now for the other three credits, you can take either sociolinguistics or the survey of applied linguistics.

*14. Your advisor suggests that you take a course which you would rather not take because you think that it will be too difficult for you.

Advisor: If you're registered in our program you must take Syntax.

*15. Your advisor suggests that you take a required course. You want to try to have this course waived because you have already taken a course that you think is similar to the one that's being suggested.

Advisor: We want you to take at least Phonetics this semester.

*16. Your advisor suggests that you take a course which you would rather not take because you think that it will be a waste of your time since it will be too easy for you.

Advisor: If you're registered in our program you must take Syntax.

*17. Your advisor suggests that you to take a required course (which is offered every semester) which conflicts with a course in another department which you have been wanting to take ever since you started your program.

Advisor: You probably want to take Second Language Acquisition this semester.

*18. Your advisor suggests that you take a course that you have already taken.

Advisor: If you're interested in Phonology I strongly suggest that you take Professor Smith's L410.

*19. Your advisor suggests that you take a particular required course next semester. You know that the timing is good, but you would prefer not to take the course from the professor who is teaching it. If you wait one more semester you can take it from someone else.

Advisor: You need ten more credits, and you haven't done Second Language Acquisition. I'm going to write that down for fall.

*20. [Not analyzed in this study]

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Assessing L2 Sociolinguistic Competence: In Search of Support from Pragmatic Theories

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With a heavy emphasis on communicative approaches to language teaching, many culturally-specific norms and rules of speech behavior in English have gradually found their way into second language classrooms. In spite of the overwhelming acceptance of emphasizing cross-cultural awareness in the teaching-learning process, it has remained an uncertain area in language testing. Such measurement devices have proven more or less dependable at evaluating the necessary grammatical competence of most nonnative speakers of English, but have yet to demonstrate sensitivity to sociocultural factors. Intercultural pragmatic success or "failure" (Thomas 1983) needs to be incorporated into the assessment of ESL/EFL students as well. Authentic means for pursuing this objective warrant the use of roleplays and simulations for testing overall communicative competence, which by definition, includes a sociolinguistic component. However, face validity alone is not satisfactory; construct validity should be the primary concern in test development. Accordingly, we must continue to work out the specifics of the psychological trait we wish to assess by examining the theoretical frameworks in use in this area--Speech Act theory and Politeness Theory. Their contributions and shortcomings to L2 testing in terms of measuring sociolinguistic abilities are discussed from the context-oriented perspective of semiotics.

INTRODUCTION

Tests claiming to assess communicative competence are rampant despite the vague nature of this super construct. Along with the gradual acceptance of a componential framework accounting for successful and problematic talk (Canale & Swain 1980), sociolinguistic competence--otherwise known as sociocultural, intercultural, or pragmatic competence--is gradually gaining attention. Classroom teaching materials have begun to reflect this trend toward discussing situation perception skills (see Wolfson 1989) of register variation, status, social distance, and face-related issues while, ironically, most L2 assessment procedures remain aloof.

Part of the reason behind this procrastination stems from the task of measuring cognitive skills: in order to test a psychological trait, we must be able to clearly define and explain it. For test developers, construct validity must remain a priority. Before they can assess whether or not second language (L2) students know "when to speak, when not, and as to what to talk about, with whom, where and in what manner" (Hymes' 1972 original definition of communicative competence), they had better be clear on how to view it in the grander scheme of things. Members of the applied linguistics community need to investigate if a proliferation of pragmatic theories has gotten out of hand (Zuengler 1992). It is my contention that theoretical reorganization is in order so that we avoid redundancy and overlap: a broader pragmatic framework which incorporates some of the sociocultural aspects necessary to explain and predict human communication. This umbrella perspective is best understood visually (Fig. 1):



Figure 1: The pragmatic umbrella

As this diagram illustrates, several theoretical positions contribute to our understanding of the message exchange process in face-to-face communication. The problem is that we have a tendency to limit or confine the power of our theory in order to explain a specific aspect of this process. In the area of assessing first language sociolinguistic transfer--the carry-over of sociocultural norms and implicit behavioral guidelines during second language acquisition and interlanguage processes--a near blind acceptance of two prototypical pragmatic theories has emerged in the literature: *Speech Act Theory* and *Politeness Theory*. When used for L2 assessment objectives, these frameworks determine testing criteria. Sensitivity to illocutionary force of various speech acts or to appropriate politeness norms during facework have frequently served in this role. Both theories focus on social aspects of communicative exchanges while remaining true to pragmatic principles. However, neither framework in isolation can handle the entire explanatory process; along with other problems, an understanding of the interactional nature of psycholinguistic processing remains weak. Only a return to the original source--*Semiotic Theory*--can permit a cognitive view of social interaction with sufficient muscle.

Semiotic or Broad Pragmatic Theory

Semiotics, or the study of signs, sign systems and the meaning generated when such systems are translated, boasts as its protypical example the study of language (linguistics). A prominent feature of semiotic analyses of discourse involves examining icons, indexes and symbols in terms of the networks or relationships in which they occur (context) and by so doing, arriving at an interpretation of the given text. The key to this task of producing meaning from such signs lies in the inclusion of the whole system and its complex networking with other systems. Charles Sanders Pierce, in his philosophical writings on the sorts of logical reasoning man uses to function in his environment, equates semiotics with a term he coined, *Pragmatics*, or the process of inference generation and interpretation (Oller 1989). Consequently, semantics (at the content level) is designated as the organizer of the sign systems, while pragmatics (at the relationship level) is assigned to the actual interpretation of such systems by individuals.

Pierce suggests that only three types of reasoning are available to the human mind: the first involves drawing inferences based on experiential, sensory perceptions of a physical sort (**Abduction-iconic signs**); the second type relies on probability and experimentation via experience and includes affective and kinesic information exchanges (**Induction-indexical signs**); the third type differs from abduction and induction in its lack of reference to time and space--here we have the realm of theory and universal rules (**Deduction-symbolic signs**). The pivotal

point of all three reasoning processes is the world of experience and all logical conclusions must be verified by this critical feature (Oller 1991; 1992). Experience (social and cognitive) grounds all of our perceptions which are in turn, filtered through language; consequently context is the primary ingredient of discourse analysis.

How can this trichotomy account for sociolinguistic competence? The socialized, conventional parts of language and the struggle for normative conformity and consensus clearly demand inductive reasoning. For example, appropriate sensitivity to politeness norms is acquired through experimenting and hypothesizing; after a few bad experiences with violating these norms, we draw inferences that this specific behavior in this specific time and place must not be acceptable to members of our cultural community. Another example involves gestures and other paralinguistic communicative acts. Gestures "guide us in the way we manage and negotiate relations with things, events, and persons in our environment" (Oller 1991, p 5). Thus, the idea that meanings of signed expressions are socially recognized because they develop through interpretations conveyed in their contexts and circumstances, is in fact a social extension of semiotic philosophy (see Halliday & Hassan 1989; Hodge & Kress 1988). By infusing a broad pragmatic framework with the face-to-face concerns of human interaction (i.e., speech community conventions and face needs), we see how comfortably certain communication models fit within this powerful structure. At the same time, we begin to understand how comparatively weak Speech Act Theory and Politeness Theory appear when used in isolation. Even if a psycholinguistic support mechanism could be arranged, the relationship with other sign systems (i.e., kinesic, prosodic) remain disconnected.

Speech Act Theory

Speech Act Theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) classifies verbal messages according to their communicative function. A triad of these basic categories include: a *locutionary act* or the act of saying something in quotable, literal terms (he said to "Call back later"); an *illocutionary act* or the act identified by the statement which conveys the force or function of the utterance--the speaker's intended meaning (I suggested, urged or ordered them to call back later); and a *perlocutionary act* or the act performed as a result of the utterance in terms of a commentary from the speaker's perspective--what the hearer understands from the utterance (he persuaded us to call back later).

Specifically, Searle (1975) suggests that the *illocutionary force* of an utterance consists of two parts, namely a proposition and a force or function-indicating device (e.g., word order, mood of the verb, punctuation, etc..). So that a

statement can be converted into a question or an emotional command simply by applying one or a combination of these devices. The rationale underlying this maneuver is that by altering the force of a message, its interpretation changes. This distinction between literal and implied force represents the star feature of Speech Act Theory and, some claim, the key to understanding indirect speech acts.

The question still remains as to how the speaker's intentions are actually inferred by the hearer. If reviewed from a semiotic, Piercian perspective this psycholinguistic cavity can be filled. Since each participant comes into the speech scenario with a set of communal and personal experiences about two sets of expected behavior norms--linguistic and cultural--meanings of messages will be inferred according to this backdrop. But it must be pointed out that the text itself also contributes to this comprehension process. So that a web of indirect inferences (Oller and Jonz, In press, p.23) are drawn from three sources--the speaker, the hearer and their relationship with the text itself--although not as simply and direct as Searle seems to suggest (Figure 2) .



FIG. 2: Speech Act Theory via a semiotic exchange of information and intentions.
From *Cloze and Coherence* by J.W. Oller and J. Jonz (In press)

Should these multi-directional interpretations lack coherence by virtue of an incomplete triad, successful communication cannot occur; an unexpected ill-formedness or inappropriateness to the situation at hand, in effect, renders a message incomprehensible or uninterpretable. Sociocultural differences come into play because a common "world of experience" is essential for effective "pragmatic mapping" between the facts (what we know to be true) and representations of those facts (Oller 1992). This relationship assures that a sense of logical connectedness and consistency escort the interpretation process so that responses are relevant and appropriate; it also generates communicative breakdown if expectations lack mutuality. Flowerdew (1990) views this lack of coherence as reflective of the discrete point discourse analysis approach underlying Speech Act Theory. Since it fails to explain why the individual linguistic acts do not contribute to the total meaning of the conversation, its utility is questionable. A possible reason for this disappointment is because illocutionary forces may in fact "spread over a number of utterances and that one utterance may share more than one force" (Flowerdew, p 94) so that separating speech acts into distinct, isolated units does not make sense. By denying this interdependent state of affairs, Speech Act Theory can only generate a set of vaguely related functions or tasks such as in a functional-notional syllabus. Without some linguistic glue, an incomplete relationship persists between verbal acts and highly contextualized social interactions. Ironically, despite this and other serious shortcomings (i.e., the belief that speech acts can be finitely numbered or that there exists no means for explaining nonverbal speech acts), researchers in a wide spectrum of disciplines from linguistics to sociology to anthropology to communication have placed their trust in Austin and Searle's philosophical concepts.

Politeness Theory

Brown and Levinson's chapter on politeness phenomena (1978) constitutes an example of the great impact a single publication can have on the linguistic academic community. Their notion of "face-threatening acts" (FTAs) needs to be examined more closely however. It seems that although it may offer some insights into social behavior norms (Tracy 1990), this theoretical model conveys a rather incomplete picture of communication via language.

Brown and Levinson's innovative theory stipulates that in order to predict the politeness strategy of choice, two criteria must be addressed: (1) whether the illocutionary act will be **on record** (state intentions clearly, e.g., "I promise I'll clean my room") or **off record** (ambiguous, more indirect statements of intention, e.g., "Didn't I tell you I would clean my room?", rhetorical questions, metaphor, irony, understatement, etc.); and (2) in the latter situation where redressive action

is expected, if **positive face** needs (solidarity) vs. **negative face** needs (freedom from impeded action) require attention. Following, but by no means limited to Grice's (1975) cue, Brown and Levinson (1978 p 64-65) concede that it is "mutual knowledge" that drives their strategic model. But where Grice's *Cooperative Principle* focuses on mutual understanding, Politeness Theory becomes counterbalanced by certain protective measures in a frame loaded with risk and danger. Speech participants need defensive equipment to safely engage in conversation. In short, Politeness Theory prioritizes social pressures in explaining verbal interaction. These social factors, when combined under certain circumstances, determine the specific choice and sequencing of conversational strategy.

Evidence for the Politeness Theory lies in its generalizability across cultures. Through much cross-cultural empirical data (e.g., Olshtain & Cohen 1983; Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Kitao 1990; Beebe & Takahashi 1989), it appears that politeness may be a universal occurrence. Accordingly, this paradigm has won much respect among sociolinguists. Despite the support it has received, Politeness Theory cannot account for all dimensions of linguistic functions; some communicative acts may not even involve facework such as intrapersonal message exchanges. Cognitive processing, particularly from an interlanguage perspective (Gass & Varonis 1991), also remains a mystery when Politeness Theory is solely applied.

Politeness Theory , in summary, stands on firm ground, although it lacks the amount of power for which it originally strived. It must be viewed under a pragmatic umbrella in order to gather adequate support for carrying out its theoretical responsibilities. Because it attempts to forecast linguistic behavior from social experiences, it remains pragmatically sound. It helps to explain **some** of the illocutionary force variability, particularly indirect speech acts--but not **all** of it. A gap remains where social needs extend beyond those of face, where kinesic or prosodic channels interact with speech or where Western socialization objectives may not account for the notion of face cross-culturally (Gu 1990; Matsumoto 1988).

Pragmatic theories are the only ones capable of accounting for the situated aspect of language use; things get very messy due to a collage of interacting variables like power hierarchies, social distance, gender subcultures, age and the like, PLUS factors like native speaker negotiation/accommodation patterns, L2 interlanguage development, individual variation (i.e., personality, empathy) and others relevant to the translation of semiotic material. A broad version of pragmatic theory welcomes these variables since the context itself provides sufficient information for the work of making meaning. In other words, by highlighting the unique sociocultural baggage each interlocutor brings to the

message exchange forum and how it contributes to its interpretation in that particular "strip of activity", we can arrive at a more accurate response to Goffman's (1974) perceptive question: *What's going on in this frame?* A semiotic perspective actually authorizes us to look at each communicative encounter on a case-by-case basis: within a particular situation we find particular interactants who are influenced by particular cultures and social communities to convey and interpret verbal and nonverbal discourse in particular ways.

Testing L2 Sociolinguistic Skills

In the area of L2 measurement, sociolinguistic competence has influenced various testing paradigms. Bachman's (1990) popular multi-dimensional framework of communicative competence, for example, divides this grand ability into two principle skill subcategories: *Organizational Competence* (grammatical competence and textual competence), and *Pragmatic Competence* (illocutionary competence and sociolingusitic competence). Bachman (p 90) defines the latter as "the knowledge of the pragmatic conventions for performing acceptable language functions and...the knowledge of the sociolinguistic conventions for performing language functions appropriately in a given context." Bachman also includes a psycholinguistic thread to his model, an innovative addition to many pragmatic theories. Yet no explanation about how these components interact with one another has been tendered. Can someone be sociolinguistically competent without having first reached a certain level of grammatical ability? How much of sociolinguistic competence depends on discourse cohesion and organization? Moreover, where do alternate communication modalities such as intonation, gestures and facial expressions fit in? These are issues that need empirical attention before any L2 student is deemed sociolinguistically competent or not. These are issues which tests claiming to assess overall communicative competence cannot ignore. Shohamy (1984) explains the urgency of developing this type of assessment tool:

> Till today, sociolinguistic proficiency has rarely been tested. Most language tests still focus on linguistic aspects as the major criteria for test construction. Overlooking the state of the art in knowing what a language means today, implies the construction of tests which fail to tap the construct of language proficiency in its full and complete definition...The construction of such tests will involve imposing rigorous measurement criteria to convert this sociolinguistic information into tests of sociolinguistic proficiency. (p.161)

Validity & Roleplaying: The Discourse Completion Test

Endeavors to assess communicative competence, or at least the portion of that competence that language tests have successfully been able to tap (i.e., proficiency), have more recently included a sociolinguistic component. As more and more L2 curricula begin to include the various ingredients of linguistically realized politeness norms (e.g., register variation as dictated by perceived status of interlocutors, by sensitivity to situational formality and the face needs of interlocutors) as well as other socio-context dependent linguistic phenomena, the development of a valid process of evaluation becomes imperative. One procedure which relies on a roleplay format is currently under analysis both as a linguistic research tool and as a candidate for a supplementary position in tests claiming to assess overall communicative competence (i.e., an alternative to oral proficiency interviews).

The Discourse Completion Test (DCT) elicits responses to problematic, contextually-specific prompts as participants, in writing or orally, roleplay their responses. It is somewhat analogous to a cloze test where the blank is beyond the one-word level and instead begs for an extended, pragmatic level response. Both the cloze and DCT task parallel one another in terms of tapping inferencing skills and sensitivity to coherence of text.

The origin of this sociolinguistic instrument (Blum-Kulka 1982) promotes a written interaction with often more than one rejoinder between the respondent and a hypothetical character in the second person. In other words, the respondent of the DCT was originally meant to write a least two separate utterances. The DCT has evolved gradually over the past decade into several different modified versions, including some using a third person perspective, many requiring only a one-utterance written response from subjects, some which allow for oral response and, more recently, an extended interaction nearing an oral interview-like character. Oral responses, furthermore, have been videotaped for later assessment or rated by trained NS judges immediately upon oral performance (see Cohen & Olshtain 1991). All the various DCT adaptations which have been studied share a common characteristic: they have all relied on a textual description of a particular situation which requires examinees to *act as if* by demonstrating their skills of empathetic roleplay acting.

What is roleplaying? From the outset, some clarification of this pedagogical strategy is needed. By dissecting this verbal compound, we find that when students assume a *role*, they take on a part (either their own or someone else's) in a specific situation. *Play* means that this role is performed in a safe environment so as to promote creativity and motivation while reducing stress and anxiety (Ladousse 1987). This tactic has been used in L2 classrooms for quite

some time, especially during the audio-lingual period. However, communicative teaching principles have converted a controlled, scripted roleplay into a more free, improvisational technique. The DCT capitalizes on the proven benefits that this methodology has demonstrated in the teaching arena (Bardovi-Harlig et al. 1991) and applies them to the work of assessment. It is very important to keep in mind that despite its popularity among instructors, teaching and testing have different criteria because of their different objectives.

From a semiotic approach, however, context-related revisions of the DCT are absolutely necessary. Despite their well-meaning inclusion of situationally-specific discourse frames, the schematic information with which DCT researchers have supplied examinees does not convey enough about the relationship (e.g., status, positional identities) between the speaker and hearer. Furthermore, the unextended feature of these examples illustrates the unlikelihood of their occurrence in natural discourse. Students do not know enough about the characters they are role-playing nor about their conversational partners. The contextual tapestry is not complete; yet, NNSs are supposed to respond as if it were. The use of hypothetical simulations depends on an abundance of schema if appropriateness intuitions are to be stimulated. Since we can only infer examinee's underlying sociocultural competence based on their performance in the role-play, the script must provide for a more effective conveyance of the relationship between the characters. The latest studies on roleplay effectiveness as an evaluation tool indicate that communicative performance is highly situation specific, so that the context of each scenario can actually affect examinees' speech act strategies (Cohen & Olshtain 1991). Consequently, while social, cultural and personal factors influence speech act realization choices among NNS examinees, situation outweighs these others. This point should be incorporated into the DCT design.

The following role-play prompt exemplifies the DCT as a data elicitation instrument currently used in the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (CCSARP). This collaborative study examines the production of NNS requests and apologies across 7 linguistic cultures using a strictly third person type of roleplay (see Blum-Kulka et al. 1989). The DCT item (1) represents one of the more popular DCT formats: :

At the professor's office
A student has borrowed a book from her professor,
which she promised to return.
Professor: Ann, I hope you brought the book I lent you.
Ann: _____
Professor: OK, but please remember it next week.

Other variations (Beebe et al.) replace the student's name with "you" in the above. Rintell & Mitchell (1989) suggests removing the sandwich approach by switching the blank line of dialogue to the end of the critical incident description. The teacher-student interaction conveyed above would be modified into a more cohesive prompt as in the following example (2):

> Ann, a student at the university, borrowed her professor's book last week. She promised to return it today in class but is not finished using it. She would like to borrow the book a few more days. Imagine you are Ann. What would you say to your professor to get an extension on the book loan?
>
> YOU:_____

Regardless of the DCT prompt format used, some unavoidable pragmatic problems prevail. Despite their well-meaning inclusion of situationally-specific discourse frames, the test's original authors seem more concerned with *co-textual* clues than with *contextual* ones. The schematic information with which they have supplied examinees does not convey enough about the relationship (e.g., status, social distance) between the speaker and hearer. Students do not know enough about their hypothetical conversational partners 'o determine the degree of imposition of the FTA. The use of hypothetical simulations depends on an abundance of schema if appropriateness intuitions are to be stimulated; there exists a camouflage of communicative intent which hides a lack of real-life applicability. Since we can only infer examinee's underlying sociolinguistic competence based on their performance in the role-play, the script must provide for a more effective conveyance of the relationship between the characters. Offering a preliminary introduction of the two basic characters and then retaining those two speech participants throughout the 16 different situations might be helpful.

This roleplaying methodology conveys a high degree of *face validity* (Clark 1978). Few test developers would question this, although some have doubted the realistic nature of using *written* roleplays for speech that is normally produced in an oral fashion (Cohen & Olshtain 1991). Face validity or authenticity of communicative competence is one of the major issues confronting test developers today. The appearance of a test can actually affect test performance if examinees perceive the test to be measuring what they expect it to measure even though the test may not tap the targeted psychological construct.

As discrete point tests have become a near taboo in the field of language testing development (although in practice they remain popular), researchers are

determined to produce a more holistic, natural means of evaluation. But does that criterion necessarily translate into direct testing? The overlap or area of gray that results when attempting to delineate trait from method is problematic due to the arbitrary cut-off point we set in our validation work (e.g., when do the roleplay prompts cross over from method into the category of trait?); and it may be this problem which complicates our interpretation of test statistics (Stevenson 1981).

Nevertheless, Clark (1978) defends direct tests as advantageous because ethnographic observation is simply too impractical as a systematic testing tool. Authenticating opportunities for communicative interaction within the limits of testing time and facilities means that real life situations are approximated to the greatest extent possible. Wesche (1985) supports the need for direct testing since predictive validity is almost guaranteed; the inferred skills demonstrated during the test can be extended to real life language use with some degree of confidence since the test supposedly mirrors such use. But most of these kinds of claims lack empirical support, as we see that rationalization does not equal validation. The inherent artificiality despite attempts to appear natural stems from a lack of puposefulness and contextualization (Raffaldini 1981). For example, when communicative functions are targeted as if they occur in isolation from others, when prosodic and kinesic cues are awkwardly missing or when the relationships between interlocutors are not clarified for examinees, pragmatic mapping is made difficult if not impossible.

With all the inexact cognitive probing test developers must contend with, face validity seems, ironically, to provide a way to appease various audiences: students, administrators, teachers, etc. The facade is effective only until students are misplaced in programs or their problems are misdiagnosed. Face validity can be a plus only after true construct validity has been established. Some questions affecting the construct validity of roleplays include: *Do role plays elicit opportunities for examinees to generate evidence of their native-like ability in spoken discourse? Do they provide enough context to students so that a hypothetical response can be gleaned from students' real experiences? Or better yet, do the discourse prompts promote appropriate and polite responses by providing students with culturally-specific discourse signals that native-speakers would recognize immediately?* If any of these questions cannot be answered with conviction, it is perhaps due to the weakness of the theories from which roleplay and interview tools gather support.

CONCLUSION

The communicative objectives of the DCT appear quite in line with pragmatic principles; yet, because its developers have not specifically admitted that a communicative assessment strategy is in fact one based on broad pragmatic theory, they can only muster a vague notion of its validity. The DCT could be revised, however, in correlation with clear pragmatic criteria. Its estrangement from an empirically-supported theory of language--one which is not plagued with criticisms (e.g., Speech Act Theory) or one which can account for more than mere sociolinguistic phenomena (e.g, Politeness Theory)--hinders its utility as a tool for measuring sociocultural competence. Much work remains in terms of clarifying specific construct validity requirements of roleplays, both written and oral. Only as more empirical studies produce evidence beyond the anecdotal and intuitive level, can we anticipate espousing that various roleplay techniques indeed measure what they purport to measure.

While a written description of a scenario can certainly provide examinees with numerous contextual cues, to fully enable them to respond appropriately, we must enrich this context with more than mere verbal signs. As Semiotic Theory explains, nonverbal cues often carry much of the affective and sociocultural message (Oller 1992; Feldman et al 1991). The inclusion of time, moreover, makes expression of signs via video or film "more complete" or more accurate in specifying a particular event than most other textual formats (Korac 1988). Thus, why not reinforce the text itself with some alternative modes of communication such as gesture and prosody? The same critical incident that was originally read by participants can then be interpreted in gestures and in sensory-motor modalities in addition to pure linguistic representations. This approach considers the variation of learning styles and culturally-based inferencing processes among L2 students. Moreover, if we want to know how well examinees can use the elements of language in real-life communication, we must offer them a testing forum which not only simulates real-life communication, but which provides meaningful contexts where interaction with interlocutors or with other examinees enhances successful outcomes.

Future Research

For this reason, a video version of the DCT has been produced by this writer which conveys each situation audio-visually. Before each 10-30 second critical incident appears on the video monitor, a brief preamble is provided. Examinees

can read and listen to the information regarding character roles and relationships as they are "set up" (i.e., given a communicative objective) for the elicitation of one of four speech acts: apology, request, refusal or complaint. They are finally asked to respond as if they were actually in the particular context of the character they *see and hear* on the screen. Responses can be videotaped or, if time and money constraints do not permit, written questionnaires used in the traditional DCT can be substituted. Research on this and other methodological variations of the DCT are in demand before we can confidently suggest its adoption for use (e.g., Rintell & Mitchell 1989; Cohen & Olshtain 1991; Cohen in press).

In the L2 pedagogical niche known as communicative testing, the rationale for revising our theoretical model is twofold: first, we absolutely need to establish construct validity to justify psycholinguistic measurement instruments; second, we need to collectively work toward understanding human communication so that refinement of linguistic theories can follow. In our efforts to link theory to L2 teaching and testing practices, we must work toward validation of our pragmatic framework--a model which accounts for natural, non-ideal discourse in a variety of sociocultural contexts. In so doing, we need to recycle some good ideas, throw out those lacking support and reorganize for effectiveness of explanation.

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Exchange Structure in the ESL Classroom: Q-A-C and Q-CQ-A-C Sequences in Small Group Interaction

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This paper begins by briefly reviewing the literature related to classroom discourse structure and proceeds to explore how specific findings in the literature are reflected in two transcribed university-level ESL classes which were involved in small group work. More specifically, "Question-Answer-Comment" (Q-A-C) sequences are identified, as are a significant derivation thereof: "Question-Counter Question-Answer-Comment" (Q-CQ-A-C) sequences. Instances of the latter are closely considered in the contexts in which they occur, and an attempt is made to link the nature of classroom talk to the larger concern of classroom dynamics. It is argued that despite the fact that students involved in small group work are able to freely self-select, the exchange structure characteristic of this interaction remains traditional in nature. Finally, one case within the data is examined where the counter questioning move in the Q-CQ-A-C sequence is generally absent; as a result, the classroom discourse here becomes markedly less traditionally pedagogical in nature.

To communicate in the classroom is to play a kind of language game: this game "is a goal-oriented activity involving moves by one or more players, mutual dependence and constraint among moves, and [it involves] the need for strategy and tactics" (Jacobs, 1986, p. 151). Inherent in our ability to identify classroom talk as one of many "games" included in the larger entity that is discourse is the fact that we understand how this game as distinct from others is played. The purpose of this paper is to examine how specific findings in the literature are made manifest in two transcribed ESL lessons.[1] I am particularly interested in how certain "rules of the game" are or are not adhered to by the players and I will, as a result, pay close attention to what are referred to by McHoul (1978) as "Question-Answer-Comment" (QAC) exchange sequences, and, importantly, the derivations thereof. It is my contention that they exist in the data cases of

interactional modifications which result in a variant of the QAC sequence; namely that of the Q-CQ-A-C sequence, or "Question-Counter Question-Answer-Comment" sequence. I would like to suggest ways in which these two exchange structures may relate to classroom dynamics. Finally, I will conclude by examining one case in the data where the exchange structure looks decidedly less pedagogic than conversational in its orientation. This example is significant in that it suggests a quite different dynamic in the classroom.

Classroom talk, as part of a larger domain known as institutional or formal talk, is best understood as it exists in relation to ordinary talk. It is via this comparative focus that the features unique to classroom talk are brought into relief. In keeping with Goffman's (1974) observation that utterances are "anchored in the surrounding, ongoing world" (p. 500), recent studies of institutional interaction reveal that while resembling ordinary talk in many ways, institutional talk is governed by considerations of "task, equity, efficiency, etc. in ways that mundane conversational practices manifestly are not" (Heritage, 1988, p. 34). Significantly, what becomes central to the identification of institutional talk as distinct from ordinary talk is its turn-taking system.

Like ordinary conversational interaction, institutional interaction is understood as being managed on a turn-by-turn basis (Zimmerman, 1987). This form of management, however, is modified in an institutional setting where factors such as "rights and obligations and differential patterns of opportunity and power" (Heritage, 1988, p. 34) have a strong bearing upon the interaction. Thus, rooted in the resulting modification is a situation whereby, according to Heritage (1988),

> the incumbents of particular roles (e.g. doctor, teacher, lawyer, interviewer) ask questions and, where relevant, select next speakers, while others (e.g. patients, pupils, witnesses, interviewees) are largely confined to answering them (p. 34).

How this role-related "question-answer-mediated-turn-taking" (Heritage, 1988, p. 34) influences the management of classroom talk is of key importance here.

McHoul (1978) maintains that the management of classroom talk is ruled by the distribution of differential participation rights in classrooms. He argues that "only teachers can direct speakership in any creative way" (McHoul, 1978, p.188). Notably, this does not mean that students cannot direct speakership they can but the nature of student-directed speakership is not creative: after having typically been first selected by the teacher, they can then select only to continue their turn, or select the teacher; the student is thus not granted the permutability which allows the teacher to creatively select any speaker (McHoul, 1978). Therefore, as Heritage (1988) asserts, the "relatively restricted patterns of conduct

characteristic of [the classroom] are primarily the product of turn-type pre-allocation" (p. 34). In other words, the teacher alone has what Long (1983) refers to as the "predetermined ability to control topic and speaker" (p. 11). Jacobs (1986) notes that both teacher and student are tacitly aware of these rules and "have the ability to more or less artfully play the game" (p. 151).

This conversational dance assumes a particular rhythm which again works to distinguish classroom talk from ordinary talk. More specifically, where turns in ordinary talk are often organized as question-answer (Q-A) utterance or adjacency pairs (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), turns in the classroom are most often organized as question-answer-comment (Q-A-C) "utterance triads" (McHoul, 1978, p.191); importantly, McHoul sees only teachers as having the right to comment on the sufficiency of an answer once it has been produced, although this C-part is ultimately optional. He provides in his commentary some examples of C-parts, such as the one below, which is for both teacher and student striking in its familiarity:

Excerpt 1

1		T:	Yes Denise
2		D:	I think em firstly there prob'ly be residential along
3			the em railway but then -- later on that land would
4			increase in *value* and the businesses would prob'ly
5			buy the people out.
6	C	T:	Very good answer.
7			(1.0)
8	C	T:	n quite correct. (McHoul, 1978, p. 191)

As Allright and Bailey (1991) maintain, this C-part, or evaluative feedback on the form of an utterance "is not what we expect in normal, non-teaching conversation" (p. 98). It is, however, in combination with the initial Q-A, recognized as being a ubiquitous element in classroom talk; as a result, interaction analysts spend a great deal of time identifying and describing the symmetry of the Q-A-C sequence.

Stubbs (1983) concurs that the Q-A-C sequence is "particularly applicable to teacher-pupil interaction" (p. 131) He argues that the traditional lesson provides the basis for a "consensus model" in which there is an agreement between teachers and students about the norms and conventions inherent in that context (p. 135). Certainly, what is explicit in much of the literature surrounding the topic of classroom talk in traditional, teacher-fronted classrooms where the teacher is the obvious "director" or "head" is the attitude that this talk is at bottom an expression

of power inequalities; Long (1983) calls it 'unequal power' discourse" (p. 11). At the root of this power imbalance is the general understanding that there exists an unequal distribution of knowledge between teacher and students. Müller (1988) writes that common expectations which both students and teachers share minimally involve expectations where "the teacher [is] 'the one who knows' (the primary knower) [...] and the students [are] the 'ones who do not know' (the secondary knowers)" (p. 315). Fundamental to the nature of discourse in the traditional classroom, then, is the sense that knowledge is somehow the property of the teacher.

Several interaction analysts make reference to the fact that when the teacher is not clearly acting in his or her traditional role as "head" of a teacher-fronted class, and when, instead, the class consists of small group work activities, the nature of classroom discourse may be modified to a certain degree. Stubbs (1983), for example, questions whether or not the organization of exchanges would be as pronounced in less traditional lessons where "clear status and power relations" are not immediately apparent, if there at all (p. 134); he goes on to suggest the possibility that students and teachers in a less highly controlled context may have "different views about how discourse could and should develop" (p. 135). It appears to rarely be the case, however, that the discourse of the classroom traditional or not diverges from the classic model of classroom talk to such an extent that the interaction and thus the participants' roles become unrecognizable. Much of the following will support this contention, although included in the final segment of this paper is a discussion of additional data which is illustrative of a more conversational orientation to classroom discourse.

The data in this paper largely works to underscore the fact that, though engaged in small group work, the teacher usually works very consistently at maintaining her role as the "primary knower" whenever there is a chance of becoming, like her students, a hearer and, by extension, a "secondary knower."[2] She is thus reluctant to relinquish her right to manage the discourse when her students attempt to creatively distribute turns. The exchange structure which results is variant in that it could best be described as Q-CQ-A-C, the CQ being an important move on the teacher's part, whereby her right to direct the discourse is made most explicit. In this way, the class remains in one way quite traditional in that although it is not technically speaking teacher-fronted and students may self-select the capacity to direct the discourse is retained by the teacher. In an attempt to support this finding, let us now take a closer look at the data.

What is immediately significant with regard to the nature of group work here is that the students and not the teacher are self-selecting in order to ask questions of the teacher. The situation where the teacher directs discussion and allocates

questions is thus inverted as the students conduct their own discussions and encounter their own questions. The following example illustrates this process:

Excerpt 2

```
1      L12:  <h> Mary
2      T:    yeah
3 Q    L12:  what's the meaning of (+) Ausch[v]itz?
4 CQ   T:    d'uhm does anybody here know what Auschwitz was?
5 A    L6:   yeah //concentration camp//
6      T:        //you want to explain it//
7             (+)
8      T:    //explain it to her//
9      L6:   //Ausch[v]itz
10     T:    explain it to Hiroko
```

Note that L12's question at line 3 sets the teacher up, so to speak, to provide an answer; this then leaves the student in the position to comment on or evaluate the teacher's response.[3] The teacher's next turn at line 4, however, works to fundamentally reshape the structure of the exchange. The teacher responds to L12's question with a counter question which re-allocates L12's question to the group--this re-allocating move is one which only the teacher has the right to make, and by so doing she thereby re-positions herself within the exchange structure so that she is in the position to comment upon a response and is not, instead, the one whose response may be commented upon. In fact, the teacher does not comment on L6's answer at line 5, although, significantly, her capacity to do so was secured by her counter-questioning move at line 4.

The teacher employs this discourse strategy on a number of occasions in the lesson where a Q-A-C exchange is initiated by a student's self-selected question. In the following example (Excerpt 3), we can see that the teacher makes two attempts to modify the potential student-initiated Q-A-C exchange with a second "CQ" part; the first attempt, which involves re-allocating this "CQ" part to the small group at line 3, is unsuccessful as no one within the group can respond; necessarily, then, the teacher re-directs her question once again at line 8, this time to the entire class. What follows is a rather long but not a typical exchange whereby the teacher prompts a student whose reply is incomplete; her turns at lines 11 and 14 are commenting turns insofar as they evaluate the incomplete nature of L5's answers, and ask for more information. Mehan (1978) writes that when a student gives a partial or incorrect answer, carefully directed teacher-student interaction continues until the correct answer appears, which it does at line 19.

Excerpt 3

```
1   Q L8:   uh Mary (+) uhm what's ideology means
2           (++)
3  CQ  T:   ideology. (++) does anybody know? (+) here.  (+) uh did you
4           ask
5           (++)
6     L8:   //yeah I//asked (+) I asked her
7     L7:   //uh huh//
8  CQ  T:   ok who knows what an ideology is? (1) does anybody know what
9           an ideology is?
10    L5:   thought,
11C//Q T:   a //what?//
12    L8:      //what?//
13 A  L5:   a kind of thought,
14C//Q T:   a kind of thought  what kind of u:h-  //what kind// of
15          thought
16    L8:                                          //idea?//
17 Q   T:   it be (+) for example (+) give an example of //an ideology//
18    L7:                                            //((unintelligible))//
19 A  L5:   o:h u:hm socialist, (+) communist, (+) democracy is a-
20     T:   can you hear tell (+) tell her
```

Most of the time, as we have seen, when faced with a student's question the teacher is able to modify the ensuing discourse by inserting a "CQ" part into the exchange. Only once does she need to defend, in a sense, her right to manage the discourse. Consider the first part of the extended exchange:

Excerpt 4

```
1      L9:   Mary? ((formally))
2      T:    uh huh?
3      L9:   your input plea// (h huh //huh//huh)//
4      T:                          //huh//
5      L11:                 // (h huh //huh//huh// huh) <huh>
6   Q  L9:   there is this e::h (+) some sort of an idiom you pretend to
7           pay us and we pretend to work
8  CQ  T:    ok.  what do you think that could be: (+) do you have any
9                idea?
10     L11:  do you know what the word pretend means
11          (++)
12     T:    do I  know what the word pretend means
13     L11:  yeah (+) I- I doubt (+) I don't know that see
14 CQ T:     oh ok who - do - does anybody know what the word pretend
15          means.
16     L5:   //pretend?//
17     L6:   //pretend?//
18     L8:   pret(h)e:nd? ((L8 sounds disbelieving))
19     L7:   //pretend?//
20 A   L6:   //pretend// to be (+) like you're trying to show something
21          from
22          you that u:h
23 A   L9:   is not?
24 A   L6:   is actually not you
25          (+)
26     L11:  a::h
27     L5:   pretend
28     L11:  ok
```

What is surprising in Excerpt 4 is L11's decision to respond to the teacher's counter question at lines 8 and 9 with a question of his own, "Do you know what the word pretend means?" at line 10. This represents a violation of the turn-taking rules for classroom talk which, as we have seen and according to McHoul (1978), "permit and oblige the teacher and only the teacher to initially instigate a topic or topics and, from there on, to maintain or change that topic or topics" (p. 203). The teacher's response at line 12, "Do *I* know what pretend means?" another question is asked in an attempt to allow the student to in some way repair the situation, which he does by admitting his ignorance in the matter at line 13. The teacher then exercises her right to go on, securing her true second "CQ" part at line 14, and the discourse continues smoothly.

It is interesting to consider the exchange which immediately follows Excerpt 4 The teacher, whose role as the primary knower and director of the discourse was momentarily undermined by L11's apparent disregard for the conventions of classroom talk at line 10, again uses, as in Excerpt 3, a series of prompts to now very carefully manage the direction of the discourse. These occur at lines 10, 15, 19, and 23. As the Q-A-C sequences emerge at lines 15, 17, 19, 22, and 23, the familiar symmetry of the exchange structure typical of the classroom becomes recognizable. By virtue of the teacher's involvement here, the interaction becomes much more traditionally pedagogic in nature insofar as the teacher designates both topic and speaker.

Excerpt 5

```
1      L11:  but I mean ///(huh)// I don't know the meaning (h huh huh)
2                                                          //<huh>//
3       L9:                          ///(huh huh)//
4        T:                                                   //ok//
5            //think// about it think read the sentence //again//
6      L11:   //anyway//                              //yeah yeah//
7        T:  with that idea
8      L11:  yeah yeah, ((louder))
9            (9)
10  Q   T:  ok (+) Rein- Reinhard it's a criticism of what . (+) d'you
11               know what it could be possibly a criticism of,
12           (+)
13  A L11:  of the communism
14           (+)
15 C//Q T:  but what aspect
16           (2)
17  A L11:  of not being a free market there
18           (+)
19 C//Q T:  u::hm (+) yeah (+) but specifically what sector
20           (1)
21     L11:  ///((cough))//
22  A  L9:  //<hhh>// the wor- the working class maybe
23 C//Q T:  the working class ok (+) when (+) the working class is not
24           in a free market and what happens (+) when you work for the
25           state?
26     L11:  yeah (+) okay
27           (10)
```

Despite the predominance of the Q-CQ-A-C sequence in the class transcriptions examined, teachers did not always respond to students' self-selected questions with a counter question of their own. In other words, they did not always move in such a way as to grant themselves the opportunity to closely direct the subsequent interaction. What happens when teachers do not employ Q-CQ-AC sequences is also extremely interesting, and, not surprisingly, this particular conversational dance also affects the rhythm of classroom dynamics. Consider the following exchange:

Excerpt 6

```
1  Q   L6:   what ehspur ((spur)) means?  how do you pronounce it
2             s-p-u-r ((L6 spells the word out))
3  A   T:    spu:r
4      L6:   spur=
5      T:    =//uh huh, <h>//
6  Q   L6:   //what does this mean.//
7      T:    can I see the sentence?
8      L6:   sure
9      T:    it depends on (1) uh::m (1) where was it again down
10            here somewhere (+)
11     L6:   it's supposed to be here (+) uh:m (++) <hhh>
12     L5:   (hhhhh) ((L5 laughs under his breath))
13     L6:   uh:: oh, oh. (+) yeah its here
14            (+)
15 A   T:    ok (3) to: in this case it's to encourage
16            (+)
17     L6:   to en//courage//
18     T:        //to ((unintelligible)) (into)// courage <hh>
19 Q   L6     does it have another meaning too
20 A   T:    yeah you know uh on a ho:rse (+) uhm (+) when you're riding
21            (+) you have on you::r (hh) (+) on your shoe a sp//ur//
22     L6:                                                  //yeah//
23 A   T:    and you use that to:
24     L6:   ok//I understand//
25 A   T:      //make the horse// go faster <hhh> it comes from
26                                                    //there it's//
27     L6:                                            //excuse me//
28 A   T:    called a spu:r (+) and so the verb (1) here to spur would be
29            to encourage
30 Q   L6:   so is it //a: verb//
31     L5:              //<hhh>//
32 Q   L6:   and noun too yeah=
33 A   T:    =yeah a spur (+) //is//
34     L6:                    //sp//ur=
35 A   T:    on your shoe=
36     L6:   =is a noun
37            (+)
38 A   T:    and to spur- it could be to spur or to spur on is to
39            encourage
40     L6:   so you pronounce it ehspur ((spur))
41     T:    spur (+) uh //huh//
42     L6:                //ok//
```

In sharp contrast to excerpt 5, here the student does the questioning, and the teacher does the answering. And, most notably, the teacher provides these answers without first countering with a question of her own. As the student self-selects again and again, at lines 1, 6, 19, 30, and 32, the direction of the discourse is very clearly in his hands as he succeeds in designating the topic with each self-initiated question. What results is a series of adjacency pairs whereby the teacher in a sense relinquishes her right as primary knower to more carefully manage the discourse. In this more conversationally-oriented exchange, the issues of power and status usually associated with classroom talk are far more subtle, particularly insofar as the student is able to control the topic, traditionally the sole domain of the teacher.

The goal of the analyst is ultimately to discover the orderliness inherent in various exchanges like the ones above by, according to Zimmerman (1987), examining "collections of comparable conversational materials in which similarly shaped and situated utterances can be shown to have similar consequences or to function in the manner claimed" (p. 419). Continued work with small group interaction in the classroom is sure to give rise to a better understanding of the structures of modified classroom discourse associated with it. As the rules of this game become clearer, so should the effects discourse structure has on classroom dynamics. By extension, this research should lead to important insights regarding classroom methodology and Second Language Acquisition research.

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THE AUTHOR

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NOTES

[1] I would like to thank Dr. Numa Markee for generously providing me with these transcribed lessons.

[2] McHoul in his analysis of formal talk in the classroom finds that within the classic model where Q-A-C sequences reign, teachers, because of their right to creatively distribute turns, are able to operate "without [the] fear of becoming hearers" (p. 192).

[3] An interesting question to raise at this point relates to how frequently students do in fact comment on the teacher's answer if given the opportunity to do so; to the best of my knowledge, this question remains as yet unanswered. It represents, however, a fascinating line of inquiry within the relatively new area of research into small group interaction in classrooms.

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Appendix 1
Transcription conventions (from Markee, in press)

T:	: teacher
L1, L2, etc.	: identified learner
L	: unidentified learner
L3?	: probably learner 3 (L3)
LL	: several or all learners simultaneously
/yes//yah//ok	: overlapping or simultaneous listening
///huh?///oh///	: responses, brief comments, etc., by two, three, or an unspecified number of learners
=	: a) turn continues below, at the next identical symbol b) if inserted at the end of one speaker's turn and the beginning of the next speaker's adjacent turn, it indicates that there is no gap at all between the two turns
(+) (++) (+++)	: pauses; (+) = a pause of between .1 and .5 of a second; (++) = a pause of between .6 and .9 of a second; and (1) (2) (3) = pauses of one, two, or three seconds respectively.
?	: rising intonation, not necessarily a question
!	: strong emphasis with falling intonation
OK. now. well., etc.	: a period indicates falling (final) intonation
so, the next thing	: a comma indicates low-rising intonation suggesting continuation
e:r, the:::, etc.	: one or more colons indicate the lengthening of the precedeing sound
emphasis	: italic type indicates marked stress
SYLVIA	: capitals indicate increased volume
. . . . (radio)	: single brackets indicate unclear or probable item
((unintelligible)), ((coughs))	: double brackets indicate (a stretch of) unintelligible text (approximate length indicated), or comments about the transcript, including non-verbal actions
no-	: a hyphen indicates an abrupt cut-off, with level pitch
yesterday Peter went	: capitals are used only for proper names, not to indicate beginnings of sentences
[si:m]	: square brackets indicate phonetic transcription
<hhh>	: in-drawn breath
hhh	: exhaled breath
(hhh)	: laughter tokens
*	: schismatic turns (i.e. a conversation that is separate from the main interaction)
†L11: //yeah// I †T: //yeah.//	: overlaps worked out from different tape sources where the precise overlaps are inaudible but can be estimated by listening to the surrounding interaction

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Discourse Organization and Power: Towards a Pragmatics of Sales Negotiations

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The article examines audio recordings of authentic business negotiations carried out by native speakers of English in U.K. companies. It focuses on the roles of Buyer and Seller, with special emphasis on the inbuilt power differential caused by the reality of the business transaction and the pragmatics of the business relationship. In these, a key feature is dynamism, which allows and makes space for developments in the business relationship. It is suggested that power relationships are reflected in the way the negotiators organize their discourse around topics. Consequently, a topic-oriented, cycle-based, model is used to describe these power relationships and subtle shifts in power. Topic initiation, development, and endings are examined from the point of view of power implications. In this process, the notion of tactical deference is introduce as a useful tool for the description of a seemingly deliberate use, by the less powerful speaker, of less powerful, or "weak" strategies for the sake of eventually achieving a shift in power.

Finally, some teaching applications are suggested for training non-native speakers, business executives and sales staff in particular, in English negotiation skills.

INTRODUCTION

In the title of my paper I link **power** and **organization**-two highly problematic concepts. This linkage demands justification and definition of the concepts. I will therefore start off by briefly exploring both **organization** and **power** as concepts. On the basis of that, I will then argue that, understood against the contextual background of the business roles imposed upon the negotiators by the overall

transactional content, the suggested organization provides a framework for power wielding. Within this framework, the organizational elements can be manipulated by those who are aware of the potential. To illustrate and justify this claim, examples will be given from an analysis of authentic business-to-business sales negotiation data audio-recorded in U.K. companies in 1988.

POWER IN BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS

Let us start with the basic question: What is 'power' in negotiations? The attempt to answer this question will provide us with a framework within which to consider the following: How is this power then manifested in the way negotiation discourse is organized?

Power in a negotiation depends upon assumptions made by the negotiators about each other, and about the nature and stage of their overall business relationship. Research dealing with power usually sees it as a relatively static phenomenon (see e.g., Miller 1976; Rich 1976). Polarization of power is also often assumed. In the vein of a zero-sum game tradition, interaction is then assumed to contain a finite amount of power so that if one interactant loses power, the other is bound to gain it; witness descriptions in value-laden terms like winners and losers, dominant and subordinated interactants (Lips 1981, Gilligan 1982).

Some researchers, however, point out that power does not necessarily entail domination of others (see e.g., Miller 1976). Lips (1981), for example, links power with more positive concepts, and instead of dominance he speaks of strength. Foucault (1980) joins this more positive way of thinking and points out that power is inherent in all interactive situations and all relationships. According to him, power does not necessarily constitute a limitation of freedom; nor is it necessarily a system of domination exercised by individuals or groups of individuals. Domination is basically a negative concept: in interaction, it represses the freedom of the interactant. Power, on the other hand, may be viewed as the ability to create action, not to suppress it (Foucault 1980). Accordingly, power is the driving force behind interaction and should not be explored in terms of static, value-laden judgements.

Linguistic studies on language and power generally take the power relationship prevailing in the interactive situations studied to be constant; relationships are characterized as 'symmetrical' or 'asymmetrical,'[1] with no suggestion of how the interaction might possibly affect this basic power assumption. Indeed, most studies on the subject focus on situations in which one of the interactants has institutional power vested in him (see e.g., Thomas 1984). By definition, this institutional

power is not negotiable. It is not up for grabs. (No way can a police interview, for example, end up with the suspect, or witness, having more power than the police officer and dominating the interaction; nor can a pupil exchange 'power' roles with his headmaster.)

In her illuminating studies on language and power, Thomas (1985 and 1984) argues a case for 'dynamic pragmatics.' Referring to various studies on politeness, notably Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) and Leech (1983), she points out the role of pragmatic ambivalence in power relationships i.e., leaving the precise illocutionary intent of an utterance diplomatically unclear: If the precise force of a speech act is left unclear, the understanding is that the speaker of the ambiguous utterance gives a free hand to his interactant to interpret the utterance. Conversely, then, the lack of ambiguity, i.e., the explicit signalling of the illocutionary intent of the utterance restricts the freedom of the interactant to interpret the illocutionary force of the utterance (e.g.,'... well there you are Barry I've spelt it out to you. I've left you in no doubt at all how you stand ...' Inspector to police constable, Thomas 1984).

Similarly, Fairclough (1989) looks at the impact of directness in discourse in his data on conversations between a doctor and a group of medical students. He refers to lack of indirectness as 'cornering,' and takes it to be characteristic of the more powerful speaker: the doctor's speech is characterized by (a) explicit announcements of what is going to happen and what the students are to do ('now what I want you to do is to ...'; 'off you go'), and (b) series of questions which, in their directness, put the student on the spot ('did we not look at a baby with a head problem yesterday'), and force the student to 'join in' in an exchange during which he will need to produce utterances that he can, from the very beginning, see to be leading him into a face-losing (or at least, a face threatening) situation for himself.

The data used by both Fairclough and Thomas differ from the data used in the present study in one crucial aspect: in their encounters power is static to a degree in which power in negotiations never is. In business negotiations, roles and relationships change and develop. That is why power in business negotiations is dynamic and creative, allowing and making space for development and for the joint creation of discourse. Yet it is status-and-role bound, in that both parties enter a negotiation event with certain transaction based expectations concerning the relative power invested in each other's roles in that particular business transaction at that particular stage of the business relationship. (On the interplay of role/status and language, see Lampi 1990.)

My data would seem to suggest that there is a particular way of achieving this movement: the imposition of organizational control on the discourse.

Let us turn our attention to organization.

ORGANIZATION AND POWER

Organization[2] in negotiation discourse is here considered to be topic related: Through the discussion of certain issues (Lampi 1989), the negotiators want to get something done, to achieve something. However, there may be a discrepancy between the issues that the two negotiators want to discuss. That is why the ability to initiate topics and get them established as discourse topics and then to develop them for as long as is deemed necessary gives a negotiator the power to create and shape the negotiation interaction. In the following we shall briefly discuss the way this was done in the negotiation data on which the present study is based.

Organizational Framework

In the data, a layered cyclical pattern was identified largely as a result of inspiration from a model proposed by Sinclair (1988), for analyzing written interactive text. The model suggested in the present study for the analysis of negotiation discourse differs in certain significant aspects from Sinclair's model: descriptive detail of the constituents, even the names suggested for the cyclical elements are different, yet its obvious debt to Sinclair (ibid.) must be acknowledged.

In the best discourse analysis tradition, Sinclair's model has three elements: **P** (Posit), **R** (React), and **D** (Determine). These elements are identified through verb tense, attribution, and overall progression of theme in the writing. For the purposes of the present study, these elements were rechristened as **I** (Initiation), **D** (Development), and **E** (End); the three together form a cycle. Furthermore, the individual elements are identified in terms of the kind of contribution they make to 'what is being talked about', i.e., the topic.[3] The cycle is thus given a referential framework: it is topic oriented, and the three constituent elements refer to stages in topic development. For this purpose, topic was defined as a concept or an ideational element in an utterance, about which a proposition or propositions is/are made.

From the point of view of the cyclical organization vis à vis power, two aspects emerge as significant in determining the power relationship currently obtaining between the negotiators: the opportunities open to each individual negotiator to initiate a discussion on a topic that he himself or she herself wants to discuss, and secondly, each negotiator's ability to develop that topic in such a way that the topic is dealt with to the extent that he or she at that point wishes it

to be. Accordingly, each of the cyclical elements will here be looked at separately, with particular focus on the I-element, it being perhaps the most crucial element for gaining dominance.

Defining Topic

In accordance with Brown and Yule (1983), I here take topic, and topic initiation, development and ending, to be discoursal rather than sentence-level phenomena. In other words, a mere topic introduction, performed by one interactant does not suffice to convert a proposition or a noun phrase into a topic. To convert a **potential** topic into a **discoursal** topic, the topic needs to be accepted, i.e., taken up, either explicitly by the other interactant, or implicitly through failure, on behalf of the other interactant, to utilize the Transition Relevance Point for the purpose of turn taking. In other words, as Sperber and Wilson (1986) put it, each utterance contains a pool of potential topics, from which one of them is interactively developed into a topic.

Let us have a closer look at how this happens.

The Power of Topic Initiation

The following extract (1) illustrates the sharing and distribution of power between the main negotiators.

(1)[4] Buyer: OK / well ... we know why we're here today ... **to discuss welding material**

Seller: **right / there are two aspects ... really ... that we would like to ... take up ... one is** ... clearly ... you had the fifty ton trial ... we 'd be interested to get some detailed views from you as to how it's performed right through the process ... and the second aspect of course is ... the commercial aspect ...what it has meant to you in terms of cost ... and what it means to us in terms of potential selling price and cost ... have we got a potential commercial deal between the two companies ... / **maybe we could deal with the** ... the ... technical process route **side first** ... would be the logical place to ...

Buyer: **yes... well...Dennis has handed out some pieces of paper here** ... I mean ... frankly ... we don't need to talk about this

In lines 1 and 2 the Buyer introduced the topic. The utterance is fairly specific and direct on the **organizational** level: It contains conventionalized markers

signalling a topic change (*OK - pause - well)*, i.e., in our terms, a change from one organizational element, cycle, to another. On the **illocutionary** level, however, the utterance is unspecific and indirect; it leaves the Seller considerable freedom to choose the particular aspect he wants to discuss and take up. All it does is impose upon the Seller the task of producing an I-move to break down in any way he likes the main agenda item agreed on beforehand for the negotiation session, the discussion of welding materials. The organizational intent of the Seller's next utterance has thus been specified by the Buyer, who is imposing organizational power on the discourse. On line 3 the Seller corroborates this power and joins in to create coherent discourse. The rest of the organizational structuring is given in bold.

The Power of Topic Development

How can constructive power be wielded through topic development? In any consideration of this question, the default assumption is that the topic being developed contributes to, i.e., is relevant to, the overall aims of at least one of the negotiating parties. In that situation, the negotiator who perceives a topic to further his or her own negotiation aims, can show power through the successful maintenance of the topic. When a negotiator, on the other hand, perceives a topic to further the other party's aims, he or she can show power through successfully changing the topic, and thus finishing the discussion of that particular topic.

In (2) we have an illustration of the successful maintenance of a desirable topic and the simultaneous prevention of topic change. The example is really a part of a series of sequences where the Seller tries to initiate a new topic. His turn starts off in the typical manner of a topic ending element, the summing up of the preceding discussion:

(2) Seller: **so... then it's up to you to make some comparisons...*let me just add one [thing to that***

Buyer: well... well...] *how sensitive ... or otherwise ... is it going to be with volume* ... I mean that ... I'd certainly like you to quote a five ton per week or something up to twenty tons per week

The Buyer quite simply ignores the Seller's efforts to add something, i.e., to change the focus of the conversation. The Seller had used a conventionalized topic opener ("let me just add one thing to that...") which, in the content, functions as an indirect way of saying "Look, I don't want to discuss the current topic any more." Conventionalized indirectness, however, is not a powerful enough strategy

for one in whom power is not at this point vested, to bring about the desired effect. The Buyer produced an 'elicit information', a direct question, (which organizationally constitutes the initiation of a sub-layer in the discourse, the topic of the sub-layer being *volume sensitive of price) and gets the requested information from one of the subordinate negotiators. Direct questions operate on both the* organizational and the illocutionary levels of discourse, and are thus extremely efficient. (Even in ordinary casual conversation, as we well know from our everyday experience, it is very difficult indeed to ignore a direct question.)

About a minute later the Seller makes a second attempt at topic initiation. Again, it occurs at a perfectly expected and organizationally legitimate point, right after a subordinate negotiator summarizes and evaluates the topic he and the Buyer had been developing, thus (indirectly) signalling topic ending. His language, again, signals the desire to begin a new topic, and therefore to finish discussion of the current topic. This desire to finish the discussion is, again signalled indirectly:

(3) Seller 3: well ... well ... we shall improve our yield we shall im- ... even improve the quality to what we've got now **so err .. that ... that is the ... that's where we see ourselves ... and ... that's why ... if we go into that ... five ton or ten ton lots that's ...** not really good for us

Seller 1: *the other interesting [aspect to this* Buyer: so ... so ... ten tons] is not very ...*(Seller clears his throat)*

Seller 3: well ... I mean ... if ... if ... if we don't ... if we ... if we got to have five tons and then ... wait again and ...then have another five tons and so on ... [if we

Buyer: oh no]

He still isn't successful poor Seller. I must give you the end of his efforts as well, mustn't I; the passage (4) where his topic initiation is finally successful:

(4) Seller 3: I mean ... not ... not for any other reason ... I'm talking about it from the manufacturing point of view
Buyer: yes
Seller 3: and the technical point of view
Buyer: OK fair enough

Seller: There's another important aspect **though and ... that is the regularity of it ... mm ... if we're ... to start with the steel situation ... if we can take some regular ... scheduled forwards on British Steel ... based on a schedule ... from** yourselves ... I mean ... our price is slightly better from British Steel than on a stop stock situation and ...
Buyer: yes

This initiation would only seem to be successful because the Buyer the more powerful one explicitly accepted the ending of his topic with his sequence *"OK fair enough - no new initiation"*. He thus recognized the Seller's desire to initiate another topic. This is a recurrent feature in the data: the negotiator with less power has to 'receive permission' from the more powerful negotiator to initiate topics; i.e., he will usually wait for the more powerful one to explicitly end the discussion of a previous topic, or be silent, before he produces an I-move. In doing so, both negotiators are displaying tactical deference. They are, in other words, seemingly deliberately leaving the field open for the other interactant, by using less powerful, "weaker" strategies, for the sake of achieving eventually a possible shift in power, or for the sake of maintaining a balance of power, within their business relationship.

So, in view of the above, where does power in topic development lie? The power of the more powerful one in this case the Buyer is basically status-oriented, but expressed through language. The power that he has means that he can make the Seller talk and make him keep on talking or prevent him from talking, as above. The weaker party's power, in our case the Seller's, on the other hand, is in his ability to choose with great care the language the actual wording that he uses to give information, and the strategies he chooses. (An examination of that process, of course, lies beyond the scope of the present paper.) Only organizationally, as well as "overall agendawise" is the Seller restricted by the Buyer. And therein lies the difference between the organizational power wielding to be observed in business negotiations, where the power distribution is dynamic, and illocutionary level power wielding the kind that Jenny Thomas has examined in asymmetrical situations where the power distribution is static: On the organizational level, the more powerful one leaves his interactant freedom, albeit limited, to contribute to the creation and development of discourse; power wielding on the illocutionary level tends to restrict the interactant's freedom to creatively shape the discourse.

The Power of Ending a Topic

The ultimate ending of the discussion of a topic is, effectively, the initiation of a new topic. Only then can the interlocutors see that one topic has really at least for the time being been abandoned for another. This, in fact, reflects conversational reality: A speaker can produce an utterance containing conventionalized signals to express his intent / desire to end topic development. (This we saw happening in (2) and (3.) He can do this by producing summaries and evaluations of preceding topics. He can also, of course, include actual lexical and discourse markers in his utterance. Nevertheless, unless his interactant shares this desire to finish the topic, and joins in and accepts the ending of that topic, the topic development will not be finished.

Basically, power in topic endings can be displayed in one of the two ways already familiar to us: the ability to produce an utterance that will discontinue an unpalatable sequence, and, on the other hand, the ability to prevent the other negotiator from ending the discussion of the topic should the speaker himself wish to continue.

In my data, the less powerful negotiator (in the current negotiation the Seller) tends to use indirect strategies to indicate his desire to end a topic; there was less explicitly marked orientation towards structuring the discourse. The more powerful negotiator, on the other hand, (in our example negotiation the Buyer) displays an explicitly marked, direct, intent to organize and control the event. The Seller relies on moves whose illocutionary values are 'summarizing,' and 'concluding', marking his intent with e.g., a summarizing 'so', but seldom uses metalanguage to indicate actual organizational intent. An example from his utterances:

(5) Seller: so we have room to manoeuvre there's no question about that … as … we always thought we would have

This contrasts with the strategy used by the Buyer in (6):

(6) Buyer: **I'm … just … just at this mo … moment somewhat … reluctant to … talk about … or say even how much we're paying for our seamless hollow** … but I would just like to reaffirm how … how much we paid for the welding material that we got from you.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING

So, where does all this leave us who are faced with the challenge of teaching non-native speakers to negotiate in English? Negotiating in a foreign language is not something that learners automatically pick up during the process of learning a foreign language. It needs special attention, but the time spent on it is, I feel, amply rewarded.

Operating in Finland as I do, I have had native Finnish speaker managerial level staff on in-company training courses come to me to discuss the problems they experience in English-language negotiations, and they sometimes do it in excellent English. Their complaints are manifold, but mostly seem to concentrate on one particular aspect: the difficulty of interpreting the pragmatic meanings of their negotiation partner's utterances. And vice versa: they seem to feel that their own pragmatic intentions may not be fully appreciated, that their carefully planned negotiation strategy falls flat in its actual implementation; that, in fact, they are powerless in the face of (especially) their native speaker counterpart.

Today I have focused on one of these pragmatic problems: the problem that the non-native speaker faces in simply attempting to initiate discussion of an issue and to avoid discussion of other issues; in other words, the problems he has when he feels he wants to contribute, from an equal platform, to the development of the structure and organization of the ongoing negotiation. The ability to do that is a very important skill indeed. The ability to take and share responsibility for the organization of the discourse means that you are not at the mercy of your interactant as non-native speakers often reportedly feel themselves to be.

What could we do?

Basically, I would suggest first of all that we should make our learners aware of the impact of certain situational parameters the power parameter, in particular in negotiations. We should encourage them to analyze the negotiation situation at hand be it a real one or a case study to be worked on in the English negotiation skills course. They should ask themselves the all-important question: What is my initial power status in this negotiation? Do I see myself as the more powerful one in business terms or does the other party have the upper hand?

If our learner perceives his own party to be the more powerful one for example, if he is the Buyer receiving a new Seller he should be helped to utilize this position through his language, yet to avoid domineering language, i.e., cornering his interactant by totally restricting the illocutionary force of the subsequent utterance; that would only serve to destroy the potential of the business

relationship. He should be taught to make agenda item statements: to initiate new topics using utterances which exhibit constructive control of the overall topic organization; utterances, with which he hands the floor to this interactant, utterances which would thus give him organizational power while leaving his interactant freedom to operate within the organizational limits he has set. By so doing, he would be offering the other negotiating party the chance to also contribute.

However, it is the less powerful party who is likely to perceive himself as having more problems than actually the powerful one. Therefore more attention should be paid to that angle. Quite specifically, I would suggest that the potential and principles of tactical deference should be pointed out to the one who perceives himself or is perceived--initially to have less power. We should point out that by adhering to his initial status-bound role albeit a seemingly less powerful one at times he will at least have a better chance to gain long-term success than through aggressively domineering behavior, which would, of course, render him short-term power. This attention to the requirements of a long-term relationship can be referred to with the term **deferential strategy**. As part of his deferential strategy we could help him to

1. identify the main points of organizational topic structure, i.e., how topics are dealt with in negotiations.
2. identify the cues produced by the more powerful speaker for taking up the offered floor, and helping him to act on those cues.
3. produce utterances which not only take up but also organize discourse so that he is able to share responsibility instead of being a subservient follower.

We should, in other words, encourage the less powerful party the Seller in the initial stages of the business relation, but perhaps the buyer at later stages? To use strategies which are in accordance with his role behavior; yet he should naturally be encouraged to use every opportunity to share responsibility for structuring the discourse in other words, to avoid submissive behavior and, instead, to produce utterances which simultaneously conform with the organizational expectations and show initiative in topic initiation, development or ending.

Can all that be done? I would hope so, and I think it can. Business executives, in particular, in my experience, have very shrewd ideas about the pragmatic power relations obtaining between the negotiating parties much shrewder, I must say than we linguists. We need, however, to know much more about the power pragmatics of negotiations. Here I have only been able to hint at some points. If

familiar and mundane aspects of negotiation discourse are subjected to scrutiny from the perspective of the pragmatics of power, I feel confident that new and exciting discoveries will be made.

There is evidence that business executives keenly feel their status-bound power in negotiations, as well as awareness of the goals that they are aiming at. These should be taken up and discussed, and the language implications pointed out. In doing this, we would, in fact, be relating language to the pragmatic reality of our learners. And surely this a good starting point for actually helping them to learn meaningful language in a meaningful context. What more could we want?

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NOTES

[1] A good illustration in itself is the emergence of the term 'gatekeeper encounters,' based on the idea of static power asymmetricity; also studies of immigrant > < native speaker interaction.

[2] In this paper the term "organization" is used advisedly, as, following Hoey (1991), we make a difference between discourse organization which is a patterned (and here) cyclical phenomenon not necessarily embracing every single textual detail and discourse structure which assumes a hierarchical, comprehensive rank scale type of description. Reference is quite specifically made to organization rather than structure.

[3] A subdivision of topics on the basis of their business relevance and business target orientation would, of course, be illuminating. This, however, falls outside the scope of the present paper.

[4] Note the transcription conventions used throughout the examples: / stands for a pause of c. 1 sec.; ... stands for a clear pause of less than 1 sec.; [ ] signifies overlapping speech. In addition, those parts of the example which are the special focus of analytical attention are highlighted, either in bold, underlined, or in italics.

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What Do You Include In a Narrative? A Comparison of the Written Narratives of Mexican and American Fourth and Ninth Graders

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ABSTRACT

The present study is a comparison of the types of information included in the English narratives written by monolingual American students, the English narratives written by bilingual Mexican students and the Spanish narratives written by monolingual Mexican students. The following three questions are addressed: (1) Do Mexican and American monolingual students include different information in their narratives? (2) Does grade influence the types of information students include in their narratives? and (3) Does students' bilingualism influence the types of information they include in their narratives, and if so, does this influence manifest itself in the form of transfer or of a developmental lag?

INTRODUCTION

The narrative provides an excellent genre for combining quantitative contrastive discourse analysis with the investigation of first and second language acquisition. It is a naturally bounded unit of discourse with a regular internal structure and is found in all cultures. Furthermore it is functionally quite important. Regardless of age, language or cultural background, people learn to interact with their environment by creating systematic representations of experience. One important

way by which they order experience is the construction of narratives. By sharing narratives people make their interpretation of events and ideas available to others, thus facilitating construction of a joint social reality.

The narrative has been extensively studied both developmentally as well as cross-culturally. Expanding on the work of Propp (1968), scholars have proffered a variety of different but overlapping models of narrative structure (Labov 1972; de Beaugrande and Colby 1979; van Dijk 1980; Stein and Trabasso 1982; Stein and Policastro 1984; Brewer 1985). The models of Labov, van Dijk and Stein and Trabasso have all had a wide currency. According to Labov a completely developed narrative consists of the following structural elements: **abstract**, which serves as a short summary of the story; **orientation**, which identifies the setting and characters in the story; **complicating action**, which details the sequence of events and action in the story; **evaluation**, which reveals the point of the story; **resolution**, which gives the end result of the actions or events; and **coda**, which signals completion of the story. Van Dijk's model includes the following hierarchically arranged elements: **setting**, **complication**, **resolution**, **evaluation**, and **coda** or **moral**. The minimal story in the model of Stein and Trabasso consists of a setting and an episode. The setting includes the introduction of the protagonist and one or more statements about the protagonist and the physical, social or temporal environment. The episode consists of a sequence of five different categories. The first category, the **initiating events** contains information marking a change in the protagonist's environment which evokes a desire to achieve some sort of goal. The second category, **internal response**, includes the goal and optionally an emotional response to the initiating event. The third category is the protagonist's **attempt** to achieve the goal. The fourth category, the **consequence**, indicates whether or not the goal was achieved and may give rise to a second episode. **Reaction**, the fifth category, may include the character's response to what has occurred, events which occur as a direct result of what has gone before, or a moral which indicates what can be learned from the character's action.

A number of researchers have used the models described above to examine narrative structure both cross-culturally and developmentally. Cross-cultural studies have delineated a series of differences with respect to the presence of specific story structure categories (e.g., Shimkin 1947; Jacobs 1959; Finnegan 1967; Labov 1972; Hunt 1976; Schöttelndreyer 1978), their order (e.g., Jacobs 1959; Labov 1972; Newman 1978; Toba 1978; Scollon and Scollon 1981), and the type and amount of information included in them, particularly with respect to physical description and character portrayal (e.g., Jacobs 1964; Finnegan 1967; Labov 1972; Tedlock 1972; and Tannen 1980).

Developmental studies (e.g., Botvin and Sutton-Smith 1977; Appleby 1978; King and Rentel 1981; Yussen 1982; and Haslett 1986) have found that structural complexity increases with age. Young children tell "skeletal" stories with little attention to character motivation, feelings or logical connectives. Older children include more elements related to setting, psychological states, and actions. Older children also more frequently include formal openings, closings and morals. There is also an indication that the order of narrative acquisition appears to parallel that of analogous linguistic structures, thus suggesting that both skills may rest on similar underlying cognitive structures.

Despite the fact that there are numerous cross-cultural and developmental studies of narratives, little has been published on child second language narratives.[1] The present study investigates this area. It is a comparison of the types of information included in the English narratives written by monolingual American students, the English narratives written by bilingual Mexican students and the Spanish narratives written by monolingual Mexican students. The following three questions are addressed: (1) Do Mexican and American monolingual students include different information in their narratives? (2) Does grade influence the types of information students include in their narratives? and (3) Does students' bilingualism influence the types of information they include in their narratives, and if so, does this influence manifest itself in the form of transfer or of a developmental lag?

METHODOLOGY

Subjects

The subjects for this study were divided into six groups by the grade in which they were enrolled (fourth versus ninth) and their linguistic status (English monolingual versus Spanish monolingual versus Spanish-English bilingual). The monolingual English speakers were Americans attending school in the Midwest of the United States. Both the monolingual Spanish speakers and the Spanish-English bilinguals were Mexicans attending school in central Mexico. All of the students were from upper middle and upper class backgrounds and were enrolled in very well equipped urban private schools whose programs encompassed preschool through high school. The school in which the bilinguals were enrolled featured a bilingual program using English as the sole medium of instruction in preschool and first grade, then switching to half-day Spanish and half-day English instruction for the rest of elementary school and continuing with English for selected subjects through high school.

Data Collection

The data to be discussed here consist of English and Spanish written narratives elicited with a silent animated film of the animal fable genre. Its protagonist was a naughty owlet who liked to watch television and did not pay attention to his lessons and consequently had a frightening encounter with a fox. The film was silent in order to avoid influencing the subjects' language. It lasted slightly over four minutes. To facilitate observation and retention of the event sequence and descriptive details, the film was shown to the subjects twice. They were then asked to write the story they had seen as if they were writing an animal fable to be read by a child who had not seen the film. The task was administered in a sixty minute class period.

Data Analysis

The corpus of data used for this study consisted of 60 stories: ten English stories written by monolingual English speakers, ten English stories written by Spanish-English bilinguals and ten Spanish stories written by monolingual Spanish speakers at each of two grades - fourth and ninth. These stories were analyzed within a framework that combined aspects of the models for the analysis of narrative structure proposed by Labov 1972, Van Dijk 1980, and Stein and Trabasso 1982. A composite framework was derived in order to differentiate clearly all the structural categories found in the corpus while excluding categories that did not appear. This approach enabled us to highlight most efficiently significant differences among the narratives.

Our composite model divided the stories in terms of the following categories: the orientation or setting, six episodes, and the resolution. The orientation introduced the protagonists, a father and mother owl and their soon to hatch offspring, and provided information about the physical, social and temporal setting. The six episodes identified involved, in order of occurrence: (1) the hatching of the owlets, (2) the disappearance of the naughty owlet and his parents' search for him, (3) the owlets' flying lesson taught by the parents, (4) a day at school, (5) playing cowboy, and (6) the naughty owlet's encounter with a fox. These six episodes were separated cinematographically into six quite distinct scenes. The resolution included the rescue of the naughty owlet from the fox by his brothers and optionally a moral and/or a coda describing what happened to the protagonist(s) subsequently. For purposes of analysis we then counted the number of propositions devoted to each category in each story, normalizing these numbers by dividing by the total number of propositions in the story.[2]

Furthermore, since developmental studies have indicated that young children tell simpler stories than older ones (e.g., they include fewer details about characters and settings of actions and often omit the logical connections among actions) five additional analytic categories were included to assess the effect of age on the narratives. These analytic categories were causal links, details of setting and actions, physical descriptions of characters, descriptions of characters' personal traits and descriptions of characters' emotional states. Again, in the case of causal links, details of setting and action, and descriptions of characters' emotional states, the number of occurrences of items belonging to each category for each story was normalized by dividing by the total number of propositions in the story. In the case of physical descriptions and descriptions of personality, the number of types rather than the number of tokens was used so no normalization was done for these categories.

In order to address the three questions posed in this paper, the scores obtained for each category of analysis were submitted to analyses of variance with two between-subjects independent variables: grade and linguistic status. The variable grade had two levels: fourth and ninth. The variable linguistic status had three levels defined by a combination of the language of the story and the author's status as a bilingual or monolingual. Thus the three levels of the variable linguistic status were: English story written by a monolingual English speaker, English story written by a Spanish-English bilingual, and Spanish story written by a monolingual Spanish speaker.

TABLE 1
Results of the two-way ANOVA

	linguistic status		grade		ling stat x gr	
	SS	F	SS	F	SS	F
orientation	.012	3.862*	.000	.021	.000	.644
owlets' hatching	.016	2.719	.011	3.782#	.000	1.849
naughty owlet's disappearance	.003	.638	.005	1.236	.018	2.364
flying lesson	.035	4.378*	.000	.125	.002	.788
school	.032	1.969	.001	.151	.012	.740
playing cowboy	.004	.642	.004	1.164	.000	.015
encounter with a fox	.030	9.222***	.000	.000	.001	.263
resolution	.005	1.780	.002	1.409	.020	6.671**
causal links between episodes	.000	.366	.002	3.824##	.000	.282
setting and action details	.009	4.134*	.000	.482	.007	3.723*
characters' emotional states	.016	7.053**	.017	14.857***	.008	3.371*
characters' personal traits	20.033	6.629**	45.067	29.824***	35.233	11.658***
characters' physical traits	.900	.116	22.817	5.881*	3.633	.468

\# $p < .057$
\## $p < .056$

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

TABLE 2
Means

	Main effects					Interaction					
	Linguistic status			grade		fourth grade			ninth grade		
	Eng bil	Sp mono	Eng mono	4th	9th	Eng bil	Sp mono	Eng mono	Eng bil	Sp mono	Eng mono
orientation	.11	.08	.07	.09	.09	.10	.09	.07	.11	.07	.08
owlets' hatching	.12	.08	.10	.11	.08	.13	.09	.11	.10	.06	.08
naughty owlet's disappearance	.12	.13	.12	.13	.12	.15	.12	.13	.09	.15	.11
flying lesson	.07	.09	.13	.10	.10	.06	.10	.13	.08	.09	.14
school	.23	.28	.27	.25	.26	.24	.25	.27	.22	.30	.27
playing cowboy	.11	.13	.12	.11	.13	.11	.12	.11	.12	.14	.13
encounter with a fox	.16	.11	.11	.13	.13	.15	.11	.12	.16	.10	.11
resolution	.08	.10	.08	.08	.09	.06	.12	.07	.11	.08	.09
causal links between episodes	.03	.03	.03	.02	.04	.02	.02	.03	.04	.03	.03
setting and action details	.05	.08	.07	.06	.07	.04	.09	.06	.06	.06	.08
characters' emotional states	.03	.07	.05	.04	.07	.01	.04	.05	.05	.10	.06
characters' personal traits*	1.20	2.45	1.25	.77	2.50	.90	.50	.90	1.50	4.40	1.60
characters' physical traits*	2.55	2.70	2.40	1.93	3.17	1.90	2.40	1.50	3.20	3.00	3.30

All variables except characters' personal traits and characters' physical traits were normalized by dividing them by the total number of propositions in each story. Since characters' personal trait and characters' physical traits are types rather than tokens, they were not so normalized.

RESULTS

The results of the analyses are shown in tables 1 and 2. With respect to the story structure categories, there were main effects for linguistic status for the following three variables: orientation [$F(2,54)=3.862$, $p<.05$, x(SpMon)=.08, x(EngMon)=.07, x(EngBil)=.11], flying lesson [$F(2,54)=4.378$, $p<.05$, x(SpMon)=.09, x(EngMon)=.13, x(EngBil)=.07], and encounter with a fox [$F(2,54)=9.222$, $p<.001$, x(SpMon)=.11, x(EngMon)=.11, x(EngBil)=.16].

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A post hoc Newman-Keuls analysis indicated that the main effect for orientation sentences was due to the fact that there were proportionally more orientation propositions in the bilinguals' English stories than in either the Spanish monolinguals' or the English monolinguals' stories. The main effect for the flying episode was due to the fact that the English monolinguals devoted a significantly greater part of their stories to the flying lesson episode than did the bilinguals to theirs. Finally, the main effect for the fox episode was the result of the fact that the bilinguals devoted a significantly greater portion of their stories to this episode than did either of the monolingual groups.

No main effect for grade occurred for any of the story structure categories. However, the main effect for grade approached significance for the hatching episode [$F(2,56)=3.782$, $p<.057$]. Fourth graders devoted a larger proportion of their stories to this episode than did ninth graders.

One significant interaction of linguistic status and grade occurred for the story structure categories. It involved the resolution category [$F(2,56)=6.671$, $p<.01$], and it resulted from the fact that while for monolinguals' and bilinguals' English stories the proportion of the story devoted to the resolution increased greatly across grades, this proportion decreased across grades for the Spanish monolinguals' stories. One-way ANOVAs indicated that this interaction resulted from the fact that while at fourth grade, Spanish monolinguals devoted a significantly greater portion of their stories to the resolution than did monolingual English speakers or bilinguals writing in English; there were no significant differences between the groups at grade nine.

Turning now to an analysis of the results for the other categories, we find that there were main effects for linguistic status for three of them: setting and action details [$F(2,54)=4.134$, $p<.05$, $x(SpMon)=.08$, $x(EngMon)=.07$, $x(EngBil)=.05$], descriptions of characters' emotional states [$F(2,54)=7.053$, $p<.01$, $x(SpMon)=.07$, $x(EngMon)=.05$, $x(EngBil)=.03$], and descriptions of characters' personality traits [$F(2,54)=6.629$, $p<.01$, $x(SpMon)=2.45$, $x(EngMon)=1.25$, $x(EngBil)=1.20$]. A post hoc Newman-Keuls analysis indicated that the main effect for setting and action details was due to the fact that the English stories of bilinguals contained a significantly lower proportion of detailed information than did either the stories written by monolingual English speakers or monolingual Spanish speakers. The main effect for emotional states resulted from the fact that bilinguals' English stories contained a significantly lower proportion of descriptions of emotional states than did the Spanish stories of monolinguals. Finally, the main effect for personality traits reflected the fact that the stories of Spanish monolinguals contained more details about the characters' personal traits than did the stories of English monolinguals.

The variable grade produced significant main effects for the three categories pertaining to the protagonists: emotional states [$F(1,54)=14.857$, $p<.001$, $x(4th)=.04$, $x(9th)=.07$], personal traits [$F(1,54)=29.824$, $p<.001$, $x(4th)=.77$, $x(9th)=2.50$], and physical traits [$F(1,54)=5.881$, $p<.05$, $x(4th)=1.93$, $x(9th)=3.17$].

There was also an almost significant effect for causal links [$F(1,54)=3.824$, $p<.056$, $x(4th)=.02$, $x(9th)=.04$]. In each case the effect was due to greater use of propositions of these types by ninth graders than by fourth graders.

Significant interactions of linguistic status by grade occurred for three variables: setting and action details [$F(2,54)=3.723$, $p<.05$], emotional states of characters [$F(2,54)=3.371$, $p<.05$], and personal traits of characters [$F(2,54)=11.658$, $p<.001$].

One-way ANOVAs were performed to examine these interactions. They revealed that the interaction for setting and action details resulted from the fact that at fourth grade Spanish monolinguals provided proportionately more detail than did either English monolinguals or Spanish-English bilinguals, while at ninth grade there was no difference among the groups. The interaction for emotional states reflected the fact that from fourth to ninth grade both Spanish monolinguals and Spanish-English bilinguals increased the extent to which they supplied information about emotional states, whereas the English monolinguals did not. Thus at fourth grade the bilinguals provided significantly less information than either group of monolinguals, and there was no significant difference between the two monolingual groups. However at ninth grade, the bilinguals increased their use to match that of the monolingual English speakers while the use of monolingual Spanish speakers also increased so that it was now significantly greater than that of both other groups. The interaction for personal traits was due to the fact that at fourth grade there was no significant difference among the groups while at ninth grade the monolingual Spanish speakers included significantly more information about personal traits than did members of the other two groups.

DISCUSSION

The first question posed in this paper was: Do Mexican and American monolingual students include different information in their narratives? With respect to the percentage of propositions devoted to each story structure category (the orientation, six episodes, and the resolution), the answer is "very little." The only significant difference in the proportions of their narratives that the Spanish monolinguals and English monolinguals devoted to the different parts of the story

involved the resolution at fourth grade, where Spanish monolinguals provided more information than did English monolinguals. However with respect to some of the other categories of analysis, the answer is "yes." The stories of the Spanish monolinguals contained more details about the characters' personal traits than did the stories of the English monolinguals. Furthermore across the Spanish monolingual subjects, there was more variability in the details given about the owls than there was across the English monolinguals. The English monolinguals described the owls as naughty, adorable, sweet, bad, mischievous, courageous, and rascals. The Spanish monolinguals described them as *distraido* (distracted), *violento* (violent), *travieso* (naughty), *inquieto* (restless), *perezoso* and *flojo* (lazy), *tonto* (dumb), *inocente* (innocent), *bueno* (good), *ordenado* (well-behaved), *chillón* (noisy), *latoso* (annoying), *un burro* (a donkey), *simpático* (likable), *estudioso* (studious), *indefenso* (defenseless) and *irresponsable* (irresponsible). Interestingly, in describing the fox several Spanish monolinguals used the word *astuto* (clever), but no English monolinguals used its equivalent, despite the fact that the image of the wily fox is part of American folklore as well.

Additionally, we find that both Spanish monolinguals and Spanish-English bilinguals increased their descriptions of emotional states from fourth to ninth grades while English monolinguals did not. At ninth grade the Spanish monolinguals gave significantly more information about emotional states than did English monolinguals.

Finally, at fourth grade but not at ninth grade, Spanish monolinguals provided significantly more setting and action details than did English monolinguals.

The earlier attention to setting and action details of Spanish monolinguals is hard to explain without a detailed knowledge of the curricula of the schools which the two monolingual groups attended. However, the fact that Spanish monolinguals provided more information about emotional states and personal traits than did English monolinguals probably reflects the cultural differences between Americans and Mexicans described by such authors as Octavio Paz and Alan Riding. Both Paz and Riding describe Mexicans as being more concerned with psychological attributes, emotions, and subjective reality than with pragmatic outcomes or objective reality. In *El laberinto de la soledad* (1959), Paz compares the Mexican and North American character, asserting:

> *Los norteamericanos quieren comprender; nosotros contemplar. Son activos, nosotros quietistas: disfrutamos de nuestras llagas como ellos de sus inventos (p. 22).*
>
> The North Americans want to understand; we to contemplate. They are activists, we quietists: we enjoy our torments as they their inventions.]

In **Vecinos Distantes** (1985), Riding offers a similar characterization of the Mexican:

> *Más bien interpreta el mundo de acuerdo con sus emociones.... El contraste más extraño de todos pudiera estar en el ritual y el desorden que parecen coexistir dentro del mexicano, aunque ello ilustra también el predominio de lo espiritual sobre lo material. La preocupación por el aspecto emocional y el espiritual de la vida es visible...*
> *(p. 15).*
>
> [Rather he interprets the world in accordance with his emotions.... The strangest contrast of all may be in the ritual and the disorder which appear to coexist in the Mexican, although that also illustrates the predominance of the spiritual over the material. The preoccupation with the emotional and spiritual aspect of life is visible...]

The second question posed in this paper was: Does grade influence the types of information students include in their narratives? With respect to the story structure categories, it would appear that the answer is "no" or "very little." There was no significant grade effect for any of the story structure categories and only one effect, that for the hatching episode, approached significance. Fourth graders tended to devote proportionately more of their story to the first episode than did ninth graders. This may simply reflect a tendency on the part of the fourth graders to have more difficulty handling time constraints on a task. They may well have devoted more time to a description of the first episode than ninth graders and later needed to hurry to complete the task.

While little of interest with respect to grade differences is apparent for the story structure categories, there were notable age differences with respect to the description of protagonists. Fourth graders provided less description of the emotional states of the protagonists, their personal traits and their physical traits than did ninth graders. Additionally, more variability was seen in the descriptors used by ninth graders than by fourth graders. For example, monolingual Spanish fourth graders used only three different adjectives to describe the owlets, *distraído* (distracted), *violento* (violent), and *travieso* (naughty) while monolingual Spanish ninth graders used seventeen. In addition, there was a tendency for fourth graders to provide fewer causal links between actions and states than did ninth graders (the significance level for this effect was $p < .056$).

The third and final question posed in this paper was: Does students' bilingualism influence the types of information they include in their narratives and if so, does this influence manifest itself in the form of transfer or a developmental

lag? The bilinguals devoted proportionally more of their stories to the orientation and the fox episode than did either of the monolingual groups. Perhaps these facts reflected limitations on the bilinguals' ability to handle the task due to incomplete mastery of English, their second language. At the fourth grade, the bilinguals' stories evinced serious grammatical errors and at ninth grade a few students still made a number of syntactic errors. Additionally bilinguals tended to write shorter stories than did monolinguals [$F(1,54)=3.114$, $p<.052$, $\bar{x}(EngBil)=42.6$, $\bar{x}(SpMono)=52.5$ and $\bar{x}(EngMono)=51.1$]. It may be the case that, hampered by limited linguistic skills, the bilinguals had difficulty allocating time to the writing of different sections of the story. In that case, they may have taken more time than desirable at the beginning of the task, that is, in writing the orientation. Later, with inadequate time to develop all sections of the story, they may have chosen the fox episode to elaborate as the most important since the events which take place in it are the culmination of what has gone before.

A developmental lag is more clearly indicated by the fact that bilinguals included significantly fewer setting and action details than did either Spanish or English monolinguals. Both developmental lag and accommodation to L_2 norms may be involved in the fact that bilinguals included significantly less information about emotional states than did Spanish monolinguals. We find that at fourth grade, English monolinguals also included significantly more information about emotional states than did bilinguals, but at ninth grade there was no significant difference between English monolinguals and bilinguals. However at ninth grade there was a significant difference between English and Spanish monolinguals where Spanish monolinguals provided more information. It would appear then that at fourth grade, bilinguals were showing a clear lag, but at ninth grade, they were equivalent to English monolinguals. There are two possible explanations for the fact that the bilingual ninth graders provided less information about emotional states than Spanish monolingual ninth graders. One possibility is accommodation to the English norm. The other is a continued developmental lag--that is, the bilingual students might have preferred to provide more information about emotional states than the English monolinguals, but might still have been unable to do so as a result of inadequate vocabulary or insufficient time.

CONCLUSION

This paper has addressed three issues: cultural differences in narratives, developmental differences in narratives, and the effect of bilingualism on narratives. The findings indicate that although general narrative structure did not differ for Mexicans and Americans, Mexicans provided more information about emotional states and personal traits. With respect to developmental differences, we have found, as have previous authors, that younger writers tended both to include fewer physical and action details than did older writers and to provide fewer causal links between actions and states. They also provided significantly less information about the emotional states of characters and about their physical and personal traits. We have also found evidence that bilinguals did indeed show a developmental lag in their second language with respect to inclusion of information about setting and action details and perhaps also in proportion of propositions allocated to different parts of the story. At fourth grade the bilinguals also appear to have displayed a developmental lag with respect to inclusion of information about emotional states. Finally, no evidence of L_1 transfer to L_2 was found, but there is some evidence that at ninth grade bilinguals followed L_2 rather than L_1 patterns in the L_2 with respect to inclusion of information about emotional states. The data here, however, are inconclusive. The relative lack of information might have been due to accommodation to the L_2, but it might also have been due to a developmental lag which prevented the students from expressing themselves fully despite their extensive familiarity with the second language.

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NOTES

[1] However, see for example McClure and Wentz 1976; McClure and Blomeyer 1984; and Edelsky 1986.

[2] Since the stories from the three linguistic groups were scored by three different raters, interrater reliability was examined. Each of the three raters analyzed the same six stories, one fourth and one ninth grade story from each linguistic group. These stories were drawn from the total corpus of sixty stories used for the study. For each pair of raters, both percentage agreement and Kappa (K) indices were calculated (K is a conservative measure which adjusts for agreements which are expected due to chance, see Wickens 1989 pp. 238-243). Agreement between raters 1 and 2 was 93% (K=.76), between raters 1 and 3 95% (K=.83), and between raters 2 and 3, 94% (K=.82).

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